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This dissertation is an endeavor in the field of energy modeling for the North
American natural gas market using a mixed complementarity formulation combined
with the stochastic programming.
The genesis of the stochastic equilibrium model presented in this dissertation is
the deterministic market equilibrium model developed in [Gabriel, Kiet and Zhuang,
2005]. Based on some improvements that we made to this model including proving
new existence and uniqueness results, we present a multistage stochastic equilib-
rium model with uncertain demand for the deregulated North American natural
gas market using the recourse method of the stochastic programming. The mar-
ket participants considered by the model are pipeline operators, producers, storage
operators, peak gas operators, marketers and consumers. Pipeline operators are de-
scribed with regulated tariffs but also involve “congestion pricing” as a mechanism
to allocate scarce pipeline capacity. Marketers are modeled as Nash-Cournot players
in sales to the residential and commercial sectors but price-takers in all other as-
pects. Consumers are represented by demand functions in the marketers’ problem.
Producers, storage operators and peak gas operators are price-takers consistent with
perfect competition. Also, two types of the natural gas markets are included: the
long-term and spot markets.
Market participants make both high-level planning decisions (first-stage deci-
sions) in the long-term market and daily operational decisions (recourse decisions) in
the spot market subject to their engineering, resource and political constraints, re-
source constraints as well as market constraints on both the demand and the supply
side, so as to simultaneously maximize their expected profits given others’ deci-
sions. The model is shown to be an instance of a mixed complementarity problem
(MiCP) under minor conditions. The MiCP formulation is derived from applying
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions of the optimization problems faced
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the Industry
Natural gas is one of the cleanest, safest and most reliable source of energy and
the natural gas industry is an important segment of the U.S. economy. With more
than a million employees in North America alone, the natural gas market continues
to grow due to ever-increasing opportunities from exploration and production, to
marketing and trading, to transportation and consumption [72].
The natural gas market in the United States has undergone significant changes
recently due to a variety of factors such as the restructuring of the gas and power
industries. Since the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978, the
industry has been in a transition from a regulated market to a deregulated one fos-
tering more market competition. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Order 636 issued in April 1992 ordered interstate natural gas pipelines to unbundle
gas sales, transportation and storage and converted interstate gas pipelines to open
access transporters. Since that time, these agents have undertaken sole roles in the
market, competed with each other noncooperatively and acted relatively indepen-
dently. After years of attempts at market deregulation, the industry has become
much more open to choice and competition and therefore more efficient. As a re-
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sult, the popularity of natural gas use has skyrocketed and its growth is expected
to continue [10].
Although the industry has been studied and deregulated for more than two
decades and plenty of lessons have been learned, the deregulated gas market has not
evolved to its final form [78]. Deregulation of the energy market is still an area re-
quiring more research and applications to make corresponding theories and practice
more mature. The method of mathematical programming is one of the most powerful
tools available to assist either private or public sector in decision making. Mathe-
matical programming is the study and use of optimization models, which minimize
or maximize a real function of real or integer variables, subject to constraints on the
variables. Generally, optimization models not only can generate operational level
planning for individual operators, they can also help policy makers capture a big
picture of the industry. In a particular restructuring natural gas market, market
participants such as gas producers, gas shippers, etc., would like to know the other
agent’s adaptive reaction to the new market, such as production planning or invest-
ment guidance, to remain competitive with the other agents. Policy makers, rather
than using price controls, are concerned with how to guide the market in a direction
to promote the desired level of competition, how to make certain the competition is
accessible to every participant or how to achieve in energy market efficiency.
More importantly, the natural gas industry is far from static and determinis-
tic. The inherent uncertainty typically stems from natural stochastic phenomena,
the international economic condition, energy-environmental requirements and the
functioning of the domestic economic system [55]. In addition, although the North
American interstate natural gas pipeline system is generally a safe mode to trans-
port the natural gas, the reliability of the system has been challenged since terrorist
attacks in 2001. Enhanced security thus provides the motivation for how to keep the
2
system running at minimal cost and greatest reliability given these uncertain events.
Consequently, the question of how to treat the uncertainties becomes meaningful and
necessary in the natural gas industry.
All of the answers to aforementioned questions can be found through specially
designed optimization models. Optimization techniques have been applied in the
industry to address many of these problems including linear programming (e.g.,
[2]), nonlinear programming (e.g., [13]), stochastic programming (e.g., [9, 39]) and
market equilibrium modeling (e.g., [7, 33, 35]). Following the work by Gabriel et
al. [35], this dissertation is a study of the deregulated natural gas market under
uncertainty using an extension to optimization models and the notion of market
equilibria.
1.2 Game Theory
When it comes to market equilibria, one will naturally consider game theory. Game
theory is a formal study of multi-person decision making. It has two high-level
branches: noncooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. A noncoopera-
tive game is a game in which each player pursues his or her own interests which are
partly conflicting with others in the absence of an ability to make binding agree-
ments. Cooperative games that we do not discuss in this dissertation are where such
agreements are enforced. Noncooperative game theory is concerned with the anal-
ysis of strategic choices while cooperative game theory focuses on the achievement
and management of a game coalition.
The fundamental unit of the analysis in game theory is the players’ strategic
interdependence. The subject has been extensively applied to many fields such as
economics, politics, finance and computer science whenever the strategic interaction
3
is present. The application of game theory in the economics can be dated back to
1944 when the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [76] was published. Game theory is especially indispensable for
the analysis of oligopolistic markets where there is more than one but still not many
agents [54]. Game theory is less useful to the market analysis when the market
operators under perfect competition or monopoly with no strategic interactions.
The natural gas industry is characterized by imperfect competition. For ex-
ample, the supply side of the European natural gas market has an oligopolistic
structure [7, 17, 44]. As for the North American gas industry after decades’ efforts
of deregulation, gas producers are considered price-takers due to the great number
of producers each owning only a small share of the production. However, imperfect
competition could exist in other aspects of the market, such as the local distribu-
tion companies (LDCs). According to Energy Information Administration website
[21], as of December 2004, apart from regions of District of Columbia, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, residential consumers in
other places are under imperfect competition of various levels from LDCs. Despite
the fact that LDCs could be monopolists in the consumption regions they serve,
game-theoretic models are used to describe these imperfectly competing agents in
this dissertation.
In terms of the symmetry of the roles of the players take in the game, we
can distinguish between at least two equilibrium solutions: the Nash equilibrium
solution [58] and Stackelberg equilibrium solution [71]. Formal mathematical defi-
nitions for these two solution concepts are available in [4]. In a nutshell, in a Nash
equilibrium, one player cannot improve his/her outcome by altering his/her decision
unilaterally assuming players act simultaneously and no single player dominates the
decision process. When one considers application of the Nash equilibrium in the
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production/distribution models, two types of models are abundantly studied in the
literature: the Nash-Cournot model of quantity competition and the Nash-Bertrand
model of price competition. A Nash-Cournot production model concerns a number
of firms, each setting its production level so as to maximize its own profit given
that the production of the other firms remains constant. As opposed to choice of
production, firms competing in a Nash-Bertrand model choose the prices for their
single output based on maximizing their profit in the Nash manner. A Stackelberg
equilibrium is one that involves a hierarchy in the decision making. In such a game,
it is assumed that one player, the leader, declares his strategy first and enforces
it on the other players, referred to as followers. The OPEC oil-cartel versus the
fringe of non-member producers is a good example of such a game in the energy
industry. Likewise, Stackelberg equilibrium could also lead to the concepts of the
Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-Bertrand models. Compared with the Nash
equilibrium concept, the application of the Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-
Bertrand models are limited. Studies that report on the modeling, solution proper-
ties and algorithms include [14, 29, 69, 73].
Further, in terms of the importance of the order in which decisions are made,
a game could be static or dynamic. In spite of the fact that many criteria can be
used to distinguish static and dynamic games, what they have in common is the role
that time plays in the game. In this dissertation, a game is static if the players act
only once and independently of each other (e.g., [56]); a game is considered dynamic
when the decision making involves multiple time periods. In this sense, a Nash game
can be static (e.g., [66]) or dynamic (e.g., [44, 56]).
The central concept in dynamic games is the information structure which de-
scribes type and amount of information available to players. Usually three types
of structure may be distinguished: the closed-loop, feedback, and open-loop in-
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formation structures. In the first case, the players’ decisions are based on all the
available information about the past state and the previous moves made by the
other players; in the second case, the players use a Markovian strategy based on the
observation of the current state; in the last case, the only information available for
the players is related to the stage. The equilibrium solutions calculated by using
the three information structure are referred to as closed-loop, feedback and open-
loop solutions, respectively. The feedback and open-loop solutions are contained
within the set of closed-loop solutions. Due to the computational complexity, the
applications of the closed-loop and feedback solutions to large-scale models are not
available in the literature of mathematical programming. Unfortunately, open-loop
equilibria are generally not subgame-perfect [68]. This is often viewed as a major
drawback of this type of equilibrium. However, because of its simplicity, open-loop
strategies are often used as a benchmark for analysis of other strategic dynamic
equilibria. Applications of the open-loop solution in the energy industry include
[44, 45, 66]. Introduced by Haurie, Zaccour and Smeers [45], S-adapted open-loop
structure, where S stands for samples is a variation of open-loop structure designated
for the stochastic dynamic games. In this case, the players make decisions based
on their observation of the the stage and the random outcomes on the scenario tree
(defined in Section 4.2). It lies halfway between the completely adaptive closed-loop
and the completely nonadaptive open-loop.
The models presented in this dissertation treat market participants as game
players in a multistage thus dynamic, noncooperative game. Some players are price
takers as in a perfect competition environment; others compete in an open-loop,
Nash-Cournot fashion. All players have symmetric roles and make decisions si-
multaneously. The overall equilibrium is computed as a (S-adapted, if stochastic)
open-loop Nash equilibrium via a variational inequality formulation to be intro-
duced.
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1.3 NCP/VI and Stochastic Programming
The fields of mathematical programming and economic theory are closely interwo-
ven. One of the spotlights in the academic and professional communities is how
to compute economic and game theoretic equilibria by mathematical programming.
Three major methods contributing to the computation of economic equilibria have
emerged: fixed point theory (or homotopy-based) methods, nonlinear optimiza-
tion, and nonlinear complementary/variational inequality problem (NCP/VI) the-
ory. Neither the fixed point theory nor the nonlinear optimization provides sat-
isfactory generality or computational efficiency for solving large-scale equilibrium
problems. However, NCP/VI has been shown, both theoretically and practically, to
be a promising candidate for computing large-scale equilibrium problems [42].
As a result of almost four decades of research, the subject of NCP/VI has be-
come a well-established and fruitful discipline within mathematical programming.
NCP/VI theory is now an important mathematical method used by many researchers
who study equilibrium of economic systems. It has been verified both theoretically
and with applications that the NCP/VI format has significant advantages in com-
puting an economic equilibrium compared to general optimization methods [27, 42].
It is well known that the problem of a Nash Equilibrium can be formulated as a vari-
ational inequality. While a Stackelberg game is not known to be a compementarity
problem, but a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
Stochastic programming is a framework for modeling optimization problems
that involve uncertainty. “Stochastic is opposed to deterministic and means that
some data are random, whereas programming refers to the fact that various parts
of the problem can be modeled as linear or nonlinear mathematical programs” [6].
From the perspective of mathematical programming, a decision of deterministic
considerations is different from one for an uncertain environment. Using a decision
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based on deterministic conditions in an uncertain situation will possibly lead to in-
valid results. Due to the fact that real world problems almost invariably include
some unknown parameters, stochastic programming has been widely applied in a va-
riety of areas including agriculture, energy, finance, scheduling, transportation, etc.
It has also been extensively used in energy models over the years. The regulated
electricity market is the most studied area which uses stochastic programming. In
contrast to the large volume of models relating to electricity investments and oper-
ations, the application of stochastic optimization equilibrium models to the oil and
gas markets is more limited [78].
The counterpart of a market equilibrium model in stochastic programming is
a stochastic equilibrium model. Apart from the advantages an equilibrium model
has, a stochastic equilibrium model will use probability distributions to consider
the range of possible contingencies and then provide a set of strategies dealing with
different situations for decision makers rather than a single decision for the simplified
reality.
Naturally, a new area has evolved — how to solve a stochastic equilibrium
problem by NCP/VI, which has not yet been well studied. Despite its significance,
few works have been published on it so far. Haurie et al. [44] proposed a stochastic
dynamic Nash-Cournot model of imperfect competition for studying the contracts
in the European gas market, and used variational inequalities as the computational
technique. Using the same computational technique, De Wolf and Smeers [14] con-
sidered a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium model with a numerical illustration
of the European gas market. However, such an application in the North American
natural gas market, which distinguishes itself from the European market both in
regulatory and operational aspects, has not appeared. Moreover, all the completed
works of stochastic NCP/VI of the natural gas market have not taken into account
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much detail of agents beyond demand and supply sides. This dissertation estab-
lishes a detailed stochastic NCP/VI model aiming at filling the blank of such an
application to the North American natural gas market. Besides its academic inno-
vation, such study would shed light on the evolution of the restructuring natural
gas market.
1.4 Energy Modeling Activities
In general, there are two foci of natural gas optimization models: optimization of gas
operations for a particular entity (gas marketer, utility, etc.) and computation of
market equilibrium prices, flows and quantities. The latter is often accomplished by
solving an appropriate optimization problem or sequence of optimization problems.
They are referred to as operation and market (equilibrium) models, respectively.
Since the model to be developed is a market equilibrium model, we concentrate
below on the market-centric gas models but mention that [2, 13, 39] are samples of
approaches for operation models.
Compared with operation models that focus on operational aspects, market
equilibrium models are of particular importance to policy makers in that such mod-
els give insights concerning the trading prices and quantities of natural gas while
generating more comprehensive and higher level information relevant to the entire
market. An equilibrium model also facilitates the forecast of the changes in the
level of social welfare that would be caused by a change in market conditions such
as an improvement in technology or a new government tax policy. Since the oil
embargo of the early 1970s, the U.S. energy community has done extensive math-
ematical modeling to analyze various energy issues and develop a national energy
policy. Among these efforts, market equilibrium models have played an important
role. Some examples of large-scale equilibrium models for the U.S. energy industry
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are the Project Independence Evaluation System (PIES) in the 1970s [47]; the In-
termediate Future Forecasting System (IFFS) around 1980 [57]; and the National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS) in the 1990s [33].
We concentrate on reviewing works for the North American and the European
natural gas market, both of which have received considerable attention over the
years. There have been a variety of modeling efforts for the European natural gas
market since 1970s. One of the early market models was the peak-load pricing
and investment model for the domestic gas market in Great Britain [74]. It was
based on maximizing the social welfare function. Later, Haurie et al. [44] built
a stochastic dynamic Nash-Cournot model for considering long-term gas contracts
and applied their model to the European gas market. The model only considered
oligopolistic producers and end-users represented by inverse demand functions. The
market equilibrium was achieved by simultaneous choice of production by producers
so as to maximize their expected profits. They showed that their problem was
an instance of an NCP/VI. De Wolf and Smeers [14] considered a similar Nash-
Cournot problem for the European gas market from the stochastic and Stackelberg
aspect. Stackelberg problems can be described as special cases of mathematical
programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [26], which generalizes NCP/VIs.
Lastly, GASTALE [7, 17] is a recent work modeling the European gas market given
a successive oligopoly setting of two layers of imperfectly competitive suppliers.
Producers, consumers, storage operators and a transmission system operator are
considered in an equilibrium context described by a complementarity problem.
In North America, O’Neill et al. in [61] presented a network optimization
model depicting the interstate pipeline system using a linearization scheme to handle
the nonlinear relationships between gas flows and pressure in pipelines, compressors,
or valves. GRIDNET [8] is an example of a generalized network optimization model
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for gas that contains very detailed data on pipelines and gas transactions from the
gas marketing company’s perspective. The Natural Gas Transmission and Distribu-
tion Module (NGTDM) and Oil and Gas Supply Module (OGSM) are two modules
related to the natural gas market in NEMS [18, 19]. NGTDM derives natural gas
production and end-user prices and flow patterns for movements of the natural gas
through the regional interstate network. OGSM produces forecast of drilling in-
vestments for exploration and production for domestic crude oil and natural gas
using the wellhead natural gas prices supplied by NGTDM and petroleum product
prices developed by the Petroleum Market Model (PMN), a component of NEMS.
NGTDM and OGSM jointly project the regional production and wellhead prices for
the natural gas market [18, 19]. Note that OGSM or NGTDM alone is not a natural
gas market model per se.
The Gas Systems Analysis Model (GSAM) is a large-scale modular model of
the North American natural gas market developed at ICF consulting. The model is
based on the notion of maximizing the social welfare function resulting in a large-
scale nonlinear program. A successive linear programming strategy is employed to
solve the overall nonlinear problem. GSAM has been used in a variety of industry
and regulatory studies. Perhaps the most unique feature of GSAM as compared to
other market equilibrium models is its database of over 17,000 natural gas production
reservoirs each with approximately 200 variables. This makes the model free from
assumptions regarding the functional forms for the supply curves. GSAM’s time
horizon spans 23 years (1998-2020) with each year segmented into four gas seasons
and four demand sectors. The supply and demand sides are tied together by a
gas network composed of 46 nodes and 79 transportation links. A storage reservoir
database of over 500 storage sites as well as regional peak-shaving options (LNG,
propane/air) complements the network [34].
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Gabriel et al. [35] presented and analyzed a market equilibrium model that
can be applied to a natural gas marketplace resulted from the restructuring of the
industry and showed that the equilibrium model is an instance of a mixed nonlin-
ear complementarity problem (NCP). As far as is known,it is the first time in the
literature that NCP/VI formulations were used to model a natural gas market with
such a market structure. Compared with GSAM, this model considered oligopolistic
marketers competing in the Nash-Cournot manner, which is not usually seen in the
models developed for the North American natural gas market. Based on the U.S.
national pipeline grids, this model was used in [36, 37] to measure the market power
under different economic scenarios in terms of the changes in the equilibrium prices
and quantities. A detailed description for this model is presented in Chapter 3.
None of the preceding models for the North American natural gas market
accounted for the uncertain factors when they were initially developed although
they could be used for the analysis of issues involving uncertainty using techniques
such as sensitivity analysis. However, Wallace showed in [77] that sensitivity analysis
does not deliver good candidate solutions for an optimization problem with uncertain
parameters. In order to capture the uncertainty in the real market, this dissertation
provides a stochastic market model based on the market framework proposed by [35].
Unlike previous models, we distinguish two types of natural gas markets in this new
model: the long-term market and the spot market, which is not generally considered
as part of a natural gas market model. Market participants make deterministic
long-term planning decision in the long-term market and respond to the market
uncertainty in the spot market. The new model will be presented in Chapter 4.
As another direction of [35], Kiet proposed a market equilibrium model using
micro-level data to develop the demand functions, supply functions or other elements
in the gas market that do not have a closed form [50].
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1.5 Contributions and Organization of Dissertation
The main contributions of this dissertation include:
• To our knowledge, it is the first detailed stochastic equilibrium model appli-
cable to the deregulated natural gas market in North America formulated as
an NCP/VI;
• It mathematically establishes new and improved existence and uniqueness re-
sults of the model presented in [35], which is the genesis of this dissertation;
• It explores the theoretical and computational aspects of the stochastic NCP/VI,
which have been relatively unstudied to date;
• It investigates specific approaches for performing stochastic equilibrium pro-
gramming [45] in the natural gas industry.
It is important to note that this dissertation does not directly model the non-
convexities1 in the natural gas market. This is done on purpose since the convexity
assumptions facilitate to establish useful properties for the model and alleviate the
computational burdens. Such modeling assumptions have also been used by many
others described in this section, although it is known that simplification of the non-
convexities will result in a situation of market imbalance [62]. Moreover, a NCP/VI
model combined with integer variables represents a rather unstudied and challeng-
ing area and have not appeared extensively in the literature. However, there has
been some work in integer-constrained LCPs (linear complementarity problems), for
example, [12, 38, 64].
1Typical examples of nonconvexities include the nonlinear relationship between flows through
an arc and the pressures at the terminal nodes of the arc [61], the discrete decisions on whether
to invest in a new project or not and the fixed cost in the cost functions.
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The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the industry background emphasizing the outcomes of the industry deregulation. A
simplified market network is proposed for the models presented in the later chapters.
This model framework gives very comprehensive considerations to the components
of the gas supply chain. Traditionally, the focus of the market equilibrium models
is restricted to the interaction between producers and consumers located at the
two ends of the supply chain. However, this dissertation incorporates intermediate
agents located in the middle of the supply chain, i.e., regulated pipeline operators,
storage operators and peak gas operators as independent players maximizing their
expected profits, respectively.
Chapter 3 describes a deterministic equilibrium model denoted D-NGEM,
which appeared in [35], and establishes new existence and uniqueness results for the
model. Based on the mixed complementarity formulation derived from the KKT
and market-clearing conditions, we present new conditions regarding existence and
uniqueness results for the model. These conditions are more easily verified com-
pared with those presented in [35] in that the new conditions are requirements on
the inputs (i.e., the (marginal) cost functions and the (marginal) revenue functions
for the marketers) of the model rather than the outputs as previously.
Chapter 4 presents a stochastic equilibrium model denoted S-NGEM, which
is an extension of the deterministic model discussed in the previous chapter. This
stochastic equilibrium model takes advantage of the recourse method provided by
stochastic programming and sets up two types of decision variables faced by all
players, i.e., the long-term market and spot market decisions, corresponding to the
first-stage and recourse variables in the recourse method, respectively. The long-
term market decisions are concerned with high level long-term planning. The spot
market decisions are the responses to the market uncertainty in order to compensate
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for any adverse effects from the first-stage decisions. The overall objective is to
maximize the expected profits earned based on both types of decisions. This model
is shown to be an instance of an NCP/VI under minor assumptions. It is interesting
to note that we establish a relationship between the prices for the long-term and spot
markets. That is, it is generally true (except the storage gas market) that when the
production activities (i.e., pipeline flows, wellhead production rates and peak gas
production rates) are positive for the long-term market and for all possible random
outcomes in the spot market, the corresponding price (the pipeline congestion fee,
the wellhead price and the peak gas price) for the long-term market is equal to the
expected spot market price.
Using GAMS/PATH [28], we provide the numerical results for a sample net-
work with three seasons, eleven players and 64 demand scenarios in Chapter 5.
Lastly, we conclude this dissertation in Chapter 6 with a summary and some rec-
ommendations for the future work.
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Chapter 2
A Simplified Market Structure
In this chapter, we discuss a simplified market structure which is adopted by two
equilibrium models for the North American natural gas market, that is, models
D-NGEM and S-NGEM presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively. This
framework takes into account several important market characteristics including
demand seasonality, the emergence of new market participants and a variety of
market contracts as a result of the market deregulation.
2.1 Demand Seasonality
Natural gas demand is highly seasonal with higher demand during the winter par-
tially due to the fact it is used for heat in residential and commercial settings. We
examine this inherent property of the market using data published by the U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration (EIA). Figure 2.1 compares the U.S. monthly gas
consumption in 2003 by sector. As shown in the figure, the consumption in the resi-
dential and commercial sectors is significantly higher in the winter than the summer.
The industrial consumption is relatively constant throughout the year. On the con-
trary, electric power sector exhibits the strongest demand in the summer. Summing
over four sectors, the seasonality of the consumption for the natural gas is apparent.
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Such a trend can be easily found in other years as well.
Source: EIA
Figure 2.1: U.S. 2003 Monthly Natural Gas Consumption by Sector
Given the demand seasonality, we specify three seasons for a year, indexed by
s to approximate this variability; dayss is the number of days in season s. The year
is divided as follows:
• s=1, low demand season, April-October, days1 = 214;
• s=2, high demand season, November - March excluding January, days2 = 120;
• s=3, peak demand season, January, days3 = 31.
Using the seasons defined above, we average the monthly consumption within
the three seasons in Figure 2.1. For example, the average monthly consumption in
season 1 is the sum of monthly consumption from April to October divided by 7,
the number of months in season 1. The result of the averaging is shown in Figure
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2.2, which reduces the demand levels to three thus alleviating the modeling and
computational complexity.
Figure 2.2: Seasonally Averaged U.S. 2003 Monthly Consumption by Sector
2.2 Market Participants
The structure of the natural gas industry has changed dramatically over the past two
and a half decades since the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) passed by Congress
in 1978. This act ended federal control of the wellhead price of gas as of Jan-
uary 1, 1985. Later in the mid 1980’s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) Orders 436 and 500 - the latter often referred to as the Open Access Order
- encouraged pipelines to open access, non-discriminatory transportation services so
end-users could contract directly with producers for gas supply. The Natural Gas
Wellhead Decontrol Act (NGWDA) in 1989 fully lifted all controls on the wellhead
prices. FERC Order 636 in 1992 required interstate pipelines to unbundle gas sales,
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transportation and storage to ensure that transportation was equally available to
all [10].
In the restructurd market, producers, processing companies, pipeline compa-
nies, storage operators, marketers, local distribution companies (LDC) and liquified
natural gas (LNG) suppliers make up the main parts of the natural gas industry.
The existence of natural gas marketers who can serve as a middle-man between the
buyer and the seller of gas to facilitate the movement of gas, is one of the major
differences in the current structure of the market as compared to previously.
For the modeling purpose, following Gabriel et al. [35], the natural gas market
in North America is simplified to the following agents:
• Consumers — indexed by k ∈ K, that exhibit demand for the natural
gas. There is the demand by sector: residential, commercial, industrial, and
electrical power, indexed by k = 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. There are no
optimization problems for the consumers. In the model D-NGEM, they are
instead represented by demand functions. However, in the model S-NGEM,
only residential and commercial sectors are represented by demand functions.
Industrial and electric power sectors have predetermined demand in different
time periods.
• Pipeline operators — indexed by a ∈ A, that own the physical pipelines
designed to move the gas from the wellhead in the production area to the
city-gate in the consumption area via both long and short haul. The trans-
portation rates of the pipeline use are regulated by FERC in America. There-
fore, pipeline operators are assumed to be price-takers in the transportation
market.
• Production operators — indexed by p ∈ P , also referred to as producers, that
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own the gas that is produced at a well and concern themselves with exploration
and production activities. There are over 8,000 producers of natural gas in
the United States [59]. Therefore, producers in our models are assumed price-
takers given the small percentage of reserves that typically each producer holds
in North America.
• Storage operators — indexed by r ∈ R, that inject natural gas into storage
sites (depleted reservoirs, salt caverns, etc.) in the off-season (season 1) and
extract gas to consumption market when the demand is high (seasons 2 and
3), typically the winter months. As of August 2004, there are about 120
natural gas storage operators in the United States, with control over 400 active
underground storage facilities [25]. The storage facilities are regulated by the
FERC or the state depending on its service scope. For this reason, storage
operators are price-takers in the two models.
• Peak gas operators — indexed by p ∈ P , that sell peak gas (LNG or propane-
air mixtures, collectively refereed to as “peak gas”) to marketers during the
peak season (season 3) when the peak demands are not adequately supplied
by the pipeline or storage gas. Despite the forecast of the rapid growth of the
LNG imports in the next few years in Annual Energy Outlook 2004 by EIA
[20], the peak gas only serves a small amount of demand in the current North
American market. According to the data available on EIA website, the LNG
withdrawal in 2003 was 67,543 million cubit feet (MMcf). Compared with the
total consumption for the natural gas of 22 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), the LNG
supply was rather insignificant. Thus the peak gas operators are modeled as
price-takers in our models.
• Marketers/shippers — indexed by m ∈M , re-sellers of the gas that contract
with pipeline companies, production operators, storage operators, and peak
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gas operators to procure the natural gas and sell it to end users in the residen-
tial, commercial, industrial, and electrical sectors. As modeled, the marketers
are the only access of gas to end-users and thus are more likely to possess
market power. Therefore, we consider oligopolistic marketers in the models.
In the model D-NGEM, marketers are Nash-Cournot players for all the four
demand sectors. While in the model S-NGEM, marketer are Nash-Cournot
players in the residential and commercial sectors but price-takers in the in-
dustrial and electric power sectors. This change is under the consideration
that large buyers in the industrial and electric power sectors are able to get
discounts on large orders from marketers1. Large buyers could even have the
market power to set the prices. Such a market is referred to as an oligopsony.
We note that in our nomenclature, we do not distinguish between marketers
and shippers. In fact, marketers procure the natural gas from some source (produc-
ers, storage operators, etc.) and supply it to the end users in the four consumption
sectors. Shippers can have a similar role to marketers except that they themselves
may also be end users such as a local distribution company supplying natural gas
to residential end users. Structurally, they have similar optimization problems;
hereafter “marketer” will refer to either a marketer or a shipper unless specified
otherwise.
Storage gas and peak gas will be used to handle peak demands not adequately
supplied by the pipeline gas during the peak season. In general, peak gas or storage
gas is expensive.
1Based on the data available at EIA, the average consumption per consumer in the residential
sector was 394, 369, 377 and 362 thousand cubic fee (Mcf) for years 2000 - 2003, respectively.
In the commercial sector, the average consumption per custom was 635, 605, 621 and 624 Mcf,
respectively. The average consumption per industrial consumer was 36,968, 33,840, 36,458 and
34,747 Mcf, respectively.
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For modeling purposes, the whole market is divided into several submarkets:
pipeline, production, storage, peak gas and marketer submarkets. Each agent de-
scribed above operates in the submarket to which it belongs. It is reasonable to
assume that agents in the same submarket have the same competition pattern. For
example, if the marketer submarket is oligopolistic, all the marketers belonging to it
compete with each other in a Cournot-Nash or Bertrand manner. A noncooperative
game theory model may be appropriate for this case.
2.3 Natural Gas Network
In terms of the natural gas network structure, there are a set of regions for pro-
duction or consumption denoted as N . We also denote the sets for production
and consumption regions as PN and CN , respectively, satisfying two conditions
PN ∪ CN = N and PN ∩ CN = ∅. In the case that a region physically exhibits
both production and consumption behaviors, we can conceptually divide it into two
regions, production and consumption, in the network. One possible benchmark for
region division is the census regions. Examples include Oil and Gas Supply Module
(OGSM) [18] and Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Model (NGTDM) [19],
both of which are components of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).
The work by Gabriel et al in [37] adapts the same region map as NGTDM.
• Production Regions
Multiple producers are allowed per production region where one producer has
a unique production location. The set of producers located at a production
region n ∈ PN is denoted by Cn. Therefore, {· · · , Cn, · · · } forms a partition
of the set C. The mathematical operator nc(c) calculates the location of
producer c. In terms of the network structure, each production region is
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linked to the consumption regions (either to marketers or to storage operators)
corresponding to physical interstate pipelines or pipeline aggregates either of
which can accrue losses.
• Consumption Regions
The consumption regions encompass the groups of consumers, storage opera-
tors, peak gas operators and marketers. Multiple participants are allowed for
each group while every participant has one unique location. The sets Rn, P n
and Mn are groups of storage operators, peak gas operators and marketers,
respectively, located at consumption region n ∈ CN . Thus, {· · · , Rn, · · · },
{· · · , P n, · · · } and {· · · ,Mn, · · · } are partitions of sets R, P and M , respec-
tively.
Connecting each of these production and consumption regions is a set of di-
rected pipeline arcs A. A specific arc a ∈ A represents an abstraction of a pipeline,
pipeline segment, or pipelines measuring the flow between these production and
consumption regions. A(n) is the set of arcs connected to the node n ∈ N . If n is
a consumption region, then A(n) is also the set of arcs available to marketers and
storage operators located at node n. Such a simplification of the network represents
a transportation network per se. A more straightforward alternative is a tranship-
ment network. Section 3.1.1 explains why a transportation network is chosen for
the pipeline network.
Figure 2.3 is an illustration for a simplified network with interaction between
market participants during three seasons. Geographically, there are four regions in
the sample network, N = {P1, P2, C1, C2} as shown in Figure 2.3 (a). The two
shaded ones on the top represent two production nodes PN = {P1, P2}, each of
which can have one or more producers as shown in Figure 2.3 (b). On the bottom,
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there are two consumption regions CN = {C1, C2}, where marketers, storage op-
erators, peak gas operators and consumers are co-located, as shown in Figure 2.3
(b). The production and consumption regions are connected by a set of directed
arcs A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} as shown in Figure 2.3 (a). The sets of arcs available to
regions P1, P2, C1 and C2 are, respectively, A(P1) = {a1, a2}, A(P2) = {a3, a4},
A(C1) = {a1, a3} and A(C1) = {a2, a4}.
The nodes in Figure 2.3 (b) symbolize a group of operators; the number of
operators located on each node could be one or more than one. The set of producers
located at regions P1 and P2 are denoted by CP1 and CP2, respectively. Marketers
and storage operators located at the same consumption regions share the same set of
arcs, e.g., for consumption region C1, the set of available arcs is A(C1) = {a1, a3}.
Marketers (m ∈ MC1 or m ∈ MC2) procure the gas from producers in all three
seasons. Storage operators (r ∈ RC1 or r ∈ RC2) obtain the gas from producers in
season 1 and inject it into the storage for later use. Within the consumption regions,
local marketers are the only access to gas for consumers; storage operators supply
the gas to the local marketers in seasons 2 and 3; peak gas operators (p ∈ PC1 or
p ∈ PC1) supply gas to marketers in the peak demand season, season 3. Note that
these assumptions are for modeling purposes but are reasonable approximations of
reality.
2.4 Contracts and Market
In this section, we discuss how the models in this dissertation considers the uncer-
tainty inherent in the gas market and the means of contracting designed to protect
market participants against risk.
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It is well known that the natural gas industry is far from static and determin-
istic in that the fluctuation of the demand and prices over time are hard to predict.
The factors that influence the demand for natural gas include weather changes, stor-
age levels, market information as well as the economy, in general all of which are
hard to predict. Figure 2.4 from EIA [23] shows this market uncertainty in terms of
an index “price volatility”, measured by the day-to-day percentage difference in the
price of the gas. The figure examines daily spot market prices and the corresponding
price volatility index at the Henry Hub market center in Louisiana from January
1995 through October 2003. It is noticeable that the spot market prices are subject
to seasonal changes. The peak demand in the winter season is usually accompanied
by high and often volatile prices because the natural gas supply has less flexibility
to respond to the surging demand caused by the cold winter months.
Figure 2.4: Natural Gas Spot Market Prices and Volatility (1995-2003)
Consequently, finding an appropriate trade-off between gas price and supply
assurance becomes a crucial question to the industry participants since gas suppliers
do not want to commit to a low price over a long period of time while buyers do not
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want to commit to a high price over an extended period of time. Because of this
relationship there are two types of gas markets that we concentrate on:
• Spot Market
As a result of deregulation, the spot market is “a market in which natural
gas is bought and sold for immediate or very near-term delivery, usually for
a period of 30 days or less” [24]. The spot market contracts are used to
take advantage of market imbalance conditions and maintain market flexibil-
ity. Price competition is a dominant characteristic of the spot market. Spot
market prices reveal the short-term supply and demand characteristics of the
market. The Henry Hub in southern Louisiana, where more than 180 cus-
tomers regularly conduct business through 14 interconnecting pipeline system
and high-deliverability salt storage cavern facility according to EIA [22], is the
most active and publicized spot market in North America.
• Long-Term Market
The long-term market consists of buying and selling natural gas under contract
for at least one month in advance. Prices of the long-term market are negoti-
ated between the buyer and seller and often an index is used as a benchmark.
Because the long term market is less volatile than the spot market, assurance
of supply is the major advantage of this market. The long-term contracts are
the traditional ones in the natural gas market. Nevertheless, the importance
of these contracts has been lessened as a result of deregulation of the industry.
In addition, based on a consumer’s demand profile, there are three main types
of physical trading contracts: swing contracts, baseload contracts and firm contracts.
Swing (or “Interruptible”) contracts are usually short-term contracts. Under
this contract, both the buyer and seller agree that neither party is obligated to deliver
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or receive the exact volume specified. Either party can terminate the contract with
short or no notice. The buyer will generally pay only commodity charges (a unit
charge of gas delivered to the buyers) when the gas is delivered. A swing contract
has the lowest priority of all contracts.
Best-efforts contracts are similar to swing contracts. Neither the buyer nor
seller is obligated to deliver or receive the exact volume specified. Interruption of
service is allowable on short or no notice. However, it is agreed that both parties
will attempt to fulfill the contract on a “best-efforts” basis.
Firm contracts provide service on a guaranteed basis. Unlike swing and best-
effots contracts, there is legal recourse available to either party if the other party
fails to fulfill its obligation under the agreement. The buyer will generally pay
a reservation charge2 and a commodity charge. A firm contract has the highest
priority among all other contracts.
Based on the above analysis, the market structure depicted in Figure 2.3(b)
can be understood as an abstract of the long-term market with firm contracts. In
this dissertation, we assume a similar structure for the spot market: marketers buy
gas from producers in all three seasons; storage operators inject the gas in the first
season and then extract the gas to marketers in seasons 2 and 3; peak gas operators
supply gas to marketers in the peak demand season. An important aspect of the
spot market modeled in the dissertation is that all activities taken place in the spot
market are merely committed to a season. Participants have the flexibility to make
adjustment to their activity levels every season.
This dissertation develops an equilibrium model for an abstraction of the nat-
ural gas market which captures the market structure and contracts features involved
2In this dissertation, reservation charge is modeled as a charge per unit of capacity reserved on
a pipeline by firm contracts.
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in both the spot market and long-term markets. Thus, the results generated by the
model can serve as references for policy makers or other market participants.
Chapter 3 of the dissertation incorporates a deterministic market equilibrium
model, denoted D-NGEM, designed to simulate the long-term natural gas mar-
ket. The span of the time period considered as “long-term” in this context is a
medium-term horizon (one to three years) since capacity expansion decisions are
not considered. The contract forms considered by this model can be understood
as “firm contracts” in practice since market volatility is not a consideration of the
model. Market participants can use this model to do long-term planing for their
sales or purchases for the three seasons of every year at the beginning of the time.
Based on the deterministic model framework, a new stochastic equilibrium
model, denoted S-NGEM is developed in Chapter 4. This stochastic model aids mar-
ket participants in planning the sales or purchases under uncertain circumstances
by using techniques of stochastic programming. It reflects the contractual features
of not only the long-term market but also the spot market, where consumer de-
mand over the time horizon is subject to one or multiple probabilistic distributions.
The long-term and spot markets in the model are abstract generalizations of reality.
First, the long-term market provides planning level contracts which must be made
at the beginning of the time horizon and the spot market contracts are available
for delivery at the beginning of each season. We believe that these are reasonable
approximations due to the complexity of the problem and the limits on the computa-
tional capability. The model could be re-formulated to better approximate reality,
where the long-term and spot market contracts are available at any time. In an
extreme case when the number of long-term trading periods tends to infinity, the
market equilibrium tends to the perfect competition solution [1]. Secondly, since
there is no legal recourse and reservation charges associated with them, the best-
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efforts and swing contracts are considered as spot market contracts in the model;
the firm contracts belong to the long-term market where a reservation charge is
required.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the relationship between these two models using a one-
year time period. The horizontal axis represents the annual seasons and the vertical
axis represents consumption rates. For each season, there is a white and a shaded
block corresponding to the consumption in the long-term and the spot markets,
respectively. The height of these blocks represents the level of the consumption rates.
Consumption rates in the spot market are subject to probability distributions, e.g.,
an exponential distribution in season 1 and a discrete distribution of two realizations
in season 2 as shown in the figure.
In the deterministic model in Chapter 3, all consumption from the four sectors
are assumed to be deterministic and is met by long-term market supplies. By
contrast, the stochastic model in Chapter 4 determines the consumption rate served
both by the long-term and spot markets. The part of consumption rates met by
long-term market contracts is determined at the beginning of the time horizon while
those served by the spot market depends on the realizations of the possible outcomes
of the market uncertainty. For example, in Figure 2.5, two realizations A and B in
season 2 give rise to two levels of rates, a and b.
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Figure 2.5: Deterministic and Stochastic Models
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed how the market characteristics emerging after deregu-
lations, especially the existence of storage operators, marketers and the spot market,
are captured by the models D-NGEM and S-NGEM presented in the following chap-
ters.
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Chapter 3
A Deterministic Model D-NGEM
In this chapter, we first present a deterministic equilibrium model initially developed
in [35], based on the market structure depicted in Section 2.3. This market model
was denoted NGMEP in [35]. Next, we reformulate the model NGMEP as a mixed
complementarity problem (MiCP) which is different from the one shown in [35] in
that the market prices (wellhead prices, storage gas prices and peak gas prices) are
defined to be nonnegative instead of free, so that new existence and uniqueness
results are able to be developed by making mild assumptions on the marginal cost
and revenue functions thus releasing the restrictions on price variables as imposed
in [35].
For the purpose of this dissertation, we rename the model NGMEP as D-
NGEM, where D stands for deterministic, as opposed to the S standing for stochas-
tic in Chapter 4. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the
components of the model D-NGEM and the conditions when these components are
equivalent to MiCPs or NCPs. Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, show the existence
and uniqueness conditions for model D-NGEM based on the MiCP formulation de-
veloped in Section 3.1. Numerical demonstrations of the model D-NGEM can be
found in [36] and [37], in which the model was run to predict gas consumption and
prices in 2008 under different economic scenarios for the North American natural
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gas industry including the continental U.S. and Canada connected by 132 major
interstate pipelines.
For the sake of establishing existence of an equilibrium solution, assumptions
made in this chapter include:
• The cost functions of producers, storage operators and peak gas operators are
convex, continuously differentiable and strictly increasing;
• For each l ≥ 0, the end-user inverse demand functions θ(l) are nonnegative,
continuously differentiable and non-increasing and satisfy the following in-
equality: θ′(l) + lθ′′(l) ≤ 0;
• Assumption 3.2.1: The pipeline congestion price is bounded below when the
corresponding pipeline flow is zero.
All assumptions but the last item are common practice in developing existence
results for an equilibrium solution. See [30, 41, 56, 60, 69], to name but a few. As-
sumption 3.2.1 is in place due to the lack of a cost function in the pipeline operators’
objective function. Beside these preceding assumptions, if the marginal cost func-
tions are accordingly strictly increasing or strictly monotone, the uniqueness of an
equilibrium solution follows.
3.1 Model D-NGEM
Before getting into details of model D-NGEM, we introduce two important concepts
used extensively in this dissertation.
Definition 3.1.1. Let X be a nonempty subset of Rn and F be a mapping from
Rn → Rn. The variational inequality problem, denoted VI(X,F ) is to find a vector
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x∗ ∈ X such that
F (x∗)T (y − x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X (3.1.1)
It is well known that an important special case of VI(X,F ) is the nonlinear
complementarity problem NCP(F ) [26]:
Definition 3.1.2. Let F be a mapping from Rn into itself. The nonlinear comple-
mentarity problem, denoted by NCP(F ) is to find a vector x ∈ Rn such that
0 ≤ x ⊥ F (x) ≥ 0 (3.1.2)
The notation “⊥” is used extensively in the dissertation to indicate a comple-
mentarity relation. It implies in the above equation that in addition to the stated
inequalities, i.e., x ≥ 0 and F (x∗) ≥ 0, the equation xTF (x) = 0 also holds. When
F (x) is an affine function of x, the problem NCP(F ) reduces to a linear comple-
mentarity problem, abbreviated by LCP. A generalization of the NCP is the mixed
complementarity problem, abbreviated as MiCP.
Definition 3.1.3. Let G and H be two mappings from Rn1×Rn2+ into Rn1 and Rn2+ ,
respectively. Themixed nonlinear complementarity problem, denoted by MiCP(G,H)
is to find a pair of vectors (u, v) belonging to Rn1 × Rn2+ such that
G(u, v) = 0, u free
0 ≤ v ⊥ H(u, v) ≥ 0.
In Definition 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and throughout the dissertation, Rn+ denotes the
nonnegative orthant of Rn. Both the (mixed) nonlinear complementarity problems
and the variational inequality problems are related to each other. Theorem 3.1.1
and Theorem 3.1.2 establish the relations. See the work by Harker and Pang [42]
for more details on the relations between the NCP, MiCP and VI problem.
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Theorem 3.1.1. [26] Let F be a mapping from Rn into itself. A vector x solves the
VI(Rn+, F ) if and only if x solves the NCP(F ).
Theorem 3.1.2. [26] Let G and H be two mappings from Rn1 × Rn2+ into Rn1 and
Rn2+ , respectively. A vector x solves the VI(Rn1 × Rn2+ , F ), where F T = (GT , HT ) if
and only if x solves the MiCP(G,H).
In general, theorems designed for VI are applicable to NCP and MiCP. For the
purposes of the dissertation, we refer VI, NCP and MiCP to as NCP/VI collectively.
In what follows, we discuss the model D-NGEM, which consists of optimization
problems for market participants: pipeline operators, producers, storage operators,
peak gas operators and marketers, and corresponding market-clearing conditions
for sub-markets, in particular, transportation, production, storage gas and peak gas
markets described in Section 2.2. The collection of optimization problems of each
type of players are denoted as (PL), (PR), (ST ), (PG) and (MK) for pipeline oper-
ators, producers, storage operators, peak gas operators and marketers, respectively.
In the model D-NGEM, pipeline operators, producers, storage operators and peak
gas operators are price-takers while marketers are Nash-Cournot players in the mar-
keters’ market, i.e., selling gas to the four end-user sectors. Therefore, (PL), (PR),
(ST ) and (PG) can also be formulated as optimization problems. Mathematically,
a combined optimization formulation for these non-strategic players is equivalent to
the separate optimization problems for each of them. However, a combined formula-
tion would cause a lot of cancellation of terms since one player’s expense is another’s
revenue. For this reason, separate optimization problems for the non-strategic play-
ers are adapted by this work so that the insights into the interactions between the
players can be easily obtained from the problem solutions. On the other hand, in
general, there is no corresponding optimization problem immediately available for
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problem (MK)1. Thus, it is shown to be an instance of an MiCP. Lastly, we show
that model D-NGEM is an MiCP in Section 3.1.6.
Note that discounted revenues and costs are not considered for clarity of pre-
sentation as well as given the short timeframe involved. The units for the gas volume,
rate and price are million cubic feet (MMcf), million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d)
and $/Mcf. The objective functions for the players are in thousand dollars.
All variables and data used in model D-NGEM are organized in Table 3.1
by market agent. Endogenous variables are decision variables and multipliers to
the optimization problems for individual players. Exogenous variables are market
prices determined by market-clearing conditions. Data are independent inputs for
the model.
Table 3.1: Variables and Data for Model D-NGEM
Endogenous Variables
Problems
Decision Variables Multipliers
Exogenous Variables Data
(PL) fasy ρasy τasy fa
(PR) qcsy λcsy, µc pinsy qc, prodc,
cPRc (·)
(ST ) gary, xrsy δry, ωrsy, γnsy xr, gr, kr,
ξry, ζry τ regasy , c
ST
r (·)
(PG) wpy σpy βny wp, cPGp (·)
(MK) lkmsy, hamsy, umsy, φmsy τasy, pinsy, γnsy, βny τ regasy
vmy
1Hashimoto [31] points out that in special cases, such as affine demand and supply functions, a
Cournot equilibrium on a transportation network can be calculated by solving a single optimization
problem. Applications of Hashimoto’s contribution include [7, 46].
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3.1.1 Pipeline Operator
In practice, an interstate pipeline gathers natural gas from production regions then
transports the gas to consumption areas. It is common that one pipeline can serve
more than one production area or consumption area. Similar network applications
can be found in traffic assignment problems or spatial price equilibrium models [67].
A straightforward representation for such a network is an arc-path incidence matrix
along with path variables [41, 42], which identifies whether a path flow traverses
a physical arc or not in the network. An example can be found in [41] by Harker.
However, this method is not computationally efficient for large-scale networks due to
the need for a great number of path variables between production and consumption
nodes. Alternatively, and without loss of generality, we assume there is only one
consumption node denoted n1(a) and one production node n2(a) at either end of
an arc a, which is an abstraction of pipelines actually connecting n2(a) and n1(a).
The process of generating such an “arc” involves the breakdown of pipelines by
consumption and production areas and then the aggregation of pipeline segments
without violating actual pipeline capacities. The reference [37] contains a concrete
example explaining the process. In fact, such abstraction requires a great amount
of effort for data analysis before actually solving the model so as to lessen the
computational burdens. We also assume that just one arc is considered for each
pipeline operator. More generally, we would solve a corresponding problem which
sums the objective function terms for each operator and includes the corresponding
constraints for all the arcs in the network as was done in [37].
The pipeline operator in charge of arc a faces a linear programming problem
(P˜L) as shown below. The rates τasy are exogenous but are variables in the overall
equilibrium problem D-NGEM. They are determined by the market-clearing condi-
tions (3.1.12) and (3.1.13). Equation (3.1.3) describes the objective function which
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sums terms over all seasons s and years y (as is done for the other optimization
problems to be presented). Constraints (3.1.4) are the upper bounds on the arc
flows with the lower bounds being zeros.
The optimization problem (P˜L) is used to simulate the actions of a regulated
pipeline operation which must provide pipeline services to anyone that demands it at
the regulated rate of τ regasy , instead of the marginal cost, within the physical capacity.
The regulated rate, which is usually determined by governmental administration
(e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the U.S.), should recover
the transmission costs incurred by the pipeline operator. When the actual demand
for the pipeline service exceeds the pipeline capacity, the pipeline operator would
need an endogenous decision-making process to decide how to ration the capacity.
Problem (P˜L) simulates the charging of a flow premium τasy to purchasers of the
pipeline services. This premium is determined by the market-clearing conditions
(3.1.12) and (3.1.13). When the flow is positive, the term τasy corresponds to the
shadow price of the capacity constraint (3.1.4) divided by the number of days in
the season (i.e., dayss). Alternative formulations for different purposes are possible.
Reference [35] provides comparisons for some of them.
(P˜L) max
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssτasyfasy (3.1.3)
s.t. fasy ≤ fa (ρasy ≥ 0) ∀s, y (3.1.4)
0 ≤ fasy ∀s, y
Note that dual variables are presented besides the associated constraints, e.g.,
ρasy ≥ 0 for constraints (3.1.4). Given that pipeline operators have independent
decision variables and separate constraints, summing up (P˜L) for all a ∈ A gives
rise to a problem denoted (PL), which represents the optimization problem for the
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pipeline market. It is known that the problem (PL) is equivalent to problems (P˜L)
for all a ∈ A.
(PL) max
∑
a∈A
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssτasyfasy (3.1.5)
s.t. fasy ≤ fa (ρasy ≥ 0) ∀a, s, y (3.1.6)
0 ≤ fasy ∀a, s, y
Since this is a linear program, the KKT conditions are both necessary and
sufficient for optimality [5] and are shown in (3.1.7) and (3.1.8). The notation
“⊥” in the KKT conditions signify the complementarity between constraints and
associated dual variables. The KKT conditions to problem (PL) are:
0 ≤ −dayssτasy + ρasy ⊥ fasy ≥ 0 ∀a, s, y (3.1.7)
0 ≤ fa − fasy ⊥ ρasy ≥ 0 ∀a, s, y (3.1.8)
Clearly, (3.1.7) and (3.1.8) have a mathematical structure of an LCP. Let us
define
vPL ≡
 fasy (∀a, s, y)
ρasy (∀a, s, y)
 and (3.1.9)
HPL(vPL) ≡
 − dayssτasy + ρasy (∀a, s, y)
fa − fasy (∀a, s, y)
 (3.1.10)
Definitions (3.1.9) and (3.1.10) allow the KKT conditions (3.1.7) and (3.1.8)
to be expressed equivalently as
0 ≤ vPL ⊥ HPL(vPL) ≥ 0 (3.1.11)
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Market-clearing conditions, shown below as (3.1.12) and (3.1.13), are used
to enforce an equilibrium. They require that, at the equilibrium prices, the ag-
gregate supply of pipeline service (days1fa1y) equal the aggregate demand for it
(
∑
r∈R(n1(a)) days1gary in season 1 and
∑
m∈M(n1(a)) days1ham1y). If excessive sup-
ply or demand existed at the going prices, the market could not be at a point of
equilibrium. Equation (3.1.12) and (3.1.13) represent“derived demand” equations
[30] as opposed to explicit demand functions. Variables τasy, the market equilib-
rium prices, are enforced to be dual variables to these market-clearing conditions.
In order to have an NCP/VI formulation, τasy are set to be free such that a mixed
complementarity problem can be derived.
Market-clearing conditions for the pipeline or transportation market are:
days1fa1y −
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y = 0
(τa1y free) ∀a, y (3.1.12)
dayssfasy −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
daysshamsy = 0 (τasy free) ∀a, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.13)
In general, τasy is a positive penalty incurred by downstream operators when
a particular pipeline a is full. If τasy is negative, we can explain such a value as a
rebate for these downstream operators. Interestingly, as shown in Theorem 3.1.3, a
negative τasy does not occur unless fasy is zero. In other words, no one in the market
actually gets any rebates.
Theorem 3.1.3. For a particular pipeline arc a ∈ A in season s year y,
(1) if fasy = 0 then τasy ≤ 0;
(2) if fasy > 0 then τasy ≥ 0;
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(3) if τasy < 0 then fasy = 0.
Proof. (1) When fasy = 0, we must have τasy ≤ ρasy/dayss by (3.1.7) and ρasy = 0
by (3.1.8). Hence τasy ≤ 0 implied by ρasy = 0.
(2) When fasy > 0, by complementarity, we deduce from (3.1.7) that τasy =
ρasy/dayss. By definition, ρasy ≥ 0. Therefore, τasy ≥ 0.
(3) The result is contrapositively true from (2) and the fact that fasy ≥ 0.
3.1.2 Producer
The producers are modeled as price-takers in a perfect competition environment
given the small percentage of reserves that typically each producer holds in North
America. We denote (P˜R) for the optimization problems faced by producer c. Each
production company c ∈ C located at production node n ∈ PN is modeled to choose
gas production rates qcsy so as to maximize its net profit, which is the difference
between seasonal revenue (daysspinc(c)syqcsy) and seasonal costs (dayssc
PR
c (qcsy)),
summed over the time horizon.
The terms pinc(c)sy in the objective function of (P˜R), derived from market-
clearing conditions at production node n ∈ PN , are production or wellhead prices
for the node where producer c is located, and are exogenous to (P˜R) but a variable
for D-NGEM. Wellhead price pinc(c)sy is confined to be a nonnegative price, which
differs from model NGMEP in [35] where pinc(c)sy was defined free. Similar changes
are made to the storage gas price γnsy and peak gas price βny to be presented since
the nonnegative price gives a better approximation to reality. The mathematical
operator nc(c) specifies the location of producer c, s and y are for season and year,
respectively. Furthermore, we suppose that the cost functions cPGc (·) are convex
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and continuously differentiable in order to derive sufficient KKT conditions from
problem (P˜R). Similar assumptions are made on cost functions of storage operators
in Section 3.1.3 and peak gas operators in Section 3.1.4. In addition, cost functions
are assumed not to vary with seasons and years in the time horizon considered by
the model. Constraint (3.1.15) stipulates that the production capacity is fixed and
cannot be easily expanded within the medium-term (one to three years). Constraint
(3.1.16) states that the total volume of gas produced in the time horizon must
not exceed the production forecast of prodc. It is an approximation to the very
complicated spatial and temporal dependencies that can exist, examples of which
can be found in [11, 32, 34]. Note that constraint (3.1.16) links decisions from
different seasons and years, making the equilibrium model D-NGEM nonseparable.
(P˜R) max
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayss
(
pinc(c)syqcsy − cPRc (qcsy)
)
(3.1.14)
s.t. qcsy ≤ qc (λcsy ≥ 0) ∀s, y (3.1.15)∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssqcsy ≤ prodc (µc ≥ 0) (3.1.16)
0 ≤ qcsy ∀s, y
Given that producers are price-takers and hence there is no interaction between
decisions made by different individuals, the problems (P˜R) for all producers c ∈ C
can be equivalently simplified into one larger optimization problem (PR) as shown
below.
42
(PR) max
∑
c∈C
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayss
(
pinc(c)syqcsy − cPRc (qcsy)
)
(3.1.17)
s.t. qcsy ≤ qc (λcsy ≥ 0) ∀c, s, y (3.1.18)∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssqcsy ≤ prodc (µc ≥ 0) (3.1.19)
0 ≤ qcsy ∀c, s, y
Given that the cost functions are convex and the constraints are affine, the
KKT conditions (3.1.20) - (3.1.22) are equivalent to solving (PR) [5]. The KKT
conditions to (PR) are:
0 ≤ dayss
(− pinc(c)sy + d(cPRc (qcsy))
d(qcsy)
+ µc
)
+ λcsy ⊥ qcsy ≥ 0 ∀c, s, y (3.1.20)
0 ≤ qc − qcsy ⊥ λcsy ≥ 0 ∀c, s, y (3.1.21)
0 ≤ prodc −
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssqcsy ⊥ µc ≥ 0 ∀c (3.1.22)
For ease of presentation, hereafter we use MCPRcsy to denote the marginal cost
functions, that is,
MCPRcsy ≡
d
(
cPRc (qcsy)
)
d(qcsy)
, ∀c, s, y (3.1.23)
In light of the mathematical structure of these KKT conditions, we define
vPR ≡

qcsy (∀c, s, y)
λcsy (∀c, s, y)
µc (∀c)
 and (3.1.24)
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HPR(vPR) ≡

dayss
(− pinc(c)sy +MCPRcsy + λcsy (∀c, s, y)
qc − qcsy (∀c, s, y)
prodc −
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssqcsy (∀c)
 (3.1.25)
Definitions of (3.1.24) and (3.1.25) allow the KKT conditions (3.1.20)-(3.1.22)
to be expressed equivalently as an NCP:
0 ≤ vPR ⊥ HPR(vPR) ≥ 0 (3.1.26)
The following theorem, which shows that with positive cost functions, a nonzero
production rate leads to a nonzero market price, is developed for the needs of the
existence and uniqueness results shown in Section 3.1.6. Prior to the theorem, an
important assumption requiring that the marginal cost, the cost of producing one
more unit of a good, be positive when the production rate is positive, is presented.
Assumption 3.1.1. Given s and y, the marginal cost of producer c ∈ C satisfies
the following:
MCPRcsy > 0, if qcsy > 0. (3.1.27)
Theorem 3.1.4. Assume Assumption 3.1.1 holds for all producers located at a
production node n, i.e., ∀c ∈ Cn. If there exists a producer c ∈ Cn who has a
positive production rate, i.e., qcsy > 0, then the production price at production node
n is positive too, that is, pinc(c)sy > 0.
Proof. From (3.1.20), with positive qcsy, we must have
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pinc(c)sy =MC
PR
csy + µc + λcsy/dayss.
By definition, λcsy and µc are nonnegative. The term MC
PR
csy is positive by
Assumption 3.1.1. Thus, pinc(c)sy must be positive.
A general example of a cost function satisfying the above assumption is when
cPRc (·) is increasing with qcsy. In particular, examples of cost functions which satisfy
this assumption are when (1) cPRc (·) is a affine function with positive slope; and (2)
cPRc (·) is quadratic with positive coefficients. Such an assumption is quite plausible
for most of the production industry and a reasonable approximation to the produc-
tion activities in that producing at a higher rate would require more resources.
The market-clearing conditions (3.1.28) and (3.1.29) for production market
state that the aggregate supply of gas production at a node equals the aggregate
amount sent out to either storage operators and marketers in season 1 or just mar-
keters in seasons 2 and 3. The market-clearing conditions for the producer’s market
are as follows:
∑
c∈Cn
days1qc1y =
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y
)
∀n ∈ PN, y (3.1.28)
∑
c∈Cn
dayssqcsy =
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
daysshamsy ∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.29)
Note that the conditions of the nonnegative market prices, that is, pinsy ≥
0,∀n, s, y are not incorporated in the model yet. In order to do so, we construct
equations (3.1.30) and (3.1.31) where production prices pinsy are dual variables to
the modified market-clearing conditions for the production market implying that
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when the supply exceeds the demand, the market price must be zero. Theorem
3.1.5 shows the validation for such association.
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
days1qc1y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y
)
⊥ pin1y ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ PN, y (3.1.30)
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
dayssqcsy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
daysshamsy ⊥ pinsy ≥ 0
∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.31)
Theorem 3.1.5. If Assumption 3.1.1 holds for all c ∈ C, then system PR-MCC is
equivalent to system PR-MCC-NCP, where
PR-MCC ≡

NCP (3.1.26)
(3.1.28)− (3.1.29)
pinsy ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ PN, s, y
(3.1.32)
PR-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (3.1.26)
(3.1.30)− (3.1.31)
(3.1.33)
Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying PR-MCC also satisfies PR-MCC-
NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to PR-MCC-NCP will be a
solution to PR-MCC. Suppose the contrary that there exists a solution satisfying
PR-MCC-NCP such that when s = 1, for some n ∈ PN, y:
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
days1qc1y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y
)
and pin1y = 0 (3.1.34)
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or when s = 2 or 3, for some n ∈ PN, y
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
dayssqcsy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1hamsy and pinsy = 0 (3.1.35)
From (3.1.34)-(3.1.35), it must follow that for some n ∈ PN, s, y
0 < qcsy, ∃c ∈ Cn and pinsy = 0 (3.1.36)
However, 0 < qcsy for some c ∈ Cn in (3.1.36), by Theorem 3.1.4 implies that
pinsy > 0 for the location of producer c is node n. However, this contradicts pinsy = 0
in (3.1.36). Consequently, every solution of PR-MCC-NCP is also a solution to
PR-MCC. This completes the proof.
Alternatively, we could let free prices pinsy associate with (3.1.28) and (3.1.29)
to construct a mixed complementarity formulation as was done for the transporta-
tion market in Section 3.1.1 as well as in [35]. Assumption 3.1.1 ensures that piasy > 0
when qcsy > 0 for some c ∈ Cn. Without further assumptions, pinsy could be less
than zero only when qcsy = 0 for all c ∈ Cn, which, however, means that this pro-
duction node does not play a role in the market equilibrium in question and hence
can be left out. However, an NCP formulation of market-clearing conditions for the
transportation market is impossible since there are no such cost functions in the
objective function for the pipeline operators to make restrictions on.
3.1.3 Storage Operator
The storage market is modeled as perfectly competitive where the individual storage
operators each pursues maximum net profits. As such, for the sake of simplifica-
tion, a collective optimization problem (ST ) is used to present all operators in the
47
storage market which sums objective functions for individual operators and includes
the corresponding constraint sets. For a storage operator r ∈ R located at n ∈ CN ,
he/she decides on the amount injected into the reservoir from arc a available to
him/her in season 1, denoted gary, and the amount extracted in season 2 and 3,
denoted xrsy. The revenues are the sales income of extraction over the time horizon,
that is the term (dayssγnc(c)syxrsy) summed over high demand seasons, (i.e., seasons
2 and 3) and years, where γnr(r)sy is the nonnegative market prices for storage gas.
The costs are assumed to be incurred just in season 1 and consist of commodity
costs, transportation charges and injection costs for the amount delivered. Com-
modity costs, shown as (
∑
a∈A(n) days1pin2(a)1ygary) in (3.1.37) are the expenses of
purchasing the gas from producers, which in contrast are part of revenues for produc-
ers. Transportation charges for using the pipeline services include regulated charges
(
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) days1τ
reg
a1ygary) and congestion charges (
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) days1τa1ygary) (see
Section 3.1.1). As in the case of cPRc (·) in Section 3.1.2, the injection cost function
(cSTr (
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) gary)) is assumed convex and continuously differentiable and not to
vary with seasons and years.
In constraint (3.1.38), there are two loss factors, lossr for storage injection and
lossa for pipeline transmission. The term lossr ∈ (0, 1) for storage operator r ∈ R
accounts for fueling the compressors so that (1 − lossr) is the effective injection
amount. In a similar vein, lossa ∈ (0, 1) for pipeline arc a takes into account
the compression fuel by the pipeline company as well as any gas lost to pipeline
cracks. Constraint (3.1.38) stipulates that the aggregate extraction for the year
equals the total injection after losses. Such balancing of the working gas is just
one way to model these activities. In [39], alternative approaches were considered.
We could also allow the injected gas remained in the storage for the future use
in the following years. This can be done by adding a type of new variables for
the leftover gas at the end of each year and making appropriate modification to the
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constraint (3.1.38). However, Assumption 3.1.2, the positive marginal cost functions
assumption, ensures that all injected gas will be cleared at the end of each year by
Theorem 3.1.7. Therefore, constraint (3.1.38) suffices for our purposes.
Constraints (3.1.39) and (3.1.40) provide upper bounds on the extraction and
injection rates, respectively. Constraint (3.1.41) states the upper bound on the
working gas volume.
Assuming that cSTr (·) is convex and continuously differentiable, the KKT con-
ditions presented from (3.1.42) to (3.1.47) are necessary and sufficient for optimality
of (ST ) since the objective function is concave and the feasible region is polyhedral
[5].
(ST ) max
∑
r∈R
∑
y∈Y
{∑
s=2,3
dayssγnr(r)syxrsy − days1
[
cSTr
( ∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary
)
+
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(
τa1y + τ
reg
a1y + pin2(a)1y
)
gary
]}
(3.1.37)
s.t. days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy = 0
(δry free) ∀r, y (3.1.38)
xrsy ≤ xr (ωrsy ≥ 0) ∀r, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.39)∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary ≤ gr (ξry ≥ 0) ∀r, y (3.1.40)
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy ≤ kr (ζry ≥ 0) ∀r, y (3.1.41)
0 ≤ gary,∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), xr2y, xr3y ∀r, y
The KKT conditions to (ST ) are:
0 ≤ dayss
(− γnr(r)sy + δry + ζry)+ ωrsy ⊥ xrsy ≥ 0 ∀r, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.42)
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0 ≤ days1
(
τa1y+τ
reg
a1y+pin2(a)1y+
∂cSTr
( ∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary
)
∂gary
−δry(1−lossa)(1−lossr)
)
+ ξry ⊥ gary ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y (3.1.43)
0 = days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy (δry free) ∀r, y
(3.1.44)
0 ≤ xr − xrsy ⊥ ωrsy ≥ 0 ∀r, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.45)
0 ≤ gr −
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary ⊥ ξry ≥ 0 ∀r, y (3.1.46)
0 ≤ kr −
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy ⊥ ζry ≥ 0 ∀r, y (3.1.47)
An important property as shown below regarding the cost functions of the
storage operators is needed for the further analysis. We first use MCSTary to denote
the marginal cost functions for storage operators.
MCSTary ≡
∂cSTr
( ∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary
)
∂gary
∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y (3.1.48)
Assumption 3.1.2. Given a ∈ A(nr(r)), s and y, the marginal cost function of
storage operator r ∈ R satisfies the following condition:
MCSTary > 0, if gary > 0. (3.1.49)
Theorem 3.1.6 shows that under Assumption 3.1.2 the storage prices are pos-
itive provided that there exists a positive extraction rate at the same location .
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Theorem 3.1.6. Suppose that Assumption 3.1.2 holds for all storage operators
located at consumption node n. If there exists a storage operator r ∈ Rn who has
a positive extraction rate in season s, i.e., xrsy > 0, then the storage gas price for
that season at node n is positive too, that is, γnr(r)sy > 0.
Proof. By (3.1.44), a positive extraction rate implies a positive injection rate in
season 1. Consequently, by (3.1.43), it follows that for some a ∈ A(nr(r)),
δry(1− lossa)(1− lossr) = τa1y + τ rega1y + pin2(a)1y +MCSTary +
ξry
days1
Among terms in the above equation, MCSTary > 0 because of Assumption 3.1.2;
fa1y > 0 by market-clearing condition (3.1.12) showing by Theorem 3.1.3 τa1y ≥ 0;
pin2(a)1y ≥ 0 by definition; τ rega1y is a predetermined positive parameter. Hence, δry
must be positive. By complementarity, we also have γnr(r)sy = δry+ ζry+ωrsy/dayss
from (3.1.42). Both ζry and ωrsy are nonnegative by their definitions. Thus γnr(r)sy >
0.
We note that KKT conditions to (ST ) could be expressed as an instance of a
pure NCP if (3.1.44) could be substituted for the following:
0 ≤ days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary(1−lossa)(1−lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy ⊥ δry ≥ 0 ∀r, y
(3.1.50)
Theorem 3.1.7 shows the validation for such substitution when the exogenous
storage price γnr(r)sy ≥ 0. In the overall NCP to be described, this nonnegativity is
enforced. For ease of presentation, we define ST-NCP the new system consisting of
(3.1.42)-(3.1.43), (3.1.45)-(3.1.47) and (3.1.50). That is,
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ST-NCP ≡

(3.1.42)− (3.1.43), (3.1.45)− (3.1.47)
(3.1.50)
(3.1.51)
Theorem 3.1.7. Suppose Assumption 3.1.2 is in force for all r ∈ R. Considering
model D-NGEM in its entirety, the KKT conditions to (ST ), (3.1.42)-(3.1.47), are
equivalent to system ST-NCP.
Proof. First, we show that any solution of (3.1.42)-(3.1.47) is a solution of ST-NCP.
It suffices to show that δry ≥ 0 is always true for all r, y in (3.1.42)-(3.1.47). We
have two cases for discussion:
Case 1: For a storage operator r, if
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) gary(1 − lossa)(1 − lossr) =∑
s=2,3 dayssxrsy = 0, which, by (3.1.45) and (3.1.47), implies respectively, that
ωrsy = 0 and ζry = 0, then it must follow that δry ≥ 0 by (3.1.42) and the premise
of the nonnegativity of γnr(r)sy.
Case 2: For a storage operator r, if
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) gary(1 − lossa)(1 − lossr) =∑
s=2,3 dayssxrsy > 0, then there must exist some a ∈ A(nr(r)) such that gary > 0
so that following the proof for Theorem 3.1.6, we know that δry must be positive.
This completes the first part of the proof.
Now we show that any solution of ST-NCP is a solution of (3.1.42)-(3.1.47).
Assume the contrary. This can only be the case if a solution of ST-NCP exists
with days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) gary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3 dayssxrsy > 0 for some r, y,
which, by (3.1.50), implies that δry = 0. Further, we have days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r)) gary(1−
lossa)(1 − lossr) > 0, by the nonnegativity of xrsy. It follows that gary > 0 for
some a ∈ A(nr(r)), r and y ∈ Y . Hence, by (3.1.43), days1
(
τa1y + τ
reg
a1y + pin2(a)1y +
MCSTary − δry(1 − lossa)(1 − lossr)
)
+ ξry = 0 for that a, r and y, which cannot
hold unless MCSTary = 0. However, this contradicts Assumption 3.1.2. Therefore, the
KKT conditions to problem (ST ) are equivalent to system ST-NCP.
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Theorem 3.1.7 states that, in order to get maximum profits, storage operators
will not leave any injected gas that has cost them a positive amount unsold at the
end of the year. As a result, ST-NCP is equivalent to an NCP as follows:
0 ≤ vST ⊥ HST (vST ) ≥ 0 (3.1.52)
where
vST ≡

xrsy (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
gary (∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y)
δry (∀r, y)
ωrsy (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
ξry (∀r, y)
ζry (∀r, y)

and (3.1.53)
HST (vST ) ≡

dayss
(− γnr(r)sy + δry + ζry)+ ωrsy (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
days1
(
τa1y + τ
reg
a1y + pin2(a)1y +MC
ST
ary
− δry(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
)
+ ξry
(∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y)
days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy
(∀r, y)
xr − xrsy (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
gr −
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
gary (∀r, y)
kr −
∑
s=2,3
dayssxrsy (∀r, y)

(3.1.54)
The market-clearing conditions (3.1.55) for the storage gas market states
that the aggregate supply of storage gas at a consumption node (
∑
r∈Rn dayssxrsy)
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equals the aggregate amount demanded by marketers located at the same node
(
∑
m∈Mn dayssumsy). The market-clearing conditions for the storage market are:
∑
r∈Rn
dayssxrsy =
∑
m∈Mn
dayssumsy ∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y (3.1.55)
The condition for the nonnegativity of storage gas prices γnsy has not been
stated as part of the model. In order to do so, we make γnsy the dual variables
to the revised market-clearing conditions (3.1.55) as was done for the production
market.
0 ≤
∑
r∈Rn
dayssxrsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssumsy ⊥ γnsy ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y
(3.1.56)
The following theorem shows that (3.1.56) is equivalent to a system of (3.1.55)
and γnsy ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y when considered in the context of ST-NCP.
Theorem 3.1.8. If Assumption 3.1.2 holds for all r ∈ R, then system ST-MCC is
equivalent to system ST-MCC-NCP, where
ST-MCC ≡

NCP (3.1.52)
(3.1.55)
γnsy ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y
(3.1.57)
ST-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (3.1.52)
(3.1.56)
(3.1.58)
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Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying ST-MCC also satisfies ST-MCC-
NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to ST-MCC-NCP will be a
solution to ST-MCC. Suppose the contrary that there exists a solution satisfying
ST-MCC-NCP such that for some n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y:
0 <
∑
r∈Rn
dayssxrsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssumsy and γnsy = 0 (3.1.59)
From (3.1.59), it must follow that for some n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y ∈ Y :
0 < xrsy, ∃r ∈ Rn and γnsy = 0 (3.1.60)
However, 0 < xrsy for some r ∈ Rn in (3.1.60), by Theorem 3.1.6 implies that
γnsy > 0 for the location of storage operator r is node n. However, this contradicts
γnsy = 0 in (3.1.60). Consequently, every solution of ST-MCC-NCP is also a solution
to ST-MCC. This completes the proof.
3.1.4 Peak Gas Operator
The peak gas operator p ∈ P at consumption node n supplies to marketers “peak
gas”, either LNG or propane/air mixtures, to service peak demand in the highest
demand time of season 3. The peak gas market is assumed to be under perfect com-
petition. Therefore, we label (PG) for the optimization problem for all perfectly
competing peak gas operators p ∈ P without spelling out individual problems for
them for the reason stated in earlier sections. Peak gas operators are modeled as
choosing the production rates wpy taking the prices of peak gas, βnp(p)y as given,
so as to maximize the net profits, which is the difference between yearly sales in-
come (days3βnp(p)ywpy) and production costs (days3c
PG
p (wpy)) summed over years as
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shown in (3.1.61). We assume that the cost function cPGp (·) convex and continuously
differentiable in order to have a convex program. Constraint (3.1.62) sets an upper
bound on the decision variables wpy. Since this is a convex program, the KKT con-
ditions shown in (3.1.63) and (3.1.64) are equivalent to solving the problem (PG).
(PG) max
∑
p∈P
∑
y∈Y
days3
(
βnp(p)ywpy − cPGp (wpy)
)
(3.1.61)
s.t. wpy ≤ wp (σpy) ∀p, y (3.1.62)
0 ≤ wpy ∀p, y
The KKT conditions to (PG) are:
0 ≤ days3
(
− βnp(p)y +
d
(
cPGp (wpy)
)
d(wpy)
)
+ σpy ⊥ wpy ≥ 0 ∀p, y (3.1.63)
0 ≤ wp − wpy ⊥ σpy ≥ 0 ∀p, y (3.1.64)
Hereafter, for brevity, the marginal cost functions of peak gas operators are
denoted as MCPGpy . That is,
MCPGpy ≡
d
(
cPGp (wpy)
)
d(wpy)
, ∀p, y (3.1.65)
Similar to the previous analysis, the KKT conditions for all peak gas operators
p ∈ P can be expressed equivalently as an NCP:
0 ≤ vPG ⊥ HPG(vPG) ≥ 0 (3.1.66)
where
vPG ≡
wpy (∀p, y)
σpy (∀p, y)
 and (3.1.67)
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HPG(vPG) ≡
 days3
(
− βnp(p)y +MCPGpy
)
+ σpy (∀p, y)
wp − wpy (∀p, y)
 (3.1.68)
Assuming positive cost function in Assumption 3.1.3, Theorem 3.1.9 estab-
lishes a relationship between production rates wpy and market prices βnp(p)y.
Assumption 3.1.3. Given y, the cost function of peak gas operator p ∈ P satisfies
the following condition:
MCPGpy > 0, if wpy > 0,∀y. (3.1.69)
Theorem 3.1.9. Suppose that all the peak gas operators located at a consumption
node n satisfy Assumption 3.1.3. If there exists a peak gas operator p ∈ P n who has
a positive production rate, i.e., wpy > 0 , then the peak gas price for the same time
period at node n is positive too, that is, βnp(p)y > 0.
Proof. From (3.1.63), with positive wpy, we have βnp(p)y = MC
PG
py + σpy/days3,
which, by Assumption 3.1.3 implies the conclusion.
The market-clearing conditions for the peak gas market stipulate that the
total supply of the peak gas at a consumption node (
∑
p∈Pn days3wpy) equals the
total demand of peak gas from marketers located at the same consumption node
(
∑
m∈Mn days3vmy). The market-clearing conditions for the peak gas market are:
∑
p∈Pn
days3wpy =
∑
m∈Mn
days3vmy ∀n ∈ CN, y (3.1.70)
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Similar to the previous discussion, we incorporate the nonnegative peak gas
prices βny into the equilibrium model D-NGEM by the following NCP formulation:
0 ≤
∑
p∈Pn
days3wpy −
∑
m∈Mn
days3vmy ⊥ βny ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ CN, y (3.1.71)
Equation (3.1.71) is shown to be equivalent to the original formulation in
Theorem 3.1.10 under Assumption 3.1.3.
Theorem 3.1.10. If Assumption 3.1.3 holds for all p ∈ P , then system PG-MCC,
is equivalent to system PG-MCC-NCP, where
PG-MCC ≡

NCP (3.1.66)
(3.1.70)
βny ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, y
(3.1.72)
PG-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (3.1.66)
(3.1.71)
(3.1.73)
Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying PG-MCC also satisfies PG-MCC-
NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to PG-MCC-NCP will be a
solution to PG-MCC. Suppose the contrary that there exists a solution satisfying
PG-MCC-NCP such that for some n ∈ CN, y:
0 <
∑
p∈Pn
days3wpy −
∑
m∈Mn
days3vmy and βny = 0 (3.1.74)
From (3.1.74), it must follow that for some n ∈ CN, y:
0 < wpy, ∃p ∈ P n and βny = 0 (3.1.75)
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However, 0 < wpy for some p ∈ P n in (3.1.75), by Theorem 3.1.9 implies that
βny > 0 for the location of peak gas operator r is node n. However, this contradicts
βny = 0 in (3.1.75). Consequently, every solution of PG-MCC-NCP is a solution to
PG-MCC. This completes the proof.
3.1.5 Marketer
Unlike participants described above, marketers are modeled as Nash-Cournot play-
ers in the “marketer” market while price-takers in other markets. The correspond-
ing optimization problem for a marketer m ∈ M is denoted (M˜K) as shown be-
low. Marketer m ∈ Mn located at consumption node n ∈ CN , competes against
other marketers at the same location (denoted −m(n) ∈ Mn) by determining the
daily amount purchased from producers, storage operators and peak gas operators,
denoted hamsy, umsy and vmy, respectively, and the amount sold to four end-user
sectors k ∈ K, denoted by lkmsy. All marketers at node n ∈ CN face the same
inverse demand functions θknm(m)sy(·) corresponding to sector k, season s, year y
at node nm(m), as shown in (3.1.76). As opposed to price-takers accepting mar-
ket prices determined by “derived demand” equations, marketers can influence the
market prices by varying their share of supply through the explicit inverse demand
functions θ(lkmsy + l
∗
k(−m(n))sy), where the notation “∗” in l∗k(−m(n))sy indicates the
“optimal” solutions from the other marketers, appearing in their objective functions
so as to maximize net profits. The inverse demand functions θ(·) are assumed to
be nonnegative since if the natural gas prices for consumers were below zeros, no
operator would make profits by providing the natural gas. Other marketers’ supply
shares l∗k(−m(n))sy are exogenous to marketer m, but variables in the large, overall
model D-NGEM. The seasonal revenue is (dayssθknm(m)sy(·)lkmsy) earned from sec-
tor k by marketer m ∈ M at node n ∈ CN . The costs include commodity costs
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(i.e., daysspin2(a)syhamsy, dayssγnm(m)syumsy or dayssβnm(m)yvmy depending on the gas
sources) and transportation charges which are the same as storage operators. The
rates for commodity and transportation costs are fixed in (M˜K) since marketers are
price-takers in the transportation, production, storage, peak gas markets.
Constraints (3.1.77), (3.1.78) and (3.1.79) (for seasons 1,2 and 3, respectively)
state that the amount available to end-users and the amount procured from up-
stream sides by the marketers must be consistent during all seasons.
Provided that the only nonlinear terms θknm(m)sy(lkmsy + l
∗
k(−m(n))sy)lkmsy in
(M˜K) are concave, the KKT conditions shown in (3.1.80)-(3.1.86) are both nec-
essary and sufficient for solving (M˜K). To this end, typical assumptions are that
θknsy(·) is a continuously differentiable and nonincreasing function and satisfies the
inequality: θ′knm(m)sy(lkmsy)+ lkmsyθ
′′
knm(m)sy(lkmsy) ≤ 0, for all lkmsy ≥ 0. This condi-
tion was also used in [60] and [69] for the oligopolistic market. Murphy et al. in [56]
improve this condition by showing an easily verified condition of nonincreasing of
θknm(m)sy(lkmsy) and concavity of lkmsyθknm(m)sy(lkmsy). Examples of inverse demand
functions which satisfy this condition are when: (1) θ(·) is affine and non-increasing;
and (2) θ(·) is concave and non-increasing.
(M˜K) max
∑
y∈Y
[∑
k∈K
∑
s∈S
dayssθknm(m)sy
(
lkmsy + l
∗
k(−m(n))sy
)
lkmsy
−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈Am(m)
dayss
(
τasy + τ
reg
asy + pin2(a)sy)hamsy
−
∑
s=2,3
dayssγnm(m)syumsy − days3βnm(m)yvmy
]
(3.1.76)
s.t. days1
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham1y −
∑
k∈K
lkm1y
)
= 0
(φm1y) ∀y (3.1.77)
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days2
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham2y + um2y −
∑
k∈K
lkm2y
)
= 0
(φm2y) ∀y (3.1.78)
days3
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham3y + um3y + vmy −
∑
k∈K
lkm3y
)
= 0
(φm3y) ∀y (3.1.79)
0 ≤ lkmsy ∀k, s, y
0 ≤ hamsy ∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), s, y
0 ≤ umsy ∀s = 2, 3, y
0 ≤ vmy ∀y
The KKT conditions to (M˜K) are:
0 ≤ −dayss
[∂θknm(m)sy(lkmsy + l∗k(−m(n))sy)
∂lkmsy
lkmsy − θknm(m)sy(lkmsy + l∗k(−m(n))sy)
]
+ dayssφmsy ⊥ lkmsy ≥ 0 ∀k, s, y (3.1.80)
0 ≤ dayss
[
τasy + τ
reg
asy + pin2(a)sy − (1− lossa)φmsy
] ⊥ hamsy ≥ 0
∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), s, y (3.1.81)
0 ≤ dayss
(
γnm(m)sy − φmsy
) ⊥ umsy ≥ 0 s = 2, 3,∀y (3.1.82)
0 ≤ days3
(
βnm(m)y − φm3y
) ⊥ vmy ≥ 0 ∀y (3.1.83)
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0 = days1
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham1y −
∑
k∈K
lkm1y
]
(φm1y free) ∀y (3.1.84)
0 = days2
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham2y + um2y −
∑
k∈K
lkm2y
]
(φm2y free) ∀y (3.1.85)
0 = days3
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham3y + um3y + vmy −
∑
k∈K
lkm3y
]
(φm3y free) ∀y (3.1.86)
For brevity, hereafter we useMRkmsy to denote the marginal revenue functions
for marketers. That is,
MRkmsy ≡
∂θknm(m)sy(lkmsy + l
∗
k(−m)sy)
∂lkmsy
lkmsy + θknm(m)sy(lkmsy + l
∗
k(−m)sy)
∀k,m, s, y (3.1.87)
Note that there is not an optimization problem that can simply represent the
problems (M˜K) for all m ∈M as is done for pipeline operators, producers, storage
operator and peak gas operators due to marketers’ oligopolistic behavior aspects.
Still, it is well known that the Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as an
NCP/VI dating back to the early paper by Lions and Stampacchia [43]. Therefore,
in this dissertation, we adopt the NCP/VI approach for the whole marketers’ mar-
ket problem (MK). In light of their mathematical structure, including the KKT
conditions for all marketers m ∈M results in an MiCP as follows:
GMK(uMK , vMK) = 0, uMK free
0 ≤ vMK ⊥ HMK(uMK , vMK) ≥ 0
(3.1.88)
where
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uMK ≡ (φmsy (∀m, s, y) ) (3.1.89)
vMK ≡

lkmsy (∀k,m, s, y)
hamsy (∀a ∈ A(nm(m)),m, s, y)
umsy (s = 2, 3,∀m, y)
vmy (∀m, y)

(3.1.90)
GMK(uMK , vMK) ≡

days1
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham1y −
∑
k∈K
lkm1y
]
(∀m, y)
days2
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham2y + um2y
−
∑
k∈K
lkm2y
]
(∀m, y)
days3
[ ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)ham3y + um3y + vmy
−
∑
k∈K
lkm3y
]
(∀m, y)

(3.1.91)
HMK(uMK , vMK) ≡

− dayssMRkmsy + dayssφmsy (∀k,m, s, y)
dayss
[
τasy + τ
reg
asy + pin2(a)sy − (1− lossa)φmsy
]
(∀a ∈ A(nm(m)),m, s, y)
dayss
(
γnm(m)sy − φmsy
)
(s = 2, 3,∀m, y)
days3
(
βnm(m)y − φm3y
)
(∀m, y)

(3.1.92)
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3.1.6 NCP/VI Formulation of Model D-NGEM
From Sector 3.1.1 to Section 3.1.5, we presented all components of the model D-
NGEM. In this section, we show that how model D-NGEM is equivalent to an MiCP.
We first define the model D-NGEM mathematically as follows.
Definition 3.1.4. The model D-NGEM is a system composed of optimization prob-
lems (PL), (PR), (ST ), (PG) and (M˜K),∀m ∈ M , market-clearing conditions
(3.1.12) - (3.1.13), (3.1.28) - (3.1.29), (3.1.55) and (4.3.114) as well as nonnegative
market price conditions, i.e., pinsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ PN, s, y; γnsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y;
βny ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, y. That is,
D-NGEM ≡

(PL); (PR); (ST ); (PG); (M˜K),∀m ∈M,
(3.1.12)− (3.1.13); (3.1.28)− (3.1.29); (3.1.55); (3.1.70)
pinsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ PN, s, y
γnsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y
βny ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, y
(3.1.93)
The KKT conditions to these optimization problems have been converted to
NCPs, that is (3.1.11), (3.1.26), (3.1.52), (3.1.66) and (??), assuming cost functions
are convex and continuously differentiable and the marginal costs and revenues
are positive in the positive orthant. Under the same assumptions, market-clearing
conditions were shown to in a format of an NCP with the exception of market-
clearing conditions for the transportation market, which are shown to be a MiCP.
Given that its components are either NCP or MiCP, Theorem 3.1.11 shows that the
model D-NGEM is an MiCP per se. First, define some new terms for the market-
clearing conditions.
(uMCC) ≡ ( τasy (∀a, s, y) ) , (3.1.94)
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(vMCC) ≡

pinsy (∀n ∈ PN, s, y)
γnsy (∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
βny (∀n ∈ CN, y)
 , (3.1.95)
GMCC ≡

days1fa1y −
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y (∀a, y)
dayssfasy −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
daysshamsy (∀a, s = 2, 3, y)
 and
(3.1.96)
HMCC ≡

∑
c∈Cn
days1qc1y
−
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1gary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1ham1y
)
(∀n ∈ PN, y)∑
c∈Cn
dayssqcsy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1hamsy
(∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y)∑
r∈Rn
dayssxrsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssumsy (∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
∑
p∈Pn
days3wpy −
∑
m∈Mn
days3vmy (∀n ∈ CN, y)

(3.1.97)
Theorem 3.1.11. Let
uT ≡ [(uMK)T (uMCC)T ];
vT ≡ [(vPL)T (vPR)T (vST )T (vPG)T (vMK)T (vMCC)T ];
GT (u, v) ≡ [(GMK)T (GMCC)T ];
HT (u, v) ≡ [(HPL)T (HPR)T (HST )T (HPG)T (HMK)T (HMCC)T ].
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Suppose that Assumptions 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 hold for all c ∈ C, r ∈ R and
p ∈ P , respectively. Model D-NGEM is equivalent to an MiCP, denoted D-NGEM-
MiCP(G,H) where
G(u, v) = 0 u free
0 ≤ v ⊥ H(u, v) ≥ 0
(3.1.98)
Proof. Following the definition for MiCP, by Theorems 3.1.5, 3.1.7, 3.1.8 and 3.1.10,
it is trivial to show the results.
3.2 Existence Results
In what follows, we provide existence results for the model D-NGEM. In light of
the relationship between the MiCP and VI demonstrated in Theorem 3.1.1, the D-
NGEM-MiCP(G,H) can also be written as a VI denoted D-NGEM-VI(Rn1×Rn2+ , F ),
where F T = (GT , HT ) and the values of n1 and n2 depend on the actual size of
the problem. Theorem 3.2.1 shown below is a well-known existence result for VI
problems. The existence results will be established in this sector are bases on this
Theorem as well.
Theorem 3.2.1. [16, 43] Let X be a nonempty, compact and convex subset of Rn
and let F be a continuous mapping from X into Rn. Then, there exists a solution
to the problem VI(X,F ).
Clearly, the functions G and H in MiCP (3.1.98) are continuous given the
functional form and the earlier assumptions that the cost functions were continuously
differentiable. The corresponding set X for MiCP (3.1.98) is certainly nonempty,
convex and closed, since all variables are constrained to be nonnegative or free.
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Thus, to invoke Theorem 3.2.1, it suffices to show that the ground set X is bounded.
Lemma 3.2.1 and Lemma 3.2.2 as follows show that under suitable assumptions, all
variables for D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H) are bounded.
Assumption 3.2.1. All the pipeline congestion fees τasy are bounded below when
fasy = 0.
Assumption 3.2.1 relaxes Assumption 1 in [35]. In particular, prices picst, γnsy
and βny were shown to be bounded below in Section 3.1 using assumptions relative to
cost functions instead of direct assumptions made in [35]. However, such relaxation
cannot be done to pipeline price τasy due to the fact that there is not a cost function
in the problem (PL). These prices including τasy will be shown to be bounded above
in Lemma 3.2.1. In fact, Assumption 3.2.1 along with Lemma 3.2.1 plays the same
role as Assumption 1 in [35].
Lemma 3.2.1. If Assumption 3.2.1 holds, all the prices in D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H)
are bounded. That is, there exists a positive scalar ∆ such that
a. τasy ∈ [−∆,∆],∀a, s, y
b. pinsy ∈ [0,∆],∀n ∈ PN, s, y
c. γnsy ∈ [0,∆], s = 2, 3,∀n ∈ CN, y
d. βny ∈ [0,∆],∀n ∈ CN, y
Proof. Because the cost functions cPRc (·), cSTr (·) and cPGp (·) and the revenue function
θ(·)l were assumed continuously differentiable in Section 3.1, the marginal costs, that
is,MCPRcsy ,MC
ST
ary andMC
PG
py and marginal revenuesMRkmsy are continuous. Also,
it is well known that if a function f is continuous on a bounded and closed (i.e.,
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compact) set S, f is bounded on S as a result of Weirstrass’s Theorem [5]. The
following statements are true:
a. MCPRcsy is bounded over qcsy ∈ [0, qc],∀c, s, y, (3.2.1)
b. MCSTrsy is bounded over gary ∈ [0, gr],∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y, (3.2.2)
c. MCPGpy is bounded over wpy ∈ [0, wp],∀p, y, and (3.2.3)
d. MRkmsy is bounded over lkmsy ∈ [0, L],∀k,m, s, y,where L is some
nonnegative scalar. (3.2.4)
Clearly, the prices pinsy, γnsy and βny are bounded below by zero by definition
and prices τasy are bounded below when fasy = 0 and fasy > 0 by Assumption 3.2.1
and Theorem 3.1.3, respectively. It suffices to show that these price variables are
bounded above.
First consider the production prices pinsy at production node n. Suppose all
producers located at node n, that is, c ∈ Cn have qcsy = 0 for all s, y. By (3.1.21)
and (3.1.22), we obtain that λcsy = 0 and µc = 0. Further, we have pinc(c)sy ≤MCPRcsy
from (3.1.20), which implies pinsy is bounded above because of the statement (3.2.1).
Second, given s, y, if some producer c ∈ Cn has qcsy > 0, we consider two cases
implied by the market-clearing conditions (3.1.28) and (3.1.29): 1) hamsy > 0 for
some marketer m located at consumption node n1(a), where a ∈ A(n); and thus
implied by (3.1.77)-(3.1.79), lkmsy > 0 for some k of that marketer m; 2) when
s = 1, gary > 0 for some storage operator located at consumption node n1(a), where
a ∈ A(n); and thus xrsy > 0 for that r, where s = 2 or 3. In the first case, by
(3.1.80) and lkmsy > 0, it must follow that for some a, k, s, y
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MRkmsy = φmsy (3.2.5)
where φmsy is bounded above because MRkmsy is bounded via (3.2.4). Meanwhile,
by (3.1.81) and hamsy > 0, we see that τasy+ τ
reg
asy +pin2(a)sy = φmsy(1− lossa), which
implies that the production prices pin2(a)sy, where n2(a) refers to where producer c is
located, and τasy are bounded above because φmsy is bounded. Therefore, pinsy for
the node where producer c is located must be bounded above.
In the second case for proving pinsy is bounded above we see that xrsy > 0 when
s = 2 or 3 implies that umsy > 0 for some marketer m located at the same node
where storage operator r is, by market-clearing condition (3.1.55). By (3.1.78) or
(3.1.79) depending on the actual season in question, umsy > 0 implies that lkmsy > 0
for some k, which indicates φmsy is bounded via Assumption (3.2.4). From (3.1.82)
and umsy > 0, we know that γnm(m)sy = φmsy, which means that γnm(m)sy for the
node where storage operator r and marketer m are co-located is bounded. Also,
by (3.1.42) and xrsy > 0, it follows that δry for that storage operator r is bounded
above since γnr(r)sy is bounded and ωrsy and ζry are nonnegative. Further by (3.1.43)
and gary > 0, we see that
δry(1− lossa)(1− lossr) = τa1y + τ rega1y + pin2(a)1y +MCSTary +
ξry
days1
(3.2.6)
In the above equation, because δry is bounded above and ξry is bounded below,
MCSTary is bounded and γnr(r)sy is bounded, then pin2(a)1y and τa1y must be bounded
above. In other words, the production price for node n2(a) or the production node
in question n is bounded above. Therefore, the production prices pinsy are bounded
above for all n ∈ PN, s, y.
Second, we consider the pipeline prices τasy for arc a in season s and year y.
We already showed τasy bounded below, now we show bounded above. Consider the
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case when fasy = 0. In this case, by complementarity, (3.1.8) requires ρasy = 0. We
see by (3.1.7) that dayssτasy ≤ ρasy. Thus, τasy is bounded above. When fasy > 0,
by market-clearing conditions (3.1.12) and (3.1.13), we consider two cases 1) when
s = 1, gary > 0 for some storage operator r located at node n1(a) or 2) hamsy > 0
for some marketers located at node n1(a). Following the two cases discussed above
when pinsy > 0, it is not difficult to deduce that τasy is bounded above. Therefore,
τasy is bounded above for all a, s, y.
As for storage gas prices, γnsy was shown to be bounded above when some
gary > 0 in the discussion of the boundness of the production price pinsy. We
now show the boundness results when gary = 0 for all a ∈ A(n), y and all storage
operators r ∈ Rn. Consider a consumption node n ∈ CN . By (3.1.43), we have
δry(1− lossa)(1− lossr) ≤ τa1y + τ rega1y + pin2(a)1y +MCSTary +
ξry
dayss
∀a ∈ A(n), r ∈ Rn, y (3.2.7)
which implies δry is bounded above because: 1) τa1y has shown to be bounded; 2)
τ rega1y is a positive input; 3) pin1(a)1y has shown to be bounded; 4) MC
ST
ary is bounded
via (3.2.2); 5) by (3.1.44), (3.1.45), (3.1.46) and (3.1.47), we obtain that xrsy = 0,
ωrsy = 0 showing that ξry = 0 and ζry = 0, respectively. Further, by (3.1.42),
γnr(r)sy ≤ δry, which implies that γnr(r)sy is bounded above by δry. Thus γnsy is
bounded above when gary = 0 for all storage operators r ∈ Rn and all arcs a ∈ A(n)
in all year y. Next, suppose gary > 0 for some storage operators r ∈ Rn and some
arc a ∈ A(n). Therefore, γnsy is bounded above for all n, s = 2, 3, y.
In terms of the peak gas prices βny for a consumption node n ∈ CN , if all peak
gas operators located at node n have wpy = 0, the corresponding σpy = 0 by (3.1.64).
Therefore by (3.1.63), βnp(p)y ≤ MCPGpy thus βpy is bounded by statement (3.2.3).
If wpy > 0 for some peak gas operator p ∈ P n, then by (3.1.70) and (3.1.79), there
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exists at least one marketer m ∈ Mn who has vmy > 0 and thus the corresponding
lkm3y > 0 for some k. lkm3y > 0 implies that φm3y is bounded above by statement
(3.2.4) as shown in (3.2.5). Also, vmy > 0 implies βny = φm3y by (3.1.83). Thus βny
are bounded above by φm3y when wpy > 0. Therefore, βny is bounded above for all
n, y.
Lemma 3.2.2. [35] If all prices (τasy, pinsy, γnsy, βny) are bounded, all the variables
in D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H) are bounded.
Proof. In [35], it was showed that all variables for optimization problems (PL),
(PR), (ST ) and (PG) were bounded.
As for the problem (MK), hasmy, umsy and vmy were shown to be bounded
in [35]. We see via (3.1.84), (3.1.85), (3.1.86) and the fact that the hamsy, umsy
and vmy have each shown to be bounded, that the variables lkmsy are bounded.
Multiplier variables φmsy are bounded below by MRkmsy via (3.1.80) as well as
(3.2.4). Equation (3.1.80), (3.1.81) or (3.1.82) shows that φmsy is bounded above by
appropriate prices shown or assumed (for τasy) bounded. This completes the proof
showing that all the variables are bounded.
Using Theorem 3.2.1, Lemmas 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, we obtain the following exis-
tence result.
Theorem 3.2.2. If Assumptions (3.2.1) holds, then there exists a solution to D-
NGEM-MiCP(G,H).
The conclusion of Theorem 3.2.2 is straightforward based on the previous
analysis. Moreover, if Theorem 3.1.11 holds, Theorem 3.2.2 shows that a solution
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to the model D-NGEM exists. Specifically, if Assumptions 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and
3.2.1 are in force, a solution to the model D-NGEM always exists.
3.3 Uniqueness Results
In this section, we consider the uniqueness of solutions to D-NGEM. Two definitions
regarding monotonicity are introduced first.
Definition 3.3.1. [26] The mapping F : Rn → Rn is said to be
a. monotone over X , if
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) ≥ 0 ∀x, y ∈ X; (3.3.1)
b. strictly monotone over X, if
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) > 0 ∀x, y ∈ X, x 6= y. (3.3.2)
Among these properties, it is clear that every strictly monotone function must
be a monotone function but not necessary the reverse. More generally, if F is con-
tinuously differentiable, then the various monotonicity properties of F are related to
the positive semi-definiteness or positive definiteness of the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x)
[63].
In general, VI(X,F ) can have more than one solution. However, if F is strictly
monotone, then VI(X,F ) can have at most one solution as shown in the following
result.
Theorem 3.3.1. [26] If F is strictly monotone on X, then the problem VI(X,F )
has at most one solution.
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Theorem 3.3.1 does not guarantee the existence of a solution to problem
VI(X,F ). However, it can be used for uniqueness result given existence results
such as Theorem 3.2.2. The following theorem shows the uniqueness conditions to
the model D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H).
Theorem 3.3.2. If Theorem 3.2.2 holds, and
a. MCPRcsy (·) are strictly increasing functions over the nonnegative orthant for all
c ∈ C, s ∈ S and y ∈ Y ,
b. MCPGpy (·) are strictly increasing functions over the nonnegative orthant line
for all p ∈ P and y ∈ Y ,
c. MCSTry (·) ≡
[ · · · ,MCSTary(·), · · · ]T ,where a ∈ A(nr(r)), are strictly monotone
functions over nonnegative orthant for all r ∈ R and y ∈ Y ,
d. −MRknsy(·) ≡
[ · · · ,−MRkmsy(·), · · · ]T ,where m ∈ Mn, are strictly mono-
tone functions over nonnegative orthant for all k ∈ K, n ∈ CN , s ∈ S and
y ∈ Y ,
then D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H) has a unique solution.
Proof. Theorem 3.2.2 ensures a solution to D-NGEM-MiCP(G,H). For the unique-
ness of the solution, it is known that F T = (GT HT ) being a strictly mono-
tone function will suffice by Theorem 3.3.1. Our immediate goal is to show that
[F (x) − F (y)]T (x − y) > 0 for x 6= y. For brevity, we use “∆” to denote the
differences between x and y so that we have the following:
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x− y ≡

∆uMCC
∆vPL
∆vPR
∆vST
∆vMK
∆uMK
∆vMCC

≡

∆τasy (∀a, s, y)
}
(∆uMCC)
∆fasy (∀a, s, y)
∆ρasy (∀a, s, y)
 (∆vPL)
∆qcsy (∀c, s, y)
∆λcsy (∀c, s, y)
∆µc (∀c)

(∆vPR)
∆xrsy (∀r, s, y)
∆gary (∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y)
∆δry (∀r, y)
∆ωrsy (s = 2, 3,∀r, y)
∆ξry (∀r, y)
∆ζry (∀r, y)

(∆vST )
∆wpy (∀p, y)
∆σpy (∀p, y)
∆lkmsy (∀k,m, s, y)
∆hamsy (∀a ∈ A(nm(m)),m, s, y)
∆umsy (s = 2, 3,∀m, y)
∆vmy (∀m, y)

(∆vMK)
∆φmsy (∀m, s, y)
}
(∆uMK)
∆pinsy (∀n ∈ PN, s, y)
∆γnsy (∀n ∈ CN, s, y)
∆βny (∀n ∈ CN, y)

(∆vMCC)

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Spelling out all terms for [F (x)−F (y)]T (x− y), what we obtain is as follows:
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) =[GMCC(x)−GMCC(y)]T∆uMCC
+
[
HPL(x)−HPL(y)]T∆vPL
+
[
HPR(x)−HPR(y)]T∆vPR
+
[
HST (x)−HST (y)]T∆vST
+
[
HPG(x)−HPG(y)]T∆vPG
+
[
HMK(x)−HMK(y)]T∆vMK
+
[
GMK(x)−GMK(y)]T∆uMK
+
[
HMCC(x)−HMCC(y)]T∆vMCC
Based on the definitions in Section 3.1, individual terms in the above equality
are laid out in the following detail:
[
HPL(x)−HPL(y)]T∆vPL
=
∑
a,s,y
(−dayss∆τasy +∆ρasy)∆fasy −
∑
a,s,y
∆fasy∆ρasy
=
∑
a,s,y
−dayss∆τasy∆fasy
(3.3.3)
[
HPR(x)−HPR(y)]T∆vPR
=
∑
c,s,y
(
dayss
(−∆pinc(c)sy +∆MCPRcsy +∆µc)+∆λcsy)∆qcsy
−
∑
c,s,y
∆qcsy∆λcsy −
∑
c,s,y
dayss∆qcsy∆µc
=
∑
c,s,y
dayss
(−∆pinc(c)sy +∆MCPRcsy )∆qcsy
(3.3.4)
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[
HST (x)−HST (y)]T∆vST
=
∑
r,s=2,3,y
(
dayss
(−∆γnr(r)sy +∆δry +∆ζry)+∆ωrsy)∆xrsy
+
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
(
days1
(
∆τa1y +∆pin2(a)1y +∆MC
ST
ary
−∆δry(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
)
+∆ξry
)
∆gary
+
∑
r,y
(
days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
∆gary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayss∆xrsy
)
∆δry
−
∑
r,s=2,3,y
∆xrsy∆ωrsy −
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
∆gary∆ξry −
∑
r,s=2,3,y
dayss∆xrsy∆ζry
= −
∑
r,s=2,3,y
dayss∆γnr(r)sy∆xrsy
+
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1
(
∆τa1y +∆pin2(a)1y +∆MC
ST
ary
)
∆gary
(3.3.5)
[
HPG(x)−HPG(y)]T∆vPG
=
∑
p,y
(− days3(∆βnp(p)y +∆MCPGpy ) + ∆σpy)∆wpy
−
∑
p,y
∆wpy∆σpy
=
∑
p,y
days3
(−∆βnp(p)y +∆MCPGpy )∆wpy
(3.3.6)
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[
HMK(x)−HMK(y)]T∆vMK + [GMK(x)−GMK(y)]T∆uMK
=
∑
k,m,s,y
dayss
(−∆MRkmsy +∆φmsy)∆lkmsy
+
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
dayss
(
∆τasy +∆pin2(a)sy − (1− lossa)∆φmsy
)
∆hamsy
+
∑
s=2,3,m,y
dayss
(
∆γnm(m)sy −∆φmsy
)
∆umsy
+
∑
m,y
days3
(
∆βnm(m)y −∆φm3y
)
∆vmy
+
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
dayss(1− lossa)∆hamsy∆φmsy
+
∑
m,s=2,3,y
dayss∆umsy∆φmsy
+
∑
m,y
dayss∆vmy∆φmy −
∑
k,m,s,y
dayss∆lkmsy∆φmsy
=
∑
k,m,s,y
−dayss∆MRkmsy∆lkmsy
+
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
dayss
(
∆τasy +∆pin2(a)sy
)
∆hamsy
+
∑
s=2,3,m,y
dayss∆γnm(m)sy∆umsy +
∑
m,y
days3∆βnm(m)y∆vmy
(3.3.7)
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[
GMCC(x)−GMCC(y)]T∆uMCC + [HMCC(x)−HMCC(y)]T∆vMCC
=
∑
a,s,y
dayss
(
∆fasy −∆hamsy
)
∆τasy −
∑
a,r∈R(n1(a)),y
days1∆gary∆τa1y
+
∑
n∈PN,s,y
dayss
( ∑
c∈Cn
∆qcsy −
∑
a∈A(n),m∈M(n1(a))
∆hamsy
)
∆pinsy
−
∑
n∈PN,y
days1
( ∑
a∈A(n),r∈R(n1(a),
∆gary
)
∆pinsy
+
∑
n∈CN,s=2,3,y
dayss
( ∑
r∈Rn
∆xrsy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆umsy
)
∆γnsy
+
∑
n∈CN,y
days3
( ∑
p∈Pn
∆wpy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆vmy
)
∆βny
(3.3.8)
Among those terms in the above equality, we can permute them and have:
−
∑
a,s,y
dayss
(
∆hamsy
)
∆τasy
= −
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
days1∆hamsy∆τasy
(
∵
∑
a
=
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m
)
−
∑
a,r∈R(n1(a)),y
days1∆gary∆τa1y
= −
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1∆gary∆τa1y
(
∵
∑
a,r∈R(n1(a)))
=
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r
)
∑
n∈PN,s,y
dayss
( ∑
c∈Cn
∆qcsy
)
∆pinsy
=
∑
n∈PN,s,y
dayss
( ∑
c∈Cn
∆qcsy∆pinc(c)sy
) (
∵ ∆pinsy = ∆pinc(c)sy,∀c ∈ Cn
)
=
∑
c,s,y
dayss
(
∆qcsy∆pinc(c)sy
) (
∵
∑
n∈PN
∑
c∈c(n)
=
∑
c∈C
)
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−
∑
n∈PN,s,y
dayss
( ∑
a∈A(n),m∈M(n1(a))
∆hamsy
)
∆pinsy
= −
∑
n∈PN,s,y
dayss
( ∑
a∈A(n),m∈M(n1(a))
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
)
(
∵ ∆pinsy = ∆pin2(a)sy,∀a ∈ A(n), n ∈ PN
)
= −
∑
s,y
dayss
( ∑
n∈PN,a∈A(n),m∈M(n1(a))
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
)
= −
∑
s,y
dayss
( ∑
a∈A,m∈M(n1(a))
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
) (
∵
∑
n∈PN
∑
a∈A(n)
=
∑
a∈A
)
= −
∑
s,y
dayss
( ∑
m∈M,a∈A(nm(m))
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
)
= −
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
dayss
(
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
)
−
∑
n∈PN,y
days1
( ∑
a∈A(n),r∈R(n1(a))
∆gary
)
∆pinsy
= −
∑
n∈PN,y
days1
( ∑
a∈A(n),r∈R(n1(a))
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
)
(
∵ ∆pinsy = ∆pin2(a)sy,∀a ∈ A(n), n ∈ PN
)
= −
∑
y
days1
( ∑
a∈A(n),n∈PN,r∈R(n1(a))
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
)
= −
∑
y
days1
( ∑
a,r∈R(n1(a))
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
) (
∵
∑
n∈PN
∑
a∈A(n)
=
∑
a∈A
)
= −
∑
y
days1
( ∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
) (
∵
∑
a,r∈R(n1(a)))
=
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r
)
= −
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1
(
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
)
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∑
n∈CN,s=2,3,y
dayss
( ∑
r∈Rn
∆xrsy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆umsy
)
∆γnsy
=
∑
n∈CN,s=2,3,y
dayss
( ∑
r∈Rn
∆xrsy∆γnr(r)sy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆umsy∆γnm(m)sy
)
(
∵ ∆γnsy = ∆γnr(r)sy,∀r ∈ Rn; ∆γnsy = ∆γnm(m)sy,∀m ∈Mn
)
=
∑
s=2,3,y
dayss
∑
n∈CN
( ∑
r∈Rn
∆xrsy∆γnr(r)sy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆umsy∆γnm(m)sy
)
=
∑
s=2,3,y
dayss
(∑
r
∆xrsy∆γnr(r)sy −
∑
m
∆umsy∆γnm(m)sy
)
(
∵
∑
n∈CN
∑
r∈Rn
=
∑
r∈R
;
∑
n∈CN
∑
m∈Mn
=
∑
m∈M
)
=
∑
s=2,3,r,y
dayss∆xrsy∆γnr(r)sy −
∑
s=2,3,m,y
dayss∆umsy∆γnm(m)sy
∑
n∈CN,y
days3
( ∑
p∈Pn
∆wpy −
∑
m∈Mn
∆vmy
)
∆βny
=
∑
p,y
dayss∆wpy∆βnp(p)y −
∑
m,y
dayss∆vmy∆βnp(p)y
(
∵
∑
n∈CN
∑
p∈Pn
=
∑
p∈P
;
∑
n∈CN
∑
m∈Mn
=
∑
m∈M
)
In summary, we have the following:
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[
GMCC(x)−GMCC(y)]T∆uMCC + [HMCC(x)−HMCC(y)]T∆vMCC
=
∑
a,s,y
dayss∆fasy∆τasy −
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
days1∆hamsy∆τasy
−
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1∆gary∆τa1y +
∑
c,s,y
dayss
(
∆qcsy∆pinc(c)sy
)
−
∑
a∈A(nm(m)),m,s,y
dayss
(
∆hamsy∆pin2(a)sy
)
−
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1
(
∆gary∆pin2(a)sy
)
+
∑
s=2,3,r,y
dayss∆xrsy∆γnr(r)sy −
∑
s=2,3,m,y
dayss∆umsy∆γnm(m)sy
+
∑
p,y
dayss∆wpy∆βnp(p)y −
∑
m,y
dayss∆vmy∆βnp(p)y
(3.3.9)
Summing up (3.3.3)-(3.3.9), we have
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y)
=
∑
c,s,y
dayss
(
∆MCPRcsy
)
∆qcsy +
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1
(
∆MCSTary
)
∆gary
+
∑
p,y
days3
(
∆MCPGpy
)
∆wpy −
∑
k,m,s,y
dayss
(
∆MRkmsy
)
∆lkmsy
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By assumptions (a) and (b), we must, respectively, have
(
∆MCPRcsy
)
∆qcsy > 0,∀c, s, y =⇒
∑
c,s,y
dayss
(
∆MCPRcsy
)
∆qcsy > 0
(
∆MCPGpy
)
∆wpy > 0,∀p, y =⇒
∑
p,y
days3
(
∆MCPGpy
)
∆wpy > 0
By the strict monotonicity assumption (c), the following must be true:
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(
∆MCSTary
)
∆gary > 0,∀r, y =⇒
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
days1
(
∆MCSTary
)
∆gary > 0,∀r, y
=⇒
∑
a∈A(nr(r)),r,y
days1
(
∆MCSTary
)
∆gary > 0
By the strict monotonicity assumption (d), the following must hold:
−
∑
m∈Mn
(
∆MRkmsy
)
∆lkmsy > 0,∀k, n ∈ CN, s, y
=⇒ −
∑
k,m∈Mn,n∈CN,s,y
dayss
(
∆MRkmsy
)
∆lkmsy > 0
=⇒ −
∑
k,m,s,y
dayss
(
∆MRkmsy
)
∆lkmsy > 0
Hence, [F (x)−F (y)]T (x−y) > 0, which implies that F is a strictly monotone
function, and thus MiCP(G,H) has a unique solution.
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3.4 Conclusions
We discussed a deterministic equilibrium model for the natural gas market D-
NGEM, which includes optimization problems for market participants, some strate-
gic, some not, as well as market-clearing conditions for different markets where these
participants are located. with reasonable assumptions on the marginal cost/revenue
functions, an MiCP formulation, denoted D-NGEM-MiCP, are derived from the
model D-NGEM. This MiCP formulation is different from the one in [35] in that
market-clearing conditions for production, storage and peak gas markets are pre-
sented in a format of an NCP instead of an MiCP in [35]. Furthermore, we relaxed
the assumption of bounded prices in [35] using the fact that marginal costs and
revenues are bounded assuming that cost and revenue functions are continuously
differentiable, respectively. Lastly, based on these enhancements, we provided the-
oretical analysis regarding the existence and uniqueness of model D-NGEM.
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Chapter 4
A Stochastic Model S-NGEM with
Recourse Method
In this chapter, we present a stochastic extension to model D-NGEM discussed in
Chapter 3 using the recourse method of stochastic programming. The new model,
denoted S-NGEM, where S stands for stochastic, is a multistage stochastic equilib-
rium model of a finite number of scenarios with random demand. It captures several
important market characteristics not considered by Model D-NGEM, in particular,
the important roles of the spot market which emerges with deregulation to handle
market imbalances caused by random factors.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Two commonly used methods of stochas-
tic programming are introduced in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 discusses the concept
of a scenario tree and associated notation relative to the modeling of the recourse
decisions for the spot market. In Section 4.3, we present the formulation for model
S-NGEM in terms of optimization problems faced by each type of participants and
a series of market-clearing conditions and develop some mathematical properties
in order to derive its NCP/VI formulation from applying KKT conditions to these
optimization problems.
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4.1 Stochastic Programming
Stochastic programming is a generalization of nonlinear programming, whose goal is
to find some policy that is feasible for all (or almost all) the possible data instances.
For example, one possible use of stochastic programming is to maximize or mini-
mize the expectation of some function of the decisions and the random variables,
taking advantage of the fact that probability distributions governing the data are
known or can be estimated, i.e., the recourse method. The general method for solv-
ing stochastic problems is to formulate deterministic equivalents to the constraints
and the objective functions, and to solve the resulting mathematical program with
appropriate algorithms.
4.1.1 Recourse Method
A widely applied and studied stochastic programming model is a two-stage recourse
program. In the first stage, the decision maker takes some action, after which a
random event occurs affecting the outcome of the first-stage decision; in the second
stage, a recourse decision can then be made to compensate for any bad effects that
might have been experienced as a result of the first-stage decision. In particular,
two-stage recourse programs seek to minimize the cost of the first-stage decision plus
the expected cost of the second-stage recourse decision. The following is a general
example of two-stage stochastic linear program with recourse [6].
min cTx+ EωQ(x, ω)
s.t. Ax = b (4.1.1)
x ≥ 0
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where

Q(x, ω) = min q(ω)Ty(ω)
s.t. T (ω)x+W (ω)y(ω) = h(ω)
(4.1.2)
The first linear program (4.1.1) minimizes the first-stage direct costs, cTx
plus the expected recourse cost, Q(x, ω), over all of the possible scenarios while
meeting the first-stage constraints, Ax = b. The recourse cost depends both on x,
the first-stage decision, and on the random event, indexed by ω. The second linear
programming (4.1.2) describes how to choose y(ω) (a second-stage/recourse variable,
a different decision for each random ω). It minimizes the cost qTy subject to some
second-stage/recourse constraints, T (ω)x + W (ω)y(ω) = h(ω). These constraints
can be thought of as requiring some action to correct the system after the random
event occurs.
When ω represents an index for a discrete random variable, (4.1.1) and (4.1.2)
are equivalent to a deterministic linear program as follows:
min cTx+
N∑
i=1
pid
T
i yi
s.t. Ax = b
Tix+Wiyi = hi i = 1, · · · , N (4.1.3)
x > 0
yi ≥ 0,∀i
where N is the number of scenarios associated with random event ω and pi is the
probability associated with the occurrence of scenario i.
For cases where ω represents continuous random variable(s), such deterministic
equivalents are also available, though the form of the deterministic equivalent usually
depends on the problem itself as well as the probability distributions involved and it
86
is not always easy to find a general form. In this dissertation, the random variables
considered by model S-NGEM are assumed discrete. However, it is common practice
to approximate continuous distribution with a discrete distribution in decision and
risk analysis. The bracket median approaches, extended Pearson-Tukey method
and extended Swanson-Megill method are examples of well-known approximation
methods. Studies on the relative performance of difference discrete-distribution
approximations include [49, 48, 70].
Rather than a one-shot decision from a deterministic model, the optimal policy
from such a model is a single first-stage policy and a collection of recourse decisions
defining which second-stage action should be taken in response to each random
outcome. Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2 has illustrated the difference between models
D-NGEM and S-NGEM in this sense.
But most practical decision problems, including what is covered in the dis-
sertation, involve a sequence of decisions that react to outcomes that evolve over
time. A multi-stage stochastic programming approach, an extension to two-stage
stochastic programming in terms of the number of decision time periods involved,
is developed to deal with these situations. In general, the decision variables and
constraints for multistage stochastic programs can still be broken down into the
first-stage decisions and constraints that have nothing to do with the random event,
ω and the recourse decisions and constraints that depend on each random outcome
ω.
4.1.2 Chance-Constraint Method
An alternative stochastic modeling approach is based on the notion of chance-
constraints, which does not require that decisions are feasible for every outcome
of the random parameters, but instead requires feasibility with at least some given
87
probability [75]. Consider the following linear programming:
min cTx
s.t.
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≥ bi, i = 1, · · · ,m (4.1.4)
x ≥ 0
where b ∈ Rm, c ∈ Rn, x ∈ Rn. Suppose that either aij or bi is random, then the
associated probabilistic form is:
min cTx
s.t. P
( n∑
j=1
aijxj ≥ bi
) ≥ αi, i = 1, · · · ,m (4.1.5)
x ≥ 0
where αi is a “satisfaction” or “reliability” level with αi ∈ [0, 1]; and the symbol
P (·) means the probability of (·).
The main task of solving this chance-constraints problem is to find a deter-
ministic equivalent to (4.1.5). The deterministic equivalent will, in general, be a
nonlinear program depending on what is random (aij, bi or c) as well as the partic-
ular probability distribution and independence assumptions.
As an example to (4.1.5), suppose bi is random and its cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is given by Fbi(x). With the assumption that F
−1
bi
(x) exists, a
chance constraint to (4.1.5) for some i is equivalent to
P (bi ≤
n∑
j=1
aijxj) ≥ αi ⇐⇒ Fbi(
n∑
j=1
aijxj) ≥ αi
⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≥ Bα = F−1bi (αi)
where Bα is the smallest value such that Fbi(Bα) = αi [75].
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4.1.3 The Value of Information and Stochastic Solution
There are two key numbers in stochastic programming measuring its performance,
the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EV PI) and the Value of the Stochastic
Solution (V SS) .
Following [6], we introduce several solution values related to these two con-
cepts. To be consistent with the profit-maximizing problems presented in this dis-
sertation, we use maximizing-programs for illustrative purposes. Suppose there is a
stochastic program as follows,
RP ≡ max
x∈S
Eξz(x, ξ) (4.1.6)
where the set S is the feasible region of the decision variable x; symbol E is the
expectation sign; ξ is the (vector of) random variable whose realizations correspond
to the various scenarios ξ. Assuming there exists at least one feasible solution to
it, a solution of (4.1.6) is denoted x∗. The optimal value of (4.1.6) is known in the
literature as the here-and-now solution, denoted RP .
Assuming that we somehow have perfect information about the future knowing
each realization of ξ in advance, then we are able to find the corresponding optimal
solutions for each scenario ξ. The expected value of these optimal values is known
as the wait-and-see solution, denoted WS.
WS ≡ Eξ
[
max
x∈S
z(x, ξ)
]
(4.1.7)
We define the EV PI equal to the WS less the RP as shown in (4.1.8). The
EV PI measures the maximum amount a decision maker would pay in return for
the complete information about the future.
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EV PI ≡ WS −RP (4.1.8)
Due to computational difficulties to solve (4.1.6), a natural alternative is to
solve (4.1.6) by replacing all random variables by their expected values, which is
EV ≡ max
x∈S
z(x, ξ) (4.1.9)
where ξ = E(ξ) is the expectation of the random variable ξ. The optimal solution
to (4.1.9) is denoted as x(ξ). Using this solution to the original stochastic problem
(4.1.6), we have the expected value of using the EV solution (EEV ) as follows.
EEV ≡ Eξ
(
z(x(ξ), ξ)
)
(4.1.10)
The difference between RP and EEV is defined the value of stochastic so-
lution, denoted V SS. The VSS measures the cost of using the expectation of the
uncertainty thus ignoring the stochastic elements in the decision making process.
V SS ≡ RP − EEV (4.1.11)
The following relationship between WS, RP and EEV has been established
for both linear and nonlinear stochastic programming [52, 53]. According to (4.1.12),
the EV PI and V SS must be nonnegative values.
EEV ≤ RP ≤ WS (4.1.12)
Using the concepts presented above, we calculate the WS, RP , and EEV
in the context of an equilibrium model in Chapter 5 of the numerical analysis for
the stochastic equilibrium model to be presented in this chapter. It turns out that
the relationship presented in (4.1.12) does not hold in terms of the expected profits
evaluated by the equilibrium prices and quantities for most of the individual players.
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4.2 A Scenario Tree
In model S-NGEM, market participants face two types of decisions: long-term mar-
ket decisions and spot market decisions. Long-term market decisions have to be
made before random outcomes can be observed. The span for the so-called “long-
term” is the time horizon of the model, which is usually one to three years. Market
participants plan on how much to produce or purchase for each season over the
entire time horizon at the beginning of the time considered, referred to as time
“0”. When the outcome of the random elements is observed, market participants
make decisions for the spot market, which can be adjusted every season depending
on the actual outcome of the randomness. We assume in the model S-NGEM the
possible outcomes for each season cannot be observed until that season begins. In
other words, we cannot anticipate what would happen in the future. The goal of the
participants is to maximize the profits earned from the long-term market plus the
expected profits earned from the spot market. The long-term market decisions can
be thought of as the “first-stage decisions” in the recourse method. While the spot
market is a multi-stage “recourse” to compensate for any bad effects that might
have been caused by all previous decisions. All the decisions for the spot market
are “recourse decisions”, which actually involve more than one time period. In this
section, we introduce new notation regarding the discrete random events related to
the first-stage and recourse decision making for model S-NGEM.
A sample scenario tree for the demand is presented in Figure 4.1. The time
horizon involved in the event tree is one year with three seasons. We assume the
demand for each season has two possible levels, high (Ds,y = 2) or low (Ds,y = 1).
Hence, there are 8 scenarios, each of which can be identified as a branch in the
event tree, e.g., scenario 5 is the branch composed of nodes 2, 5 and 11. The total
number of the possible realizations of the randomness of this example is 14, shown
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respectively as nodes 1 to 14 in Figure 4.1. These events are hereafter referred to as
N1 to N14, respectively. A special node, node 0 is the root of the event tree. This
is the time point when the long-term decisions (or first-stage decisions) are made
therefore it is not a part of the scenario set I. Spot market decisions (or recourse
decisions) are made in response to each random event represented by nodes 1 to 14.
The bold number assigned under each node is the probability of occurrence of the
random event represented by that node.
First, we define sets for random elements. Let I denote the set of possible real-
izations of the random events in the scenario tree, indexed by i. Also, let Is,y denote
the set of possible realizations of the random events related to the season s in year y,
indexed by is,y. Naturally, {I1,1, · · · , Is,y, · · · } forms a partition of I. In the exam-
ple, we have I = {N1, · · · , N14} and three subsets of I, that is, I1,1 = {N1, N2},
I2,1 = {N3, N4, N5, N6} and I3,1 = {N7, N8, N9, N10, N11, N12, N13, N14} for
seasons 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Next, let η(is,y) denote the probability of occurrence of the random event
is,y ∈ Is,y, with ∑is,y∈Is,y η(is,y) = 1, where η(is,y) > 0 for all is,y ∈ I assumed. For
example, the probabilities of the possible realizations in season 2 are respectively, 0.2
for nodes 3 and 4; 0.18 for node 5 and 0.42 for node 6. The sum of the probabilities
of these four occurrences is 1.
Let ψ(is,y) denote the unique immediate predecessor of is,y ∈ Is,y in the event
tree; let Ψ(is,y) denote the unique immediate predecessor of ψ(is,y) in the event
tree. By an abuse of language, sometimes ψ(is,y) and Ψ(is,y) are referred to as
their singleton elements. Let PD(is,y) denote the set consisting of all the prede-
cessors of is,y ∈ Is,y inclusive of is,y in the event tree. For instance, nodes 7 and
8 have the same predecessor, node 3, that is, ψ(N7) = ψ(N8) = {N3}. Similarly,
nodes 9 and 10 share a predecessor, node 4, that is, ψ(N9) = ψ(N10) = {N4}.
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Furthermore, the predecessor of the predecessors for nodes 7-10 is node 1, i.e.,
Ψ(N7) = Ψ(N8) = Ψ(N9) = Ψ(N10) = {N1}. The predecessor set of node 7 is
PD(N7) = {N1, N3, N7}.
In addition, let SC(is,y) denote the set consisting of the all the successors
of is,y ∈ Is,y inclusive of is,y in the event tree; let ISC(is,y) denote the set of the
immediate successors of is,y ∈ Is,y in the event tree; and let IISC(is,y) denote the
set of the immediate successors for ∀˜is,y ∈ ISC(is,y), where i˜s,y, is,y ∈ Is,y in the
event tree. Considering node 1 in Figure 4.1, we have three sets related to suc-
cessors, ISC(N1) = {N3, N4}, IISC(N1) = {N7, N8, N9, N10} and SC(N1) =
{N1, N3, N4, N7, N8, N9, N10}.
In this example, the long-term market decisions are made at node 0. Players
decide on the actions taken for the following seasons, seasons 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
From season 1 on, players make spot market decisions in response to each random
event. Players are aware of the time stages and the random events they stick to.
But the decisions taken by the others at any time stages are beyond the players’
knowledge.
The description of the scenario tree relative to the predecessors and successors
aims to link separate scenarios of the same history together. However, a formulation
based on the enumeration of all random outcomes can become quite cumbersome
as the time horizon increases. In order to alleviate the computational complex-
ity involved in this type of problems, [6] presented a simpler formulation which
decomposes the problem into separate problems for each scenarios and then add
nonanticipativity constraints to link the separate scenarios. Other methods include
an approach proposed in [15] regarding how to eliminate irrelevant scenarios involved
to lessen the computation burden.
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4.3 Model S-NGEM
Model S-NGEM is a multistage stochastic equilibrium model of a finite number of
scenarios developed based on the market structure considered for model D-NGEM.
Both models have the same cost functions, that is, cPRc (·) for producers, cSTr (·)
for storage operators and cPGp (·) for peak gas operators. All the cost functions
are assumed convex and continuously differentiable so that KKT conditions are
equivalent to the original optimization problems. In addition, all the input data for
model D-NGEM, such as pipeline capacity (fa) and production capacity (qc), are
still relevant to model S-NGEM (refer to Table 4.2).
The types of market participants modeled in model S-NGEM are the same
as those incorporated in model D-NGEM, in particular, pipeline operators, produc-
ers, storage operators, peak gas operators and marketers. The objectives for all
these participants are to maximize the sum of net profits of long-term decisions and
expected net profits of spot market decisions subject to capacity and technical re-
strictions for all scenarios. The optimization problems composed of model S-NGEM
are expressed in an extensive form of a stochastic program which explicitly describes
the recourse decision variables for all scenarios. As an alternative, Birge and Lou-
veaux propose in [6] a formulation with nonanticipativity constraints for multi-stage
stochastic problems in order to alleviate the exponential growth of the size of the
formulation as the time horizon increases.
As is done in model D-NGEM, all market participants but marketers are as-
sumed as price-takers in a perfect competition environment. Generally, solving the
individual problem for each price-takers is equivalent to solving a collective problem
which sums the objective functions for all and include the corresponding constraints.
Therefore, for brevity, only the collective problems for each type of price-taking par-
ticipants, denoted (PLS), (PRS), (ST S) and (PGS), are presented in the following
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sections. The superscribes of “S” in the notations stand for stochastic, distinguish-
ing the notations in this chapter from their deterministic counterparts in Chapter
3.
In model S-NGEM, marketers are modeled as Nash-Cournot players for resi-
dential and commercial sectors while price-takers for industrial and electric power
demand sectors. The optimization problem for the individual marketer is denoted
M˜K
S
. Because of the imperfect competition between marketers, a single aggregate
optimization problem for all marketers is not available. A commonly considered
approach for solving Nash equilibrium problems is via NCP/VIs.
The industrial and electric power demand sectors are not modeled to be un-
der the market power of the marketers in model S-NGEM. These two sectors are
able to specify the amount of consumption desired throughout the time horizon in
the model. In contrary, residential and commercial consumption is still controlled
by marketers via inverse demand functions, denoted θ1knsy,is,y , which vary with the
random event i, as opposed to just θknsy in model D-NGEM.
The market-clearing conditions for both the long-term and spot markets inte-
grates all optimization problems together and forms the equilibrium model S-NGEM,
which is shown to be an MiCP under assumptions of positive marginal costs with
positive production.
We organize the assumptions and theorems presented in this chapter in Table
4.1 in terms of market participants and theorem types. Theorems-Type 1, without
additional assumptions, are those that establish the price relationship for the long-
term and spot markets. They are relatively isolated from the other theorems. Gen-
erally speaking, these theorems show that if there is positive activity (e.g., pipeline
flow, production), then the equilibrium long-term market price equals the expected
spot market price. The assumptions made in this chapter are relative to the marginal
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cost functions for producers, storage operators and peak gas operators. They are
very similar to those in Chapter 3. These assumptions can be described briefly as
positive marginal costs with positive production, where the “production” could be
production rates for producers, extraction rates for storage operators or production
rates for the peak gas operators depending on the context. Theorems-Type 2 state
that with positive production, the market prices are always positive, followed by
Theorems-Type 3, which directly lead to Theorem 4.3.14, show how to convert the
market-clearing conditions to instances of MiCPs or NCPs. Theorem 4.3.14 shows
that the model S-NGEM as a whole is an instance of an MiCP.
Table 4.1: Theorems in Chapter 4
Theorems Theorems TheoremsParticipants
Type 1
Assumptions
Type 2 Type 3
Theorems
PL 4.3.1 4.3.2
PR 4.3.3 4.3.1 =⇒ 4.3.4 =⇒ 4.3.5
ST 4.3.6 4.3.2 =⇒ 4.3.7 =⇒ 4.3.8
PG 4.3.9 4.3.3 =⇒ 4.3.10 =⇒ 4.3.11
Industrial and 4.3.1
=⇒ 4.3.14
Electric Power 4.3.2 =⇒ 4.3.12 =⇒ 4.3.13
Sectors 4.3.3
Based on the nomenclature for variables in model D-NGEM, we distinguish
the first-stage and recourse variables in model S-NGEM by superscripts “0” and “1”,
respectively. For example, the production rate for producer c in season s of year y is
denoted qcsy in model D-NGEM. Thus, we use q
0
csy and q
1
csy,is,y in model S-NGEM to
denote the production rates for the first-stage and recourse decisions, respectively.
Note that the recourse variable q1csy,is,y has one more dimension, i
s,y which belongs
to the random event set Is,y for season s in year y, than the corresponding first-
stage variable q0csy because the value of q
1
csy,is,y depends on the actual realization
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of the random events. The season s and year y associated with the random event
is,y should synchronize with the season and year indices of the variable in question.
In general, the indices s and y determine the random event is,y. In the case that
the time point (s and y) associated with the random event i is unclear, we use two
operators s(i) and y(i) to calculate the season and year relative to i. For example, in
equation (4.3.20), the variables q1csy,is,y are summed over a time period of more than
one season so that to be more accurate, they are re-written as q1cs(i)y(i),i, summed
over i subject to a certain condition.
Similar to Table 3.1, Table 4.2 organizes the variables and data used in model
S-NGEM by market agent. Endogenous variables include decision variables and
multipliers for constraints. Exogenous variables in our case are market prices de-
termined by market-clearing conditions. The table also distinguishes the long-term
and spot market variables in a pair of rows. All the variables including multipliers
related to the long-term market are superscripted by “0”, while those for the spot
market are superscripted by “1”.
Note that discounted revenues and costs are not considered for clarity of pre-
sentation as well as given the short timeframe involved. The units for the gas volume,
rate and price are million cubic feet (MMcf), million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d)
and $/Mcf. The objective functions for the players are in thousands of dollars.
All input data for model D-NGEM are also used by model S-NGEM. However,
the reservation chargesRC0asy are specific to the model S-NGEM. Besides, a new type
of data in model S-NGEM is the description of the randomness, i.e, the information
conveyed by the scenario tree introduced in Section 4.2. This includes ηis,y explicitly
shown in the table, and scenario sets and predecessor and successor sets that are
not present in the table.
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Table 4.2: Variables and Data for Model S-NGEM
Endogenous Variables Exogenous
Problems
Decision Variables Multipliers Variables
Data
L* f0asy τ
0
asy η(i
s,y), fa
(PLS)
S** f1asy,is,y ρ
1
asy,is,y τ
1
asy,is,y
L q0csy pi
0
nsy η(i
s,y), qc,
(PRS)
S q1csy,is,y λ
1
csy,is,y ,
µ1
c,i3,|Y |
pi1nsy,is,y prodc,
cPRc (·)
L g0ary, x
0
rsy δ
0
ry γ
0
nsy η(i
s,y), xr,
(STS)
S g1ary,i1,y , x
1
rsy,is,y δ
1
ry,i3,y ,
ω1rsy,is,y ,
ξ1ry,i1,y , ζ
1
ry,i3,y
γ1nsy,is,y gr, kr,
cSTr (·),
τ regasy , RC
0
asy
L w0py β
0
ny η(i
s,y), wp
(PGS)
S w1py,i3,y σ
1
py,i3,y β
1
ny,i3,y c
PG
p (·)
L l0kmsy, h
0
amsy, u
0
msy, v
0
my φ
0
msy τ
0
asy, pi
0
nsy, γ
0
nsy,
β0ny
η(is,y),
τ regasy ,
(MKS)
S l1kmsy,is,y , h
1
amsy,is,y ,
u1msy,is,y , v
1
my,i3,y
φ1msy,is,y τ
1
asy,is,y ,
pi1nsy,is,y ,
γ1nsy,is,y , β
1
ny,i3,y
RC0asy
*: Long-term decision variables; **: Spot market decision variables.
4.3.1 Pipeline Operator
The problem for the pipeline market is denoted (PLS) as shown below. There are
two types of decision variables for pipeline operators, f 0asy, the arc flow in the long-
term market, and f 1asy,is,y , the arc flow for the spot market under different random
outcomes. The objective function as shown in (4.3.1) is a summation of two parts:
the congestion fee income of the long-term market, which is similar to the objective
function (3.1.5) of (PL) in D-NGEM, and the expected congestion fee income of
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the spot market. As τasy in D-NGEM, the terms τ
0
asy and τ
1
asy,is,y , exogenous to
(PLS) but a variable in S-NGEM, are derived from the market-clearing conditions
(4.3.16) and (4.3.17). They represent the congestion fee for the pipeline in the long-
term and spot markets, respectively. The term η(is,y) is the probability associated
with the occurrence of realization is,y. The expected profits for pipeline a from the
spot market are dayssη(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,yf
1
asy,is,y summed over all possible outcomes of the
random perturbation in the time horizon. Constraints (4.3.2) are the upper bound
on the arc flows for all realizations with the lower bounds being zero.
(PLS) max
∑
a∈A
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayss
[
τ 0asyf
0
asy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)τ 1asy,is,yf
1
asy,is,y
]
(4.3.1)
s.t. f 0asy + f
1
asy,is,y ≤ fa (ρ1asy,is,y ≥ 0) ∀a, s, is,y, y (4.3.2)
0 ≤ f 1asy,is,y ,∀is,y, f 0asy ∀a, s, y (4.3.3)
The KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the optimality of
the problem because (PLS) is a linear programming. The KKT conditions to (PLS)
are:
0 ≤ −dayssτ 0asy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y ⊥ f 0asy ≥ 0 ∀a, s, y (4.3.4)
0 ≤ −η(is,y)dayssτ 1asy,is,y + ρ1asy,is,y ⊥ f 1asy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀a, is,y, s, y (4.3.5)
0 ≤ fa − f 0asy − f 1asy,is,y ⊥ ρ1asy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀a, is,y, s, y (4.3.6)
Naturally, (4.3.4) - (4.3.6) have a mathematical structure of an NCP. Let us
define
vPL
S ≡

f 0asy (∀a, s, y)
f 1asy,is,y (∀a, is,y, s, y)
ρ1asy,is,y (∀a, is,y, s, y)
 and (4.3.7)
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HPL
S
(vPL
S
) ≡

− dayssτ 0asy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y (∀a, s, y)
− η(is,y)dayssτ 1asy,is,y + ρ1asy,is,y (∀a, is,y, s, y)
fa − f 0asy − f 1asy,is,y (∀a, is,y, s, y)
 (4.3.8)
Definitions (4.3.7) and (4.3.8) allow the KKT conditions (4.3.4) - (4.3.6) to be
expressed equivalently as
0 ≤ vPLS ⊥ HPLS(vPLS) ≥ 0 (4.3.9)
We establish a relationship between the congestion fees for the long-term mar-
ket and the spot market in Theorem 4.3.1. This theorem states that for any pipeline
arc with a positive flow in a given season and year for the long-term market, the cor-
responding long-term congestion fee for that pipeline (τ 0asy) is greater or equal to the
expected congestion fees for the spot market in that season (
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,y).
In contrast, when some pipeline has positive arc flows under all random outcomes
in some season, the congestion fee for the long-term market in that season has to
be less or equal to the expected congestion fee in the same season. Similar relations
are also established for producers, storage operator and peak gas operators to be
presented in the following sections.
Theorem 4.3.1. For any pipeline arc a ∈ A in seasons s of years y,
a) if the long-term pipeline flow f 0asy > 0, then the long-term market congestion
fee is greater than or equal to the expected spot market congestion fee, that is,
τ 0asy ≥
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,y ;
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b) if the spot market pipeline flow f 1asy,is,y > 0,∀is,y, then the long-term market
congestion fee is less than or equal to the expected spot market congestion fee,
that is, τ 0asy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,y ;
c) if the long-term pipeline flow f 0asy > 0 and spot market pipeline flow f
1
asy,is,y >
0,∀is,y, then the long-term market congestion fee is equal to the expected spot
market congestion fee, that is, τ 0asy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,y .
Proof. a) By (4.3.4), if f 0asy > 0, we see that
dayssτ
0
asy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y (4.3.10)
By (4.3.5), it follows that
η(is,y)dayssτ
1
asy,is,y ≤ ρ1asy,is,y ,∀is,y (4.3.11)
Summing this inequality for all is,y ∈ Is,y, we have
dayss
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)τ 1asy,is,y ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y
= dayssτ
0
asy by (4.3.10)
Therefore, τ 0asy ≥
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)τ 1asy,is,y when f
0
asy > 0.
b) By equation (4.3.5), if f 1asy,is,y > 0,∀is,y, it follows that
η(is,y)dayssτ
1
asy,is,y = ρ
1
asy,is,y ,∀is,y (4.3.12)
The summation of the above equation over is,y ∈ Is,y gives
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dayss
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)τ 1asy,is,y =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y (4.3.13)
Also by (4.3.4), we see that
dayssτ
0
asy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ρ1asy,is,y
= dayss
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)τ 1asy,is,y by (4.3.12)
Clearly, the conclusion follows.
c) The conclusion is evident from parts (a) and (b).
An equilibrium is enforced by market-clearing conditions (4.3.14) – (4.3.17),
which state that the supply of pipeline gas is equal to the demand for all circum-
stances. Equations (4.3.14) and (4.3.15), which are similar to conditions (3.1.12)
and (3.1.13) in model D-NGEM, are market-clearing conditions for the equilibrium
in the long-term market. Besides, Equations (4.3.16), for season 1 when the storage
injection denoted by variable g1ary,i1,y is present, and (4.3.17), for seasons 2 and 3,
are market-clearing conditions for the spot market under different random outcomes,
whose dual variables τ 1asy,is,y are used to measure the congestion fees for each i
s,y ∈ I
accordingly.
days1f
0
a1y =
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
(
τ 0a1y free
) ∀a, y (4.3.14)
dayssf
0
asy =
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
0
amsy
(
τ 0asy free
) ∀a, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.15)
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days1f
1
a1y,i1,y =
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y
(
τ 1a1y,i1,y free
) ∀a, i1,y, y (4.3.16)
dayssf
1
asy,is,y =
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
1
amsy,is,y
(
τ 1asy,is,y free
) ∀a, is,y, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.17)
Note that the congestion fees, τ 0asy and τ
1
asy,is,y associated with market-clearing
conditions (4.3.14) - (4.3.17), are all free. A negative congestion fee can be inter-
preted as an incentives for pipeline users. However, as shown in Theorem 4.3.2,
the congestion fees would not take negative values unless the arc flows are zeros for
both the long-term and spot markets. Also, whenever the arc flow is positive, the
corresponding congestion fee is nonnegative. This means that the total congestion
cost, a product of the pipeline flow and the congestion fees, is always zero when a
negative congestion fee is present. Being a portion of the costs for storage operators
and marketers, a zero congestion cost certainly has no influence on the equilibrium
solution.
Theorem 4.3.2. For a pipeline a ∈ A in season s of year y, the following statements
are true:
(a) if the long-term pipeline flow f 0asy = 0 and the spot market pipeline flow
f 1asy,is,y = 0 for a random outcome i
s,y ∈ Is,y, then the long-term market
congestion fee τ 0asy ≤ 0 and the spot market congestion fee τ 1asy,is,y ≤ 0 for that
random outcome is,y;
(b) if the long-term pipeline flow f 0asy > 0 then the long-term market congestion
fee τ 0asy ≥ 0;
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(c) if the spot market pipeline flow f 1asy,is,y > 0 for a random event i
s,y ∈ Is,y, then
the spot market congestion fee τ 1asy,is,y ≥ 0 for that is,y;
(d) if the long-term market pipeline flow τ 0asy < 0 then the long-term market con-
gestion fee f 0asy = 0.
(e) if the spot market pipeline flow τ 1asy,is,y < 0 for a random event i
s,y ∈ Is,y, then
the spot market congestion fee f 1asy,is,y = 0 for that i
s,y.
Proof. (a) When f 0asy = 0 and f
1
asy,is,y = 0 for an i
s,y, we must have ρ1asy,is,y = 0 for
that is,y by (4.3.6). Also, (4.3.4) and (4.3.5) imply that τ 0asy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y ρ
1
asy,is,y/dayss
and τ 1asy,is,y ≤ ρ1asy,is,y/[dayssη(is,y)]. This shows that τ 0asy ≤ 0 and τ 1asy,is,y ≤ 0 for
that random outcome is,y because ρ1asy,is,y = 0.
(b) When f 0asy > 0, by complementarity, we deduce from (4.3.4) that τ
0
asy =∑
is,y∈Is,y ρ
1
asy,is,y/dayss, which by definition is nonnegative. Therefore, τ
0
asy ≥ 0.
(c) When f 1asy,is,y > 0, by complementarity, we deduce from (4.3.5) that
η(is,y)τ 1asy,is,y = ρ
1
asy,is,y/dayss where ρ
1
asyis,y ≥ 0 and η(is,y) > 0 by definition. There-
fore, τ 1asy,is,y ≥ 0.
(d), (e) are contrapositives of statements (b) and (c), respectively. Therefore
the conclusions follow.
4.3.2 Producer
The production market’s problem is denoted by (PRS) It aggregates all producers
c ∈ C given the assumption of perfect competition in the marketplace for producers.
Producers make decisions on how much to produce in the long-term market, denoted
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q0csy i.e., the first-stage decision, and the spot market, denoted q
1
csy,is,y i.e., the re-
course decision. The nodal production prices faced by producers are denoted pi0nc(c)sy
and pi1nc(c)sy,is,y for the long-term market and spot market, respectively. Both pi
0
nc(c)sy
and pi1nc(c)sy,is,y , exogenous for (PR
S) but overall variables in model S-NGEM, are
derived from the market-clearing conditions (4.3.36) - (4.3.39) for the production
market, by Theorem 4.3.5. Therefore, in the objective function (4.3.18) of (PRS),
the first term daysspi
0
nc(c)syq
0
csy is the long-term seasonal gross income; the second
term η(is,y)daysspi
1
nc(c)sy,is,yq
1
csy,is,y summed over all the possible outcomes i
s,y ∈ Is,y
in season s and year y is the expected seasonal gross income in the spot market. The
last term in the objective function cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y) approximates the aggregate
production costs incurred in the two markets, where (q0csy+ q
1
csy,is,y) is the total pro-
duction rate for random outcome is,y in season s and year y. By (q0csy + q
1
csy,is,y), we
assume that the long-term and spot market production rates are non-discriminative
and additive, which is reasonable because the natural gas is generally considered as
a homogeneous product. Similar assumptions can be found in the storage operator’s
problem (ST S) and the peak gas operator’s problem (PGS). Alternatively, but more
restrictively, we could separately write the costs as cPRc (q
0
csy) + c
PR
c (q
1
csy,is,y), which
assumes the production costs for the long-term and spot markets are additive.
Constraints (4.3.19) stipulate upper bounds on the production capacity with
the lower bounds being zero. Constraints (4.3.20) state that, for each scenario,
the total gas produced to both markets in the time horizon cannot exceed the
production forecast prodc. The term
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S dayssq
0
csy in constraints (4.3.20)
is the total gas produced over time according to the long-term contracts. The
total gas produced over the time horizon under each scenario is summed in the
term
∑
i˜∈PD(i3,|Y |) dayssq
1
cs(˜i)y(˜i),˜i
, where the set PD(i3,|Y |) keeps track of all random
outcomes belonging to the same scenarios; the operators s(i) and y(i) point to the
season and year associated with the realization i, respectively.
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As in the model D-NGEM, the cost function cPRC (·) is assumed convex and
continuously differentiable. Therefore, given that the constraints are affine, the
KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient to solving (PRS) [5].
(PRS) max
∑
c∈C
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayss
{
pi0nc(c)syq
0
csy
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)
[
pi1nc(c)sy,is,y − cPRc (q0csy + q1csy,is,y)
]}
(4.3.18)
s.t. q0csy + q
1
csy,is,y ≤ qc (λ1csy,is,y ≥ 0) ∀c, is,y, s, y (4.3.19)∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssq
0
csy +
∑
i˜∈PD(i3,|Y |)
dayssq
1
cs(˜i)y(˜i),˜i
≤ prodc
(µ1c,i3,|Y | ≥ 0) ∀c, i3,|Y | (4.3.20)
0 ≤ q1csy,is,y ,∀is,y, q0csy ∀c, s, y
The KKT conditions to (PRS) are:
0 ≤ dayss
[
− pi0nc(c)sy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)
∂
(
cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y)
)
∂(q0csy)
]
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
λ1csy,is,y
+ dayss
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | ⊥ q0csy ≥ 0 ∀c, s, y (4.3.21)
0 ≤ dayss
[
− η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y + η(is,y)
∂
(
cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y)
)
∂(q1csy,is,y)
]
+ λ1csy,is,y
+ dayss
∑
i˜∈SC(is,y)⋂ I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
⊥ q1csy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀c, is,y, s, y (4.3.22)
0 ≤ qc − q0csy − q1csy,is,y ⊥ λ1csy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀c, is,y, s, y (4.3.23)
0 ≤ prodc −
(∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssq
0
csy +
∑
i˜∈PD(i3,|Y |)
dayssq
1
cs(˜i)y(˜i),˜i
)
⊥ µ1c,i3,|Y | ≥ 0
∀c, i3,|Y | (4.3.24)
For ease of presentation, hereafter we use MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y and MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y to denote
the marginal cost functions in the long-term and spot markets, respectively. In
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particular,
MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y ≡
∂
(
cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y)
)
∂(q0csy)
,∀c, is,y, s, y (4.3.25)
MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y ≡
∂
(
cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y)
)
∂(q1csy,is,y)
,∀c, is,y, s, y (4.3.26)
Algebraically, given q0csy and q
1
csy,is,y , MC
PRS ,0
csy and MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y have the same
values, that is
MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y =MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y (4.3.27)
In light of the mathematical structure of the KKT conditions (4.3.21) - (4.3.24),
we define
vPR
S ≡

q0csy (∀c, s, y)
q1csy,is,y (∀c, is,y, s, y)
λ1csy,is,y (∀c, is,y, s, y)
µ1c,i3,|Y | (∀c, i3,|Y |)

and (4.3.28)
HPR
S
(vPR
S
) ≡

dayss
(
− pi0nc(c)sy +MCPG
S ,0
csy,is,y
)
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
λ1csy,is,y
+ dayss
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | (∀c, s, y)
dayss
[
− η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y + η(is,y)MCPG
S ,1
csy,is,y
]
+ λ1csy,is,y
+ dayss
∑
i˜∈SC(is,y)⋂ I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
(∀c, is,y, s, y)
qc − q0csy − q1csy,is,y (∀c, is,y, s, y)
prodc −
(∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
dayssq
0
csy +
∑
i˜∈PD(i3,|Y |)
dayssq
1
cs(˜i)y(˜i),˜i
)
(∀c, i3,|Y |)

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(4.3.29)
Definitions of (4.3.28) and (4.3.29) allow the KKT conditions (4.3.21)-(4.3.24)
for all producers c ∈ C to be expressed equivalently as an NCP:
0 ≤ vPRS ⊥ HPRS(vPRS) ≥ 0 (4.3.30)
Theorem 4.3.3 shows the relationship between the long-term market prices
(pi0nsy) and the expected spot market prices (
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1nsy,is,y) for the produc-
tion market, similar to those established in Theorem 4.3.1 for the transportation
market.
Theorem 4.3.3. For a production node n ∈ PN , given q0csy and q1csy,is,y , if there
exists some producer c ∈ Cn such that
(a) if the long-term production rate q0csy > 0, then the long-term production price
is greater than or equal to the expected spot market price, that is, pi0nc(c)sy ≥∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y ; and likewise if
(b) if the spot market production rate q1csy,is,y > 0,∀is,y ∈ Is,y, then the long-term
production price is less than or equal to the expected spot market price, that
is, pi0nc(c)sy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y ;
(c) if the long-term production rate q0csy > 0 and the spot market production rate
q1csy,is,y > 0,∀is,y ∈ Is,y, then the long-term production price is equal to the
expected spot market price, that is, pi0nc(c)sy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y .
Proof. (a) By (4.3.21), if q0csy > 0, we see that
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pi0nc(c)sy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | +
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
(4.3.31)
Meanwhile, it follows by (4.3.22) that
η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y ≤ η(is,y)MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i˜∈SC(is,y)⋂ I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
+
λ1csy,is,y
dayss
, ∀is,y
(4.3.32)
Summing the above inequality for all is,y ∈ Is,y, we have
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
=
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
by (4.3.27)
= pi0nc(c)sy by (4.3.31)
Therefore, when q0csy > 0, pi
0
nc(c)sy ≥
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1csy,is,y .
(b) By (4.3.22), if q1csy,is,y > 0,∀is,y, it follows that
η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y = η(i
s,y)MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i˜∈SC(is,y)⋂ I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
+
λ1csy,is,y
dayss
, ∀is,y
(4.3.33)
Summing the above equations over is,y ∈ Is,y results in the following:
110
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1
c,˜i
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
(4.3.34)
Also by (4.3.21), we see that
pi0nc(c)sy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | +
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
=
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | +
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
by (4.3.27)
=
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y by (4.3.34)
Clearly, when q1csy,is,y > 0,∀is,y, pi0nc(c)sy ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)pi1nc(c)sy,is,y holds.
(c) The conclusion follows immediately from (a) and (b).
A key in the proof of Theorem 4.3.6 is that the long-term production rate q0csy
and the spot market production rate q1csy,is,y are assumed additive. For example,
the cost function cPRc (q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y) based on this assumption leads to the fact that
MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y =MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y as stated in equation (4.3.27). Also, this assumption ensures
that both q0csy and q
1
csy,is,y are interchangeable in the capacity constraints (4.3.19)
and (4.3.20). Without this assumption, the price relationship shown in Theorem
4.3.3 is not necessarily valid.
In order to derive an NCP/VI formulation, as is done in Chapter 3, assump-
tions of positive marginal costs with positive production are assumed for the model
S-NGEM as well, e.g., Assumption 4.3.1 as shown below is the one for the producers.
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Assumption 4.3.1. Given q0csy and q
1
csy,is,y , the following statement holds producer
c ∈ C in season s, year y:
MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y =MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y > 0, when q
0
csy + q
1
csy,is,y > 0, ∀is,y (4.3.35)
Theorem 4.3.4 states that with Assumption 4.3.1 in force, the long-term market
price is greater than zero when the production rate is positive. Similar theorems are
also shown for the storage operators and peak gas operators. These sorts of theorems
play a key role in the formation of the NCP/VI formulation with market-clearing
conditions that has complementary nonnegative market prices.
Theorem 4.3.4. Suppose that Assumption 4.3.1 holds for all producers located at
a production node n. If there exists a producer c ∈ Cn such that
(a) their production rate in the long-term market is positive, that is, q0csy > 0, then
so is the long-term production price at node n, that is, pi0nc(c)sy > 0;
(b) their production rate in the spot market is positive, that is, q1csy,is,y > 0, then
so is the spot market production price at node n, that is, pi1nc(c)sy,is,y > 0.
Proof. (a) From (4.3.21), with positive q0csy, we must have
pi0nc(c)sy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y +
∑
i3,|Y |∈I3,|Y |
µ1c,i3,|Y | +
∑
is,y∈Is,y λ
1
csy,is,y
dayss
By definition, in the above equation, λ1csy,is,y and µ
1
c,i3,|Y | are nonnegative and
η(is,y) is positive. The termMCPR
S ,0
csy,is,y is positive by Assumption 4.3.1. Thus, pi
0
nc(c)sy
must be positive.
(b) From (4.3.22), with positive q1csy,is,y , we must have
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pi1nc(c)sy,is,y =MC
PRS ,1
csy,is,y +
∑
i˜∈SC(is,y)⋂ I3,|Y | µ1c,˜i
η(is,y)
+
λ1csy,is,y
η(is,y)dayss
For the same reasons in part (a), pi1nc(c)sy,is,y must be positive.
The market equilibrium is enforced by the market-clearing conditions. Equa-
tions (4.3.36), for season 1, and (4.3.37) for seasons 2 and 3, are market-clearing
conditions for the long-term production market. Analogously, equations (4.3.38) for
season 1 and (4.3.39) for seasons 2 and 3 are market-clearing conditions for the spot
market. The market-clearing conditions to the production market are as follows:
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
0
c1y =
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
)
∀n ∈ PN, y (4.3.36)
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
0
csy =
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
0
amsy ∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.37)
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
1
c1y,i1,y =
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y
)
∀n ∈ PN, i1,y, y (4.3.38)
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
1
csy,is,y =
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
1
amsy,is,y
∀n ∈ PN, is,y, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.39)
Equations (4.3.40) - (4.3.41) amend the marketing-clearing conditions pre-
sented in (4.3.36) - (4.3.39) by relaxing the equalities to inequalities which imply
that the total supply is greater than or equal to the total demand. The nonneg-
ative market prices pi0nsy and pi
1
nsy,is,y are the dual variables to the corresponding
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market-clearing conditions, for instance, pi1n1y,i1,y is the dual price to the (4.3.42),
the market-clearing condition for season 1 in the spot market.
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
0
c1y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
)
⊥ pi0n1y ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ PN, y (4.3.40)
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
0
csy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
0
amsy ⊥ pi0nsy ≥ 0
∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.41)
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
1
c1y,i1,y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y
)
⊥ pi1n1y,i1,y ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ PN, i1,y, y
(4.3.42)
0 ≤
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
1
csy,is,y −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
1
amsy,is,y ⊥ pi1nsy,is,y ≥ 0
∀n ∈ PN, is,y, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.43)
Theorem 4.3.5 validates that, in the entirety of the model S-NGEM, (4.3.36) -
(4.3.39) along with nonnegative pi0nsy and pi
1
nsy,is,y are equivalent to (4.3.40) - (4.3.43).
With this result, the market-clearing conditions properly coupled with nonnegative
prices are an NCP/VI per se.
Theorem 4.3.5. If Assumption 4.3.1 holds for all c ∈ C , then the system S-PR-
MCC is equivalent to the system S-PR-MCC-NCP, where
S-PR-MCC ≡

NCP (4.3.30)
(4.3.36)− (4.3.39)
pi0nsy ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ PN, s, y
pi1nsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s, y
(4.3.44)
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S-PR-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (4.3.30)
(4.3.40)− (4.3.43)
(4.3.45)
Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying S-PR-MCC also satisfies S-PR-MCC-
NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to S-PR-MCC-NCP will be a
solution to S-PR-MCC as well. Suppose the contrary, that there exists a solution
satisfying S-PR-MCC-NCP such that when s = 1 for some n ∈ PN, y:
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
0
c1y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary +
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
)
and pi0n1y = 0 (4.3.46)
or when s = 2 or 3, for some n ∈ PN, y:
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
0
csy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
0
amsy and pi
0
nsy = 0 (4.3.47)
or when s = 1, for some is,y, n ∈ PN, y:
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
days1q
1
c1y,i1,y−
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y+
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y
)
and pi1n1y,i1,y = 0 (4.3.48)
or when s = 2 or 3, for some is,y, n ∈ PN, y:
0 <
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
1
csy,is,y−
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
1
amsy,is,y and pi
1
nsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.49)
It must respectively follow from (4.3.46)-(4.3.47) and (4.3.48)-(4.3.49) that for
some n ∈ PN, y,
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0 < q0csy ∃c ∈ Cn and pi0nsy = 0 (4.3.50)
or for some is,y, n ∈ PN, y,
0 < q1csy,is,y ∃c ∈ Cn and pi1nsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.51)
However, by Theorem 4.3.4, it follows from 0 < q0csy,∃c ∈ Cn and 0 <
q1csy,is,y ,∃c ∈ Cn that pi0nsy > 0 and pi1nsy,is,y > 0, respectively, for producer c is
located at node n. This contradicts (4.3.50) and (4.3.51), respectively. In other
words, none of the cases presented in (4.3.46) - (4.3.49) are possible. Consequently,
every solution of S-PR-MCC-NCP is also a solution to S-PR-MCC. This completes
the proof.
4.3.3 Storage Operator
The storage market is modeled as a perfectly competitive market. ST S as shown
below is the optimization problem for the storage operators. The objective of prob-
lem (ST S) is to maximize the profits gained in the long-term market plus expected
net profits, expected income minus expected costs, gained both in the spot market.
The incomes for storage operators come from the sales of the gas to marketers.
Since it is a perfectly competitive market, the storage operators have no power to
influence the prices for the storage gas, that is, γ0nr(r)sy and γ
1
nr(r)sy,is,y are exogenous
to problem (ST S). But the storage operators decide on the gas rates (x0rsy and
x1rsy,is,y) sold to the marketers in seasons 2 and 3.
The costs for the storage operators fall into three parts: commodity charges,
transportation costs and production costs. The commodity charge rates, pi0n2(a)1y
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and pi1n2(a)1y,is,y , are fixed for problem (ST
S). Storage operators pay the pipeline
charges, including regulated charges (τ rega1y), congestion charges (τ
0
a1y and τ
1
a1y,i1,y) and
reservation charges (RC0asy) for firm service. Unlike a fixed charge, the reservation
charge, RC0asy is a charge for per unit shipped by firm contracts. The production cost
is approximated by a cost function cSTr (·) which is a function of the total extraction
rates in the long-term and spot markets, i.e., x0rsy+x
1
rsy,i1,y . This setting of the cost
functions differs from the problem (ST ) in model D-NGEM in Chapter 3, where
the storage cost functions take the injection rates as arguments. These two settings
of the cost functions are in essence the same because injection and extraction rates
are related to one another by mass balance constraints. Nevertheless, in model D-
NGEM, all costs are incurred in season 1 and thus there is no explicit cost relevant
to the gas extraction sent to the marketers; while the new cost functions aim to
build a direct cost connection between storage operators and marketers.
One type of constraints needed for the problem (ST S) is the mass balance
constraint, whose counterpart in model D-NGEM is constraint (3.1.38), which stip-
ulates that the total extraction should be equal to the total injection after taking into
account appropriate losses. However, in order to establish further theoretical results
for model S-NGEM, the mass balance constraint is relaxed as shown in constraints
(4.3.53) and (4.3.54), which require that the total exaction be less or equal to the
total injection after pipeline and storage losses for each storage operator r ∈ R in
a year. As a result, under some circumstance, storage operators could have gas left
unsold at the end of the year. Although, in practice, unsold gas is passed on to the
next year’s inventory, the model S-NGEM currently leaves the leftover gas at the
end of each year out of the system. However, this is more of an abstract question
since all the numerical results presented in Chapter 5 show that storage operators
cleared their gas reservoirs in all instances. One possibility is that model S-NGEM
has some mechanism to clear the storage gas, which are unknown to us so far.
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Constraints (4.3.55) and (4.3.56) stipulate upper bounds on the injection and
exaction rate, which are nonnegative variables. Constraints (4.3.57) impose the
maximum volume of the working gas for the storage facilities owned by each storage
operator.
(ST S) max
∑
r∈R
∑
y∈Y
{∑
s=2,3
dayss
(
γ0nr(r)syx
0
rsy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)γ1nr(r)sy,is,yx
1
rsy,is,y
)
− days1
[ ∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(
τ 0a1y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
0
n2(a)1y
+RC0asy
)
g0ary
+
∑
i1,y∈I1,y
η(i1,y)
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(τ 1a1y,i1,y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
1
n2(a)1y,is,y
)g1ary,i1,y
]
−
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)cSTr
(
x0rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y
)}
(4.3.52)
s.t. days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g0ary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy ≥ 0
(δ0ry ≥ 0) ∀r, y (4.3.53)
days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g1ary,Ψ(i3,y)(1− lossa)(1− lossr)− days2x1r2y,ψ(i3,y)
− days3x1r3y,i3,y ≥ 0 (δ1ry,i3,y ≥ 0) ∀i3,y, r, y (4.3.54)
x0rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y ≤ xr (ω1rsy,is,y ≥ 0) ∀is,y, r, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.55)∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(g0ary + g
1
ary,i1,y) ≤ gr (ξ1ry,i1,y ≥ 0) ∀i1,y, r, y (4.3.56)
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy + days2x
1
r2y,ψ(i3,y) + days3x
1
r3y,i3,y ≤ kr
(ζ1ry,i3,y ≥ 0) ∀i3,y, r, y (4.3.57)
0 ≤ g0ary,∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), x0r2y, x0r3y ∀r, y
0 ≤ g1ary,i1,y ,∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), x1r2y,i2,y , x1r3y,i3,y ∀i, r, y
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Assuming that the cost functions cSTr (·) are convex and continuously differen-
tiable, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for solving the problem
ST S since it has a concave objective funtion being maximized and the constraint
set is polyhedral [5]. The KKT conditions to (ST S) are:
0 ≤ dayss
[
− γ0nr(r)sy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)
∂cSTr
(
x0rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y
)
∂x0rsy
+ δ0ry +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ζ1ry,i3,y
]
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ω1rsy,is,y ⊥ x0rsy ≥ 0 ∀r, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.58)
0 ≤ days2
[
− η(i2,y)γ1nr(r)2y,i2,y + η(i2,y)
∂cSTr
(
x0r2y + x
1
r2y,i2,y
)
∂x1r2y,i2,y
+
∑
i˜∈ISC(i2,y)
δ1
ry,˜i
+
∑
i˜∈ISC(i2,y)
ζ1
ry,˜i
]
+ ω1r2y,i2,y ⊥ x1r2y,i2,y ≥ 0 ∀i2,y, r, y (4.3.59)
0 ≤ days3
[
− η(i3,y)γ1nr(r)3y,i3,y + η(i3,y)
∂cSTr
(
x0r3y + x
1
r3y,i3,y
)
∂x1r3y,i3,y
+ δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y
]
+ ω1r3y,i3,y ⊥ x1r3y,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, r, y (4.3.60)
0 ≤ days1
[
τ 0a1y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
0
n2(a)1y
+RC0a1y − δ0ry(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
]
+
∑
i1,y∈I1,y
ξ1ry,i1,y ⊥ g0ary ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y (4.3.61)
0 ≤ days1
[
η(i1,y)
(
τ 1a1y,i1,y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
1
n2(a)1y,i1,y
)
−
∑
i˜∈IISC(i1,y)
δ1
ry,˜i
(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
]
+ ξ1ry,i1,y ⊥ g1ary,i1,y ≥ 0
∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), i1,y, r, y (4.3.62)
0 ≤ days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g0ary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy ⊥ δ0ry ≥ 0
∀r, y (4.3.63)
0 ≤ days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g1ary,Ψ(i3,y)(1− lossa)(1− lossr)− days2x1r2y,ψ(i3,y)
−days3x1r3y,i3,y ⊥ δ1ry,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, r, y (4.3.64)
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0 ≤ xr − x0rsy − x1rsy,is,y ⊥ ω1rsy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀is,y, r, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.65)
0 ≤ gr −
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(g0ary + g
1
ary,i1,y) ⊥ ξ1ry,i1,y ≥ 0 ∀i1,y, r, y (4.3.66)
0 ≤ kr −
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy − days2x1r2y,ψ(i3,y) − days3x1r3y,i3,y ⊥ ζ1ry,i3,y ≥ 0
∀i3,y, r, y (4.3.67)
For brevity, hereafter, we use two simplified terms MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y and MC
STS ,1
rsy,i1,y to
denote the marginal cost functions in the long-term and spot markets, respectively.
That is,
MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y ≡
∂cSTr
(
x0rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y
)
∂x0rsy
(4.3.68)
MCST
S ,1
rsy,is,y ≡
∂cSTr
(
x0rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y
)
∂x1rsy,is,y
(4.3.69)
As is done in Section 4.3.2, given x0rsy and x
1
rsy,is,y , it is true that the marginal
cost functions for the two markets are the same, i.e.,
MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y =MC
STS ,1
rsy,is,y (4.3.70)
Naturally, the KKT conditions to problem (ST S) are equivalent to an NCP
as follows:
0 ≤ vSTS ⊥ HSTS(vSTS) ≥ 0 (4.3.71)
where
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vST
S ≡

x0rsy (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
x1rsy,is,y (∀is,y, r, s = 2, 3, y)
g0ary (∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y)
g1ary,i1,y (∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), i1,y, r, y)
δ0ry (∀r, y)
δ1ry,i3,y (∀i3,y, r, y)
ω1rsy,is,y (∀is,y, r, s = 2, 3, y)
ξ1ry,i1,y (∀i1,y, r, y)
ζ1ry,i3,y (∀i3,y, r, y)

and (4.3.72)
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HST
S
(vST
S
) ≡

dayss
[− γ0nr(r)sy + ∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y + δ
0
ry +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ζ1ry,i3,y
]
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ω1rsy,is,y (∀r, s = 2, 3, y)
days2
[− η(i2,y)γ1nr(r)2y,i2,y + η(i2,y)MCSTS ,1rsy,i2,y
+
∑
i˜∈ISC(i2,y)
(δ1
ry,˜i
+ ζ1
ry,˜i
)
]
+ ω1r2y,i2,y (∀i2,y, r, y)
days3
[− η(i3,y)γ1nr(r)3y,i3,y + η(i3,y)MCSTS ,1rsy,i3,y
+ δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y
]
+ ω1r3y,i3,y (∀i3,y, r, y)
days1
[
τ 0a1y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
0
n2(a)1y
+RC0asy − δ0ry(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
]
+
∑
i1,y∈I1,y
ξ1ry,i1,y (∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), r, y)
days1
[
η(i1,y)
(
τ 1a1y,i1,y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
1
n2(a)1y,i1,y
)
−
∑
i˜∈IISC(i1,y)
δ1
ry,˜i
(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
]
+ ξ1ry,i1,y
∀a ∈ A(nr(r)), i1,y, r, y
days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g0ary(1− lossa)(1− lossr)−
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy (∀r, y)
days1
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
g1ary,Ψ(i3,y)(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
− days2x1r2y,ψ(i3,y) − days3x1r3y,i3,y (∀i3,y, r, y)
xr − x0rsy − x1rsy,is,y (∀is,y, r, s = 2, 3, y)
gr −
∑
a∈A(nr(r))
(g0ary + g
1
ary,i1,y) (∀i1,y, r, y)
kr −
∑
s=2,3
dayssx
0
rsy − days2x1r2y,ψ(i3,y) − days3x1r3y,i3,y (∀i3,y, r, y)

(4.3.73)
The first property we show for problem (ST S) is the price relationship between
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the long-term and spot markets. This is accomplished by Lemma 4.3.1 and Theorem
4.3.6.
Lemma 4.3.1. Considering a particular storage operator r in season s=2 or 3 of
year y, if the long-term extraction rate x0rsy > 0, then δ
0
ry >
∑
i3,y∈I3,y δ
1
ry,i3,y .
Proof. If x0rsy > 0, then by (4.3.63), there exists some a ∈ A(nr(r)) such that
g0ary > 0, which by (4.3.61) implies that:
δ0ry =
τ 0a1y + τ
reg
a1y + pi
0
n2(a)1y
+RC0a1y +
∑
i1,y∈I1,y ξ
1
ry,i1,y
days1
(1− lossa)(1− lossr) (4.3.74)
On the other hand, by (4.3.62), we see that for all a ∈ A(nr(r))
∑
i˜∈IISC(i1,y)
δ1
ry,˜i
≤ η(i
1,y)τ 1a1y,i1,y + η(i
1,y)τ rega1y + η(i
1,y)pi1n2(a)1y,i1,y +
ξ1
ry,i1,y
days1
(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
∀i1,y (4.3.75)
Summing the above equation for all i1,y ∈ I1,y and recall that ∑i3,y∈I3,y(·) =∑
i1,y∈I1,y
∑
i˜∈IISC(i1,y)(·), we have
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
δ1ry,i3,y ≤
∑
i1,y∈I1,y η(i
1,y)
(
τ 1a1y,i1,y + pi
1
n2(a)1y,i1,y
+ τ rega1y
)
+
∑
i1,y∈I1,y ξ
1
ry,i1,y
days1
(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
≤τ
0
a1y + pi
0
n2(a)1y
+ τ rega1y +
∑
i1,y∈I1,y ξ
1
ry,i1,y
days1
(1− lossa)(1− lossr)
by Theorems 4.3.1 and 4.3.3
< δ0ry by (4.3.74)
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Because g0ary > 0 for some a ∈ A(nr(r)), we deduce that q0c1y > 0 for some
c ∈ Cn2(a) by (4.3.36) and f 0a1y > 0 by (4.3.14), both of which further imply that
pi0nc(c)1y ≥
∑
i1,y∈I1,y η(i
1,y)pi1nc(c)1y,i1,y , where n
c(c) refers to the node where c is lo-
cated, i.e., n2(a) in this case; and τ
0
a1y ≥
∑
i1,y∈I1,y η(i
1,y)τ 1a1y,i1,y by Theorems 4.3.3
and 4.3.1, respectively. Furthermore, given that RC0asy is a predetermined positive
rate, the conclusion follows δ0ry >
∑
i3,y∈I3,y δ
1
ry,i3,y .
Theorem 4.3.6. If there exists a storage operator r in season s=2 or 3 year y,
such that if the long-term extraction rate x0rsy > 0, then the price in the long-
term market is greater than the expected one in the spot market, that is, γ0nr(r)sy >∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)γ1nr(r)y,is,y ;
Proof. First, by (4.3.63), the premise of some x0rsy > 0 implies that some g
0
ary >
0 which indicates, by Lemma 4.3.1, that δ0ry >
∑
i3,y∈I3,y δ
1
ry,i3,y . In addition, by
(4.3.58), if some x0rsy > 0, we see that
γ0nr(r)sy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y+δ
0
ry+
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ζ1ry,i3,y+
∑
is,y∈Is,y ω
1
rsy,i3,y
dayss
(4.3.76)
From (4.3.59) for the season 2, we see that
η(i2,y)γ1nr(r)2y,i2,y ≤ η(i2,y)MCST
S ,1
r2y,i2,y +
∑
i˜∈ISC(i2,y)
(
δ1
ry,˜i
+ ζ1
ry,˜i
)
+
ω1rsy,i2,y
days2
, ∀i2,y
(4.3.77)
Similarly, summing this inequality for all i2,y ∈ I2,y, we have
∑
i2,y∈I2,y
η(i2,y)γ1nr(r)2y,i2,y ≤
∑
i2,y∈I2,y
η(i2,y)MCST
S ,1
r2y,i2,y +
∑
i3,y∈I(3,y)
(
δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y
)
+
∑
i2,y∈I2,y
ω1rsy,i2,y
days2
(4.3.78)
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Also, by (4.3.60) for season 3, it follows that
η(i3,y)γ1nr(r)3y,i3,y ≤ η(i3,y)MCST
S ,1
r3y,i3,y + δ
1
ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y +
ω1r3y,i3,y
days3
, ∀i3,y (4.3.79)
Summing this inequality for all i3,y ∈ I3,y, we have
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)γ1nr(r)3y,i3,y ≤
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)MCST
S ,1
r3y,i3,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
(δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y)
+
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ω1r3y,i3,y
days3
(4.3.80)
Combining equations (4.3.78) and (4.3.80) results in one equation as follows
for s = 2, 3:
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)γ1nr(r)sy,is,y ≤
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,1
rsy,is,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
(δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y)
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ω1rsy,is,y
dayss
(4.3.81)
=
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
(δ1ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y)
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ω1rsy,is,y
dayss
by (4.3.70)
<
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y + δ
0
ry +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ζ1ry,i3,y
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
ω1rsy,is,y
dayss
by Lemma 4.3.1
=γ0nr(r)sy by (4.3.76)
This completes the proof.
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The above theorem shows that as long as the extraction rate in the long-term
market is positive, the long-term market price is always greater than the expected
spot market price. This is unlike what was done in Theorems 4.3.1, 4.3.3 for pipeline
operators, producers and Theorem 4.3.9 to be presented for peak gas operators,
respectively. As we can see from the proof, this difference attributes to the existence
of reservation charges, RC0asy for the long-term market, which are not present in
problems (PLS), (PRS) and (PGS).
Next, an important assumption regarding the marginal cost functions of the
storage operators is presented as follows.
Assumption 4.3.2. The marginal cost functions of storage operator r ∈ R meet
the following conditions in seasons 2 and 3 for all years:
MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y =MC
STS ,1
rsy,is,y > 0, when x
0
rsy + x
1
rsy,is,y > 0, ∀is,y (4.3.82)
When positive marginal cost functions with positive extraction rates are as-
sumed (Assumption 4.3.2), Theorem 4.3.7 shows for the problem (ST S) that positive
extraction rates result positive market prices for both the long-term and spot mar-
kets.
Theorem 4.3.7. Suppose that Assumption 4.3.2 holds for all storage operators
located at a consumption node n. If there exists a storage operator r ∈ Rn who
(a) has a positive long-term extraction rate in season s, year y, i.e., x0rsy > 0,
then the corresponding long-term storage gas price for that season at node n
is positive too, that is, γ0nr(r)sy > 0;
126
(b) has a positive extraction rate in season s year y in the spot market, i.e.,
x1rsy,is,y > 0, for some i
s,y, then the corresponding spot market storage gas
price is positive too, that is, γ1nr(r)sy,i1,y > 0 for that i
s,y.
Proof. (a) When x0rsy > 0, by (4.3.58), we see that
γ0nr(r)sy =
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y+δ
0
ry+
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
ζ1ry,i3,y+
∑
is,y∈Is,y ω
1
rsy,i3,y
dayss
(4.3.83)
where
∑
is,y∈Is,y η(i
s,y)MCST
S ,0
rsy,is,y is positive because of Assumption 4.3.2 and that
fact that η(is,y) > 0; δ0ry > 0 as shown in Lemma 4.3.1 as x
0
rsy > 0; ζ
1
ry,i3,y and
ω1rsy,is,y are nonnegative as defined. Therefore, γ
0
nr(r)sy > 0.
(b) When x1rsy,is,y > 0, by (4.3.59) for season 2 we see that
η(i2,y)γ1nr(r)2y,i2,y = η(i
2,y)MCST
S ,1
rsy,i2,y +
∑
i˜∈ISC(i2,y)
(
δ1
ry,˜i
+ ζ1
ry,˜i
)
+
ω1rsy,i2,y
days2
∀i2,y (4.3.84)
or by (4.3.60) for season 3, we see that
η(i3,y)γ1nr(r)3y,i3,y = η(i
3,y)MCST
S ,1
rsy,i3,y + δ
1
ry,i3,y + ζ
1
ry,i3,y +
ω1r3y,i3,y
days3
, ∀i3,y (4.3.85)
In both equations, δ1ry,i3,y , ζ
1
ry,i3,y and ω
1
rsy,is,y are nonnegative by default;
η(is,y)MCST
S ,1
rsy,is,y is positive. Given that η(i
s,y) > 0,∀s = 2, 3, y, γ1nr(r)sy,i1,y > 0
must hold for either season 2 or 3. This completes the proof.
Equations (4.3.86) and (4.3.87) are market-clearing conditions for the storage
gas market. Equation (4.3.86) states that in the long-term market, the total gas
supplied by storage operators located at a consumption node (
∑
r∈Rn dayssx
0
rsy)
should be equal to the total amount demanded by marketers at the same location for
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each high demand season in each year (
∑
m∈Mn dayssu
0
msy). Also, (4.3.87) enforces
such a relation for each possible random outcome is,y ∈ Is,y, where s = 2, 3.
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
0
rsy =
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
0
msy ∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.86)∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
1
rsy,is,y =
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
1
msy,is,y ∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.87)
Next, the two inequalities in (4.3.88) and (4.3.89) relax these original market-
clearing conditions so that the supply of the storage gas by storage operators could
exceed the demand for it by marketers.
0 ≤
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
0
rsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
0
msy ⊥ γ0nsy ≥ 0
∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.88)
0 ≤
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
1
rsy,is,y −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
1
msy,is,y ⊥ γ1nsy,is,y ≥ 0
∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.89)
Coupled with nonnegative prices γ0rsy and γ
0
rsy,is,y as dual variables to the
market-clearing condition relaxations, new market-clearing conditions (4.3.88) and
(4.3.89) are shown to be equivalent to (4.3.86) and (4.3.87) with nonnegative market
prices by Theorem 4.3.8.
Theorem 4.3.8. If Assumption 4.3.2 holds for all r ∈ R, then the system S-ST-
MCC is equivalent to the system S-ST-MCC-NCP, where
S-ST-MCC ≡

NCP (4.3.71)
(4.3.86)− (4.3.87)
γ0nsy ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y
γ1nsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y
(4.3.90)
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S-ST-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (4.3.71)
(4.3.88)− (4.3.89)
(4.3.91)
Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying S-ST-MCC also satisfies S-ST-MCC-
NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to S-ST-MCC-NCP will be a
solution to S-ST-MCC. Suppose the contrary that there exists a solution satisfying
S-ST-MCC-NCP such that for some n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y,
0 <
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
0
rsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
0
msy and γ
0
nsy = 0 (4.3.92)
or for some is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y,
0 <
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
1
rsy,is,y −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
1
msy,is,y and γ
1
nsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.93)
From (4.3.92) and (4.3.93), it must follow that for some n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y,
0 < x0rsy ∃r ∈ Rn and γ0nsy = 0 (4.3.94)
or for some is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y,
0 < x1rsy,is,y ∃r ∈ Rn and γ1nsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.95)
However, either (4.3.94) or (4.3.95) contradicts Theorem 4.3.7. Consequently,
every solution of S-ST-MCC-NCP is a solution to S-ST-MCC. This completes the
proof.
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4.3.4 Peak Gas Operator
The peak gas market is assumed to operate under perfect competition as was the case
in the pervious market studied. Problem (PGS) as shown below, which aggregates
optimization problems for all peak gas operators in the market, is the optimization
problem for the peak gas market. Given that we model this market as serving the
rest of the market only in season 3, problem (PGS) just takes into account those
realizations that could occur in season 3, that is i3,y ∈ I3,y,∀y. The objective for
the peak gas operator is to maximize the expected net profits as shown in (4.3.96),
subject to the capacity constraints (4.3.97). In the objective function, β0np(p)y and
β1np(p)y,i3,y , where n
p(p) specifies the node where peak gas operator p is located,
represent, respectively, the market prices faced by peak gas operator p and are
exogenous to the problem (PGS) but an overall variable for model S-NGEM. The
seasonly supply of peak gas operator p is denoted by w0py and w
1
py,i3,y for the long-
term and spot market, respectively. The cost function for peak gas operator p,
cPGp (·), assumed convex and continuously differentiable, is a function of the total
daily production rates, w0py + w
1
py,i3,y . Constraints (4.3.97) require that the daily
supply rates of peak gas cannot exceed the supply capacity.
(PGS) max
∑
p∈P
∑
y∈Y
days3
{
β0np(p)yw
0
py +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)[β1ny,i3,yw
1
py,i3,y
− cPGp (w0py + w1py,i3,y)
]}
(4.3.96)
s.t. w0py + w
1
py,i3,y ≤ wp (σ1py,i3,y ≥ 0) ∀i3,y, p, y (4.3.97)
0 ≤ w1py,i3,y ,∀i3,y, w0py ∀p, y
Given the convexity of the problem (PGS) and the linearity of the constraint
functions, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the optimality
[5] of the problem. The KKT conditions for problem (PGS) are:
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0 ≤ days3
[
− β0np(p)y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)
∂
(
cPGp (w
0
py + w
1
py,i3,y)
)
∂(w0py)
]
+
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
σ1py,i3,y ⊥ w0py ≥ 0 ∀p, y (4.3.98)
0 ≤ η(i3,y)days3
[
− β1np(p)y,i3,y +
∂
(
cPGp (w
0
py + w
1
py,i3,y)
)
∂(w1py,i3,y)
]
+ σ1py,i3,y ⊥ w1py,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, p, y (4.3.99)
0 ≤ wp − w0py − w1py,i3,y ⊥ σ1py,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, p, y (4.3.100)
As in the case of producer and storage operator, we use two simplified terms
to represent the marginal cost functions for the long term and spot markets. In
particular,
MCPG
S ,0
py,i3,y ≡
∂
(
cPGp (w
0
py + w
1
py,i3,y)
)
∂(w0py)
(4.3.101)
MCPG
S ,1
py,i3,y ≡
∂
(
cPGp (w
0
py + w
1
py,i3,y)
)
∂(w1py,i3,y)
(4.3.102)
Given w0py and w
1
py,i3,y , the two marginal costs have the same values, that is,
MCPG
S ,0
py,i3,y =MC
PGS ,1
py,i3,y (4.3.103)
Similar to the previous analysis, the KKT conditions for all peak gas operators
p ∈ P can be expressed equivalently as
0 ≤ vPGS ⊥ HPGS(vPGS) ≥ 0 (4.3.104)
where
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vPG
S ≡

w0py (∀p, y)
w1py,i3,y (∀i3,y, p, y)
σ1py,i3,y (∀i3,y, p, y)
 and (4.3.105)
HPG
S
(vPG
S
) ≡

days3
[
− β0np(p)y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,0
py,i3,y
]
+
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
σ1py,i3,y (∀p, y)
η(i3,y)days3
[
− β1np(p)y,i3,y +MCPG
S ,1
py,i3,y
]
+ σ1py,i3,y (∀i3,y, p, y)
wp − w0py − w1py,i3,y (∀i3,y, p, y)

(4.3.106)
Similar to the previous analysis, the following theorem shows relationship be-
tween the long-term market prices and spot market prices (ω0py) for the peak gas
market: when the production rate for the long-term market is positive, the long-
term market price (β0ny) is greater than or equal to the expected spot market prices
(
∑
i3,y∈I3,y η(i
3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y). Also, when the production rates for all realizations in
some season are positive, the expected spot market prices for peak gas is greater or
equal to the long-term market price.
Theorem 4.3.9. Considering a consumption node n ∈ CN , if there exists a peak
gas operator p ∈ P n such that
(a) if the long-term production rate w0py > 0, then the long-term peak gas price
is greater than or equal to the expected spot market price, that is, β0np(p)y ≥∑
i3,y∈I3,y η(i
3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y ;
(b) if the spot market production rate w1py,i3,y > 0,∀i3,y, then the long-term peak gas
price is less than or equal to the expected spot market price, that is, β0np(p)y ≤∑
i3,y∈I3,y η(i
3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y ;
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(c) if the long-term production rate w0py > 0 and the spot market production rate
w1py,i3,y > 0,∀i3,y, then the long-term peak gas price is equal to the expected
spot market price, that is, β0np(p)y =
∑
i3,y∈I3,y η(i
3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y .
Proof. (a) By (4.3.98), if w0py > 0, we see that
β0np(p)y =
∑
i3,y∈Is,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,0
py +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
(4.3.107)
Also, by (4.3.99), it follows for all i3,y ∈ I3,y that
η(i3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y ≤ η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,1
py,is,y +
σ1py,i3,y
days3
(4.3.108)
Summing this inequality over all i3,y ∈ I3,y, we have
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y ≤
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,1
py,is,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
=
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,0
py +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
by (4.3.103)
=β0np(p)y by (4.3.107)
Therefore, the conclusion follows.
(b) By equation (4.3.99), if w1py,is,y > 0,∀is,y, it follows that
η(i3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y = η(i
3,y)MCPG
S ,1
py,is,y +
σ1py,i3,y
days3
, ∀i3,y (4.3.109)
Summing the above equations over all is,y ∈ Is,y results in the following:
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∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y =
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,1
py,is,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
(4.3.110)
Also by (4.3.98), we see that
β0np(p)y ≤
∑
i3,y∈Is,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,0
py,i3,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
=
∑
i3,y∈Is,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,1
py,i3,y +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
by (4.3.103)
=
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)β1np(p)y,i3,y by (4.3.110)
(c) The conclusion follows immediately from parts (a) and (b).
This completes the proof.
The condition of positive marginal cost functions under positive production
rates are presented in Assumption 4.3.3, based on which, a relationship between the
peak gas production rates and the peak gas market prices for both the long-term
and spot markets is established in Theorem 4.3.10.
Assumption 4.3.3. Peak gas operator p’s marginal cost function satisfies the fol-
lowing condition for all years:
MCPG
S ,0
py,i3,y =MC
PGS ,1
py,i3,y > 0, when w
0
py + w
1
py,i3,y > 0 ∀i3,y. (4.3.111)
Theorem 4.3.10. Suppose that the marginal cost functions of all the peak gas op-
erators located at a consumption node n satisfy Assumption 4.3.3. If there exists a
peak gas operator p ∈ P n,
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(a) who has a positive production rate in the long-term market, i.e., w0py > 0, then
the corresponding peak gas price at node n is positive too, that is, β0np(p)y > 0;
(b) who has a positive production rate in the spot market, i.e., w1py,i3,y > 0 for
some i3,y, then the corresponding peak gas price at node n is positive too, that
is, β1np(p)y,i3,y > 0.
Proof. (a) From (4.3.98), with positive w0py, we have
β0np(p)y =
∑
i3,y∈Is,y
η(i3,y)MCPG
S ,0
py +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y σ
1
py,i3,y
days3
(4.3.112)
which, by Assumption 4.3.3 implies that β0np(p)y > 0.
(b) From (4.3.99), with positive w1py,i3,y for some i
3,y, we have
β1np(p)y,i3,y =MC
PGS ,1
py,i3,y +
σ1py,i3,y
η(i3,y)days3
, ∃i3,y (4.3.113)
which, by Assumption 4.3.3 implies that β1np(p)y,i3,y > 0 for that i
s,y.
Equations (4.3.114) and (4.3.115) are market-clearing conditions for the peak
gas market for the long-term and spot markets, respectively. Both (4.3.114) and
(4.3.115) state that the total peak gas supplied by peak gas operators located at
a consumption node (
∑
p∈Pn days3w
0
py and
∑
p∈Pn days3w
1
py,i3,y) should equal to the
total peak gas demanded by marketers at the same node (
∑
m∈Mn days3v
0
my and∑
m∈Mn days3v
1
my,i3,y).
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
0
py =
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
0
my ∀n ∈ CN, y (4.3.114)
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
1
py,i3,y =
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
1
my,i3,y ∀i3,y, n ∈ CN, y (4.3.115)
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In (4.3.116) and (4.3.117), the market-clearing conditions (4.3.114) and (4.3.115)
and the corresponding market prices β0ny and β
1
ny,i3,y are constructed as an NCP.
Theorem 4.3.11 shows that this NCP is equivalent to the original formulation.
0 ≤
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
0
py −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
0
my ⊥ β0ny ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ CN, y
(4.3.116)
0 ≤
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
1
py,i3,y −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
1
my,i3,y ⊥ β1ny,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, n ∈ CN, y
(4.3.117)
Theorem 4.3.11. If Assumption 4.3.3 holds for all p ∈ P , then the system S-PG-
MCC is equivalent to the system S-PG-MCC-NCP, where
S-PG-MCC ≡

NCP (4.3.104)
(4.3.114)− (4.3.115)
β0ny ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ PN, y
β1ny,i3,y ≥ 0, ∀is,y, n ∈ PN, y
(4.3.118)
S-PG-MCC-NCP ≡

NCP (4.3.104)
(4.3.116)− (4.3.117)
(4.3.119)
Proof. By construction, any solution satisfying S-PG-MCC also satisfies S-PG-
MCC-NCP. Therefore, we must show that every solution to S-PG-MCC-NCP will
be a solution to S-PG-MCC. Suppose the contrary that there exists a solution
satisfying S-PG-MCC-NCP such that for some n ∈ CN, y:
0 <
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
0
py −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
0
my and β
0
ny = 0 (4.3.120)
or for some is,y, n ∈ CN, y:
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0 <
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
1
py,i3,y −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
1
my,i3,y and β
1
ny,i3,y = 0 (4.3.121)
From (4.3.120) and (4.3.121), it must follow that for some n ∈ CN, y:
0 < w0py,∃p ∈ P n and β0ny = 0 (4.3.122)
or for some is,y, n ∈ CN, y:
0 < w1py,i3,y ,∃p ∈ P n and β1ny,i3,y = 0 (4.3.123)
However, 0 < w0py,∃p ∈ P n in (4.3.122) and 0 < w1py,i3,y ,∃p ∈ P n in (4.3.123)
result in β0ny > 0 and β
1
ny,i3,y > 0 respectively by Theorem 4.3.10, both of which
contradict β0ny = 0 and β
1
ny,i3,y = 0 in (4.3.122) and (4.3.123), respectively. Con-
sequently, every solution of S-PG-MCC-NCP is also be a solution to S-PG-MCC.
This completes the proof.
4.3.5 Marketer
Problem M˜K
S
as shown below is the optimization problem faced by marketer m.
Unlike the model D-NGEM in which marketers have the power to influence the
end-use prices of all the four consumer sectors, marketers in model S-NGEM are
assumed to be Nash-Cournot players only in the residential and commercial sectors
given the fact that the demand in these two sectors is highly seasonal and subject to
factors hardly predictable. They have power to influence these sectors via the inverse
demand functions θknm(m)sy(l
1
kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y), where l
1
kmsy,is,y is the market
supply served by marketer m and l1∗k(−m(n))sy,is,y is “optimal” supply served by other
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marketers located at the same node n as m. As θknsy in model D-NGEM, θ
1
knsy,is,y is
typically assumed continuously differentiable, nonincreasing and nonnegative on the
nonnegative orthant. Conversely, the industrial and electric power sectors, whose
demand are less likely impacted by seasonal factors and are relatively constant
throughout the year, use firm contracts extensively in order to ensure the supply
assurance. Therefore, in model S-NGEM, marketers are assumed to be price-takers
in the industrial and electric power sectors. In addition, the industrial and electric
power sectors are modeled to have options to use both firm contracts (in the long-
term market) and swing/best-efforts contracts (in the spot market) with pipeline
operators. In the long-term market, marketers are obligated to supply industrial
and electric power sectors with gas at predetermined rates, denoted D0knsy over
the time horizon and model-determined prices Θ0knsy, k = 3, 4 and RC
0
asy for firm
pipeline service. The spot market is then used by the two sectors to obtain the extra
gas demand denoted D1knsy,is,y under different scenarios, where the market prices for
these market are denoted Θ1knsy,is,y , k = 3, 4. In this sense, marketers are not modeled
to have market power over the industrial and electric demand any more and thus
the end-use prices for industrial and electric sectors Θ0knsy and Θ
1
knsy,is,y , k = 3, 4 are
determined by market-clearing conditions rather than the inverse demand functions.
The objective for marketer m is to maximize the expected net profits, which
is the difference between expected incomes and expected costs. The income for
marketer m is composed of sales to the industrial and electric power sectors in the
long-term market and the expected sales to all sectors in the spot market. The costs
can be broken down into two categories: commodity charges and pipeline charges
both in the long-term and spot markets. The commodity charges are what marketers
pay for the value of the gas and are exogenous to the problem M˜K
S
. Depending on
the source of the gas, the commodity charge rates are pi0n2(a)sy, γ
0
nm(m)sy or β
0
nm(m)y in
the long-term market and pi1n2(a)sy,is,y , γ
1
nm(m)sy,is,y or β
1
nm(m)y,i3,y in the spot market,
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respectively. The pipeline charges include pipeline regulated charges (τ regasy per Mcf)
whenever the pipeline is used, congestion fees (τ 0asy or τ
1
asy,is,y per Mcf) whenever
using a full pipeline and reservation charges (RC0asy per Mcf) for the firm service.
Constraints (4.3.125) - (4.3.130) state that the amount of gas marketer m can
supply the consumers should be equal to the total amount they purchase from the
producers, storage operators or peak gas operators. Constraints (4.3.125) - (4.3.127)
enforce such a balance for the long-term market and constraints (4.3.128) - (4.3.130)
are for spot market.
(M˜K
S
) max
∑
y∈Y
{∑
s∈S
dayss
[ ∑
k=3,4
Θ0knm(m)syl
0
kmsy
+
∑
k=1,2
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)θ1knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)
l1kmsy,is,y
+
∑
k=3,4
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)Θ1knm(m)sy,is,y l
1
kmsy,is,y
−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
dayss
[(
τ 0asy + τ
reg
asy + pi
0
n2(a)sy
+RC0asy
)
h0amsy
+
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)
(
τ 1asy,is,y + τ
reg
asy + pi
1
n2(a)sy,is,y
)
h1amsy,is,y
]
−
∑
s=2,3
dayss
[
γ0nm(m)syu
0
msy +
∑
is,y∈Is,y
η(is,y)γ1nm(m)sy,is,yu
1
msy,is,y
]
− days3
[
β0nm(m)yv
0
my +
∑
i3,y∈I3,y
η(i3,y)
(
β1nm(m)y,i3,y
)
v1my,i3,y
]}
(4.3.124)
s.t. days1
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am1y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km1y
)
= 0
(φ0m1y) ∀y (4.3.125)
days2
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am2y + u0m2y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km2y
)
= 0
(φ0m2y) ∀y (4.3.126)
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days3
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am3y + u0m3y + v0my −
∑
k=3,4
l0km3y
)
= 0
(φ0m3y) ∀y (4.3.127)
days1
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am1y,i1,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km1y,i1,y
)
= 0
(φ1m1y,i1,y free) ∀i1,y, y (4.3.128)
days2
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m)
(1− lossa)h1am2y,i2,y + u1m2y,i2,y
−
∑
k∈K
l1km2y,i2,y
)
= 0 (φ1m2y,i2,y free) ∀i2,y, y (4.3.129)
days3
( ∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am3y,i3,y + u1m3y,i3,y + v1my,i3,y
−
∑
k∈K
l1km3y,i3,y
)
= 0 (φ1m3y,i3,y free) ∀i3,y, y (4.3.130)
0 ≤ l1kmsy,is,y ,∀is,y, l0kmsy ∀k, s, y
0 ≤ h1amsy,is,y ,∀is,y, h0amsy ∀a ∈ A(nm(m), s, y
0 ≤ u1msy,is,y ,∀is,y, u0msy ∀s = 2, 3, y
0 ≤ v1my,i3,y∀i3,y, v0my ∀y
Problem (M˜K
S
) is a convex program provided that the only nonlinear term,
the revenue function θ1knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
) · l1kmsy,is,y in the objective
function (4.3.124) is concave. The conditions of θ1knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y+l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)·
l1kmsy,is,y being concave was discussed in Section 3.1.5. Given the problem (M˜K
S
)
is a convex programming, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for
optimality [5]. The KKT conditions are:
0 ≤ −Θ0knm(m)sy + φ0msy ⊥ l0kmsy ≥ 0 ∀k = 3, 4, s, y (4.3.131)
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0 ≤ η(is,y)
[
− ∂θ
1
knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)
∂l1kmsy,is,y
l1kmsy,is,y
− θ1knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)]
+ φ1msy,is,y ⊥ l1kmsy,is,y ≥ 0
∀is,y, k = 1, 2, s, y (4.3.132)
0 ≤ −η(is,y)Θ1knm(m)sy,is,y + φ1msy,is,y ⊥ l1kmsy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀is,y, k = 3, 4, s, y
(4.3.133)
0 ≤ τ 0asy + τ regasy + pi0n2(a)sy +RC0asy − (1− lossa)φ0msy ⊥ h0amsy ≥ 0
∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), s, y (4.3.134)
0 ≤ γ0nm(m)sy − φ0msy ⊥ u0msy ≥ 0 s = 2, 3,∀y (4.3.135)
0 ≤ β0nm(m)y − φ0m3y ⊥ v0my ≥ 0 ∀y (4.3.136)
0 ≤ η(is,y)(τ 1asy,is,y + τ regasy + pi1n2(a)sy,is,y)− (1− lossa)φ1msy,is,y ⊥ h1amsy,is,y ≥ 0
∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), is,y, s, y (4.3.137)
0 ≤ η(is,y)γ1nm(m)sy,is,y − φ1msy,is,y ⊥ u1msy,is,y ≥ 0 ∀is,y, s = 2, 3, y (4.3.138)
0 ≤ η(i3,y)β1nm(m)y,i3,y − φ1m3y,i3,y ⊥ v1my,i3,y ≥ 0 ∀i3,y, y (4.3.139)
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am1y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km1y (φ
0
m1y free) ∀y (4.3.140)
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am2y + u0m2y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km2y (φ
0
m2y free) ∀y
(4.3.141)
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am3y + u0m3y + v0my −
∑
k=3,4
l0km3y (φ
0
m3y free) ∀y
(4.3.142)
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am1y,i1,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km1y,i1,y
(φ1m1y,is,y free) ∀i1,y, y (4.3.143)
141
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am2y,i2,y + u1m2y,i2,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km2y,i2,y
(φ1m2y,i2,y free) ∀i2,y, y (4.3.144)
0 =
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am3y,i3,y + u1m3y,i3,y + v1my,i3,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km3y,i3,y
(φ1m3y,i3,y free) ∀i3,y, y (4.3.145)
In light of their mathematical structure, including the KKT conditions for all
marketers m ∈M results in an MiCP as follows:
GMK
S
(uMK
S
, vMK
S
) = 0, uMK
S
free
0 ≤ vMKS ⊥ HMKS(uMKS , vMKS) ≥ 0
(4.3.146)
where
vMK
S ≡

l0kmsy (∀k = 3, 4,m, s, y)
l1kmsy,is,y (∀is,y, k,m, s, y)
h0amsy (∀a ∈ A(nm(m)),m, s, y)
u0msy (∀m, s = 2, 3, y)
v0my (∀m, y)
h1amsy,is,y (∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), is,y,m, s, y)
u1msy,is,y (∀is,y,m, s = 2, 3, y)
v1my,i3,y (∀i3,y,m, y)

(4.3.147)
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HMK
S
(vMK
S
) ≡

−Θ0knm(m)sy + φ0msy (∀k = 3, 4, s, y)
η(is,y)
[
− ∂θ
1
knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)
∂l1kmsy,is,y
l1kmsy,is,y
− θ1knm(m)sy,is,y
(
l1kmsy,is,y + l
1∗
k(−m(n))sy,is,y
)]
+ φ1msy,is,y
(∀is,y, k = 1, 2, s, y)
− η(is,y)Θ1knm(m)sy,is,y + φ1msy,is,y (∀is,y, k = 3, 4, s, y)
τ 0asy + τ
reg
asy + pi
0
n2(a)sy
+RC0asy − (1− lossa)φ0msy
(∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), s, y)
γ0nm(m)sy − φ0msy (s = 2, 3,∀y)
β0nm(m)y − φ0m3y (∀y)
η(is,y)(τ 1asy,is,y + τ
reg
asy + pi
1
n2(a)sy,is,y
)− (1− lossa)φ1msy,is,y
(∀a ∈ A(nm(m)), is,y, s, y)
η(is,y)γ1nm(m)sy,is,y − φ1msy,is,y (∀is,y, s = 2, 3, y)
η(i3,y)β1nm(m)y,i3,y − φ1m3y,i3,y (∀i3,y, y)

(4.3.148)
uMK
S ≡
φ0msy (∀m, s, y)
φ1msy,is,y (∀is,y,m, s, y)
 and (4.3.149)
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GMK
S
(uMK
S
) ≡

∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am1y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km1y (∀y)
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am2y + u0m2y −
∑
k=3,4
l0km2y (∀y)
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h0am3y + u0m3y + v0my −
∑
k=3,4
l0km3y
(∀y)∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am1y,i1,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km1y,i1,y (∀i1,y, y)
∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am2y,i2,y + u1m2y,i2,y −
∑
k∈K
l1km2y,i2,y
(∀i2,y, y)∑
a∈A(nm(m))
(1− lossa)h1am3y,i3,y + u1m3y,i3,y + v1my,i3,y
−
∑
k∈K
l1km3y,i3,y (∀i3,y, y)

(4.3.150)
It is well known that MiCP (4.3.146) is equivalent to a collection, denoted
(MK), of the optimization problems for all the marketers who are strategic players
in an imperfect competition setting [26].
All theoretical results shown in this section consider model S-NGEM in its
entirety with previous results holding. For brevity, we do not state them explicitly
for each result. In Theorem 4.3.12, we show that, for the industrial and electric
power sectors, if a sector located at node n receives a positive supply of gas from
some marketer, the sectoral end-use prices for node n must be positive. We first
present two useful lemmas.
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Lemma 4.3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 hold for all pro-
ducers c ∈ C, storage operators r ∈ R and peak gas operators p ∈ P , respectively.
For a marketer m in the long-term market,
(a) if h0amsy > 0 for some a ∈ A(nm(m)), then φ0msy > 0;
(b) if u0msy > 0, then φ
0
msy > 0 when s = 2, 3;
(c) if v0my > 0, then φ
0
m3y > 0.
Proof. a) First, h0amsy > 0 via (4.3.134) implies that
φ0msy =
τ 0asy + τ
reg
asy + pi
0
n2(a)sy
+RC0asy
1− lossa (4.3.151)
where (1− lossa) is positive, since it does not make sense in reality to have the loss
factor lossa greater than or equal to 1.
In addition, h0amsy > 0 implies that q
0
csy > 0 for some producer c located at
node n2(a) by (4.3.36) in season 1 or (4.3.37) in seasons 2 or 3. Further, by Theorem
4.3.4, we see that when q0csy > 0, pi
0
nc(c)sy > 0, i.e., pi
0
n2(a)sy
> 0 for node n2(a) is where
producer c is located. Also, h0amsy > 0 implies that f
0
asy > 0 by (4.3.14) or (4.3.15)
showing that τ 0asy ≥ 0 by Theorem 4.3.2. Given that pi0n2(a)sy > 0, τ 0asy ≥ 0 and the
fact that τ regasy and RC
0
asy are all positive, φ
0
msy > 0 must hold in (4.3.151).
b) u0msy > 0 via (4.3.135) implies that
φ0msy = γ
0
nm(m)sy (4.3.152)
By the market-clearing condition (4.3.86), u0msy > 0 also implies that x
0
rsy > 0
for some storage operator located where marketer m is. This further indicates that
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the storage price for the node is positive, that is, γ0nm(m)sy > 0 by Theorem 4.3.7.
Therefore φ0msy in (4.3.152) must be positive.
c) In this case, via (4.3.136), v0my > 0 implies that
φ0m3y = β
0
nm(m)y (4.3.153)
On the other hand, by the market-clearing condition (4.3.114), v0my > 0 implies
that w0py > 0 for some peak gas operator p located where marketerm is. By Theorem
4.3.10, this further shows that the peak gas price for this node is positive, that is,
β0nm(m)y > 0. Hence φ
0
m3y > 0 in (4.3.153). This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.3.3. Suppose that Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 hold. For a mar-
keter m in the spot market,
(a) if h1amsy,is,y > 0 for some a ∈ A(nm(m)), then φ1msy,is,y > 0;
(b) if u1msy,is,y > 0, then φ
1
msy,is,y > 0;
(c) if v1my,i3,y > 0, then φ
1
m3y,i3,y > 0.
Proof. a) First, h1amsy,is,y > 1 via (4.3.137) implies that
φ1msy,is,y = η(i
s,y)
τ 1asy,is,y + τ
reg
asy + pi
1
n2(a)sy,is,y
1− lossa (4.3.154)
In addition, h1amsy,is,y > 0 implies that q
1
csy,is,y > 0 for some producer located
at node n2(a) by the market-clearing conditions (4.3.38) or (4.3.39). Further, by
Theorem 4.3.4, we see that when q1csy,is,y > 0, pi
1
nc(c)sy,is,y > 0, i.e., pi
1
n2(a)sy,is,y
> 0
for nc(c) and n2(a) both refer to the same production node where producer c is.
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Also, h1amsy,is,y > 0 shows that f
1
asy,is,y > 0 by market-clearing conditions (4.3.16) or
(4.3.17), showing that τ 1asy,is,y ≥ 0 by Theorem 4.3.2. Given that pi1n2(a)sy,is,y > 0,
τ 1asy,is,y ≥ 0, and the fact that η(is,y) and τ regasy are positive, φ1msy,is,y > 0 must hold
in (4.3.154).
b) u1msy,is,y > 0 via (4.3.138) implies that
φ1msy,is,y = η(i
s,y)γ1nm(m)sy,is,y (4.3.155)
By the market-clearing condition (4.3.87), u1msy,is,y > 0 also implies that
x1rsy,is,y > 0 for some storage operator r located where marketer m is. Thus by
Theorem 4.3.7, the storage price for the node is positive, that is, γ1nr(r)sy,is,y > 0, i.e.,
γ1nm(m)sy,is,y > 0 for in this case, storage operator r and marketer m are located at
the same consumption node. Therefore φ1msy,is,y in (4.3.155) must be positive due
to the fact that η(is,y) > 0.
c) In this case, via (4.3.139), v1my,i3,y > 0 implies that
φ1m3y,is,y = η(i
3,y)β1nm(m)y,i3,y (4.3.156)
By market-clearing condition (4.3.115), v1my,i3,y > 0 implies that w
1
py,i3,y > 0 for
some peak gas operator p located where marketer m is. Thus by Theorem 4.3.10,
the peak gas price for this node is positive, that is, β1nm(m)y,i3,y . Hence φ
1
m3y,i3,y in
(4.3.156) must be positive given that η(i3,y) > 0. This completes the proof.
The following theorem, Theorem 4.3.12 shows that the end-user prices for
the industrial and electric power sectors, Θ0knsy and Θ
1
knsy,is,y are positive when
they receive positive supply from marketers. Note that the end-user prices for the
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residential and commercial sectors are positive in that they are determined by the
inverse demand functions, which are assume nonincreasing and nonnegative on the
nonnegative orthant.
Theorem 4.3.12. Suppose Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are in force for all
c ∈ C, r ∈ R and p ∈ P , respectively. For the industrial and electric power sectors
(k = 3, 4),
(a) if sector k receives a positive supply from some marketer m in the long-term
market, that is, l0kmsy > 0, then the corresponding sectoral end-use price is
positive too, that is, Θ0knm(m)sy > 0;
(b) if sector k receives a positive supply from some marketer m in the spot market,
that is, l1kmsy,is,y > 0, then the corresponding sectoral end-use price is positive
too, that is, Θ1knm(m)sy,is,y > 0.
Proof. (a) First, by (4.3.131), l0kmsy > 0 implies that Θ
0
knm(m)sy = φ
0
msy. By the mass
balance constraints (4.3.140) - (4.3.142), l0kmsy > 0 also implies, respectively, that at
least one of h0amsy, u
0
msy and v
0
my is positive, and Lemma 4.3.2 shows that φ
0
msy > 0.
Therefore, l0kmsy > 0 implies that Θ
0
knm(m)sy > 0.
(b) By (4.3.133), l1kmsy,is,y > 0 implies that η(i
s,y)Θ1knm(m)sy,is,y = φ
1
msy,is,y .
By the mass balance constraints (4.3.143) - (4.3.145), l1kmsy,is,y > 0 also implies,
respectively, that at least one of h1amsy,is,y , u
1
msy,is,y and v
1
my,i3,y is positive, and Lemma
4.3.3 shows that φ1msy,is,y > 0. Therefore, l
1
kmsy,is,y > 0 implies that Θ
1
knm(m)sy,is,y > 0
given that fact that η(is,y) is positive.
Since the inverse demand functions for industrial and electric power sectors
are not in the objective function of problem M˜K
S
, we need a new mechanism to
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establish a relationship between the equilibrium consumption and prices. Thus,
market-clearing conditions (4.3.157) and (4.3.158) are introduced. These condi-
tions state that the total supply of gas from the marketers (dayss
∑
m∈Mn l
0
kmsy and
dayss
∑
m∈Mn l
1
kmsy,is,y) should be equal to the volume demanded by the end-users
(dayssD
0
knsy and dayssD
1
knsy,is,y) in the long-term and spot markets, respectively,
are used to enforce such an equilibrium.
dayss
∑
m∈Mn
l0kmsy = dayssD
0
knsy ∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y (4.3.157)
dayss
∑
m∈Mn
l1kmsy,is,y = dayssD
1
knsy,is,y ∀k = 3, 4, is,y, n ∈ CN, s, y (4.3.158)
In order to have an MiCP formulation, the above two equations need to be
amended into inequalities as shown in (4.3.159) and (4.3.160). The corresponding
dual variables are the prices Θ0knsy and Θ
1
knsy,is,y .
0 ≤ dayss
( ∑
m∈Mn
l0kmsy −D0knsy
)
⊥ Θ0knsy ≥ 0
∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y (4.3.159)
0 ≤ dayss
( ∑
m∈Mn
l1kmsy,is,y −D1knsy,is,y
)
⊥ Θ1knsy,is,y ≥ 0
∀k = 3, 4, is,y, n ∈ CN, s, y (4.3.160)
Theorem 4.3.13 shows how the new system of (4.3.159) and (4.3.160) is equiv-
alent to (4.3.157) and (4.3.158) with nonnegative Θ0knsy and Θ
1
knsy,is,y .
Theorem 4.3.13. Suppose Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are in force for all
c ∈ C, r ∈ R and p ∈ P , respectively. The system S-CM-MCC is equivalent to the
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system S-CM-MCC-NCP, where
S-CM-MCC ≡

MiCP (4.3.146)
(4.3.157)− (4.3.158)
Θ0knsy ≥ 0,∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y
Θ1knsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y
(4.3.161)
S-CM-MCC-NCP ≡

MiCP (4.3.146)
(4.3.159)− (4.3.160)
(4.3.162)
Proof. By construction, any solution to S-CM-MCC is also a solution to S-CM-
MCC-NCP. It suffices to show that any solution to S-CM-MCC-NCP is also a solu-
tion to S-CM-MCC. Suppose there exists a solution to S-CM-MCC-NCP such that
for some k ∈ {3, 4}, n ∈ CN, s, y:
0 < dayss
( ∑
m∈Mn
l0kmsy −D0knsy
)
and Θ0knsy = 0 (4.3.163)
or for some is,y, k ∈ {3, 4}, n ∈ CN, s, y:
0 < dayss
( ∑
m∈Mn
l1kmsy,is,y −D1knsy,is,y
)
and Θ1knsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.164)
This implies that for some k ∈ {3, 4}, n ∈ CN, s, y:
0 < l0kmsy and Θ
0
knsy = 0 (4.3.165)
or for some is,y, k ∈ {3, 4}, n ∈ CN, s, y:
0 < l1kmsy,is,y and Θ
1
knsy,is,y = 0 (4.3.166)
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By Theorem 4.3.12, 0 < l0kmsy in (4.3.165) implies that Θ
0
knsy > 0. This is
a contradiction to Θ0knsy = 0 in (4.3.165). Also, by Theorem 4.3.12, 0 < l
1
kmsy,is,y
in (4.3.166) implies that Θ1knsy,is,y > 0, which is a contradiction to Θ
1
knsy,is,y = 0 in
(4.3.166).
Therefore, any solution to S-CM-MCC is also a solution to S-CM-MCC-NCP.
This completes the proof.
4.3.6 NCP/VI formulation of Model S-NGEM
In this section, we construct an MiCP, which is equivalent to model S-NGEM based
on the previous analysis of its components. We first define the equilibrium model
S-NGEM mathematically.
Definition 4.3.1. The model S-NGEM is a system composed of optimization prob-
lems PLS, PRS, ST S, PGS and M˜K
S
,∀m ∈M , market-clearing conditions (4.3.14)
- (4.3.17), (4.3.36) - (4.3.39), (4.3.86) - (4.3.87), (4.3.114) - (4.3.115) and (4.3.157)
- (4.3.158) as well as nonnegative market price conditions, i.e., pi0nsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈
PN, s, y; pi1nsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s, y; γ0nsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y; γ1nsy,is,y ≥
0,∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y; β0ny ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, y; β1ny,i3,y ≥ 0,∀i3,y, n ∈ CN, y;
Θ0knsy ≥ 0,∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y; Θ1knsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y. That
is,
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S-NGEM ≡

PLS, PRS, ST S, PGS, M˜K
S
,∀m ∈M
(4.3.14)− (4.3.17)
(4.3.36)− (4.3.39)
(4.3.86)− (4.3.87)
(4.3.114)− (4.3.115)
(4.3.157)− (4.3.158)
pi0nsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ PN, s, y
pi1nsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s, y
γ0nsy ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y
γ1nsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y
β0ny ≥ 0,∀n ∈ CN, y
β1ny,i3,y ≥ 0,∀i3,y, n ∈ CN, y
Θ0knsy ≥ 0,∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y
Θ1knsy,is,y ≥ 0,∀is,y, k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y
(4.3.167)
In previous sections, we found NCP/VI equivalents to the components of the
model S-NGEM with appropriate assumptions in Theorems 4.3.5, 4.3.8, 4.3.11 and
4.3.13. Therefore, it is trivial to show that model S-NGEM is an instance of an
MiCP. First, let us define:
(uMCC
S
) ≡
 τ 0asy (∀a, s, y)
τ 1asy,is,y (∀a, is,y, s, y)
 (4.3.168)
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(vMCC
S
) ≡

pi0nsy (∀n ∈ PN, s, y)
pi1nsy,is,y (∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s, y)
γ0nsy (∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
γ1nsy,is,y (∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
β0ny (∀n ∈ CN, y)
β1ny,i3,y (∀i3,y, n ∈ CN, y)
Θ0knsy (∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y)
Θ1knsy,is,y (∀is,y, k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y)

(4.3.169)
GMCC
S ≡

days1f
0
a1y −
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
(∀a, y)
dayssf
0
asy −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
0
amsy (∀a, s = 2, 3, y)
days1f
1
a1y,i1,y −
∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y
−
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y (∀a, i1,y, y)
dayssf
1
asy,is,y −
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
dayssh
1
amsy,is,y
(∀a, is,y, s = 2, 3, y)

(4.3.170)
153
HMCC
S ≡

∑
c∈Cn
days1q
0
c1y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
0
ary
+
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
am1y
)
(∀n ∈ PN, y)
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
0
csy −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
0
amsy
(∀n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y)∑
c∈Cn
days1q
1
c1y,i1,y −
∑
a∈A(n)
( ∑
r∈R(n1(a))
days1g
1
ary,i1,y
+
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
am1y,i1,y
)
(∀i1,y, n ∈ PN, y)
∑
c∈Cn
dayssq
1
csy,is,y −
∑
a∈A(n)
∑
m∈M(n1(a))
days1h
1
amsy,is,y
(∀is,y, n ∈ PN, s = 2, 3, y)∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
0
rsy −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
0
msy (∀n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
∑
r∈Rn
dayssx
1
rsy,is,y −
∑
m∈Mn
dayssu
1
msy,is,y (∀is,y, n ∈ CN, s = 2, 3, y)
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
0
py −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
0
my (∀n ∈ CN, y)
∑
p∈Pn
days3w
1
py,i3,y −
∑
m∈Mn
days3v
1
my,i3,y (∀is,y, n ∈ CN, y)
∑
m∈Mn
dayssl
0
kmsy − dayssD0knsy (∀k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y)
∑
m∈Mn
dayssl
1
kmsy,is,y − dayssD1knsy,is,y (∀is,y, k = 3, 4, n ∈ CN, s, y)

(4.3.171)
Theorem 4.3.14 in the following shows that the model S-NGEM is an instance
of an MiCP mathematically with Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 holding, respec-
tively, for cost functions of all producer, storage operators and peak gas operators.
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Theorem 4.3.14. Let
(uS)T ≡ [(uMKS )T (uMCCS )T ];
(vS)T ≡ [(vPLS )T (vPRS )T (vSTS )T (vPGS )T (vMKS )T (vMCCS )T ];
[GS(uS , vS)]T ≡ [(GMKS )T (GMCCS )T ];
[HS(uS , vS)]T ≡ [(HPLS )T (HPRS )T (HSTS )T (HPGS )T (HMKS )T (HMCCS )T ].
Suppose that Assumptions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 hold for all c ∈ C, r ∈ R
and p ∈ P , respectively. S-NGEM is equivalent to an MiCP, denoted S-NGEM-
MiCP(GS, HS) where
GS(uS, vS) = 0 uS free
0 ≤ vS ⊥ HS(uS, vS) ≥ 0
(4.3.172)
Proof. Following the definition for MiCP, by Theorems 4.3.5, 4.3.8 and 4.3.11, it is
trivial to show the results.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, a stochastic equilibrium model for the natural gas market depicted
in Chapter 2, S-NGEM is developed in an extensive form of stochastic program-
ming. Model S-NGEM takes into account the long-term and spot markets of the
gas industry. The long-term market modeled is featured by supply assurance. The
decision made for the long-term market are first-stage variables. The spot market is
characterized by market uncertainty. The spot market decisions are recourse vari-
ables. Assuming that the marginal cost functions are positive when the production
is positive for producers, storage operators and peak gas operators, model S-NGEM
is shown to be an instance of NCP/VI. The GAMS/PATH solver is thus appropriate
for generating the numerical results presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Example Application of Model S-NGEM
In this chapter, we study numerical results for model S-NGEM using a sample
network of two production nodes and two consumptions nodes with eleven players
for a time horizon of one year. Our goal is to examine how the stochastic aspects
of the market influence the market activities. We use a discretized random demand
following Haurie et al. [45] and De Wolf and Smeers [14].
A base case was calibrated using the data publicly available at www.eia.doe.gov.
The values used are not unrepresentative of actual supply and demand conditions
for a small network. In particular, residential and commercial sectors exhibit strong
seasonality in terms of prices and consumption rates; the industrial consumption is
relative stable throughout the year; the electric power sector has a higher demand
in the summer season; and the end-user industrial and electric power prices are
generally lower than the other two sectors. Varying the parameters relevant to the
probability distribution of the end-user demand resulted in two cases (case 1 and
case 2). A third case, case 3 representing a perfect competition market where all
market players were price-takers was also considered. These cases, arranged in in-
creasing order of the end-user consumption, from low to high, were case 1, base case,
case 2 and case 3. We compare the changes in the equilibrium prices and quantities
for all agents in these three cases as opposed to the base case. We also calculate the
156
expected producer and consumer surplus for comparison purposes.
5.1 Data Set
This section presents the data used for the model S-NGEM. All the data to be
presented were realistic in terms of order of magnitude for small regions but not
real data per se. First, Section 5.1.1 discusses the composition of a sample network
adapted for the case studies. Next, in Section 5.1.2, we discuss the parameters, in-
cluding cost functions, production capacities, pipeline capacities and charges, which
were taken to be deterministic factors for the model. Lastly, in Section 5.1.3, we
present the stochastic parameters, i.e., the coefficients for the demand functions for
the residential and commercial sectors and the spot market demand for the industrial
and electric power sectors.
5.1.1 Sample Network
The sample network has the following elements, which are illustrated in Figures 5.1
and 5.2.
• Two production nodes, denoted pn1 and pn2;
– One producer located at each production node, denoted C1 and C2,
respectively;
• Two consumption nodes, denoted cn1 and cn2;
– Two storage operators, denoted R1 and R2, located respectively at nodes
cn1 and cn2;
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– Two peak gas operators, denoted P1 and P2, located respectively at
nodes cn1 and cn2;
– Four marketers, denoted M1, M2, M3 and M4: M1 and M2 located at
node cn1, M3 and M4 located at node cn2;
– Four consumption sectors located at each consumption node;
∗ Two residential sectors, denoted RD1 and RD2, located respectively
at nodes cn1 and cn2;
∗ Two commercial sectors, denoted CD1 and CD2, located respec-
tively at nodes cn1 and cn2;
∗ Two industrial sectors, denoted ID1 and ID2, located respectively
at nodes cn1 and cn2;
∗ Two electric power sectors, denoted ED1 and ED2, located respec-
tively at nodes cn1 and cn2;
• Four pipeline arcs connecting the production and consumption nodes, denoted
a1, a2, a3 and a4.
cn1 cn2
pn1 pn2
a1
a3a2
a4
Figure 5.1: Sample Network Structure
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Figure 5.2: Sample Network Elements
5.1.2 Deterministic Parameters
The cost functions cPRc (·), cSTr (·) and cPGp (·) respectively for the producers, storage
operators and peak gas operators were taken to be convex and quadratic, thus of the
form α1x+
1
2
α2x
2, where x was the quantity in question and α1, α2 the coefficients.
Table 5.1 presents these coefficients as well as a variety of capacity values used. It is
clear that the pair of producers, storage operators and peak gas operators are taken
to be identical.
Table 5.1: Data for Producers, Storage Operators and Peak Gas Operators
qc xr gr kr wpParticipants α1 α2
(MMcf/d)
lossr
(MMcf/d) (MMcf/d) (MMcf) (MMcf/d)
C1, C2 0.003 0.0018 2500 - - - - -
R1, R2 0.002 0.002 - 0.01 500 500 50000 -
P1, P2 0.5 0.035 - - - - - 200
Table 5.2 shows the set of inputs for the four pipelines in the sample net-
work, including the pipeline capacity, loss factors, regulated pipeline charges and
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reservation charges.
Table 5.2: Data for Pipelines
fa τ
reg
asy ,∀s, y RC0asy,∀s, y
Pipelines
(MMcf/d)
lossa
($/Mcf) ($/Mcf)
Arc a1 2000 0.01 0.15 0.25
Arc a2 900 0.02 0.15 0.25
Arc a3 900 0.02 0.15 0.25
Arc a4 2000 0.01 0.15 0.25
The long-term industrial and electric power consumption, denoted D0knsy when
k = 3, 4 in the model, are shown below in Table 5.3. Although model S-NGEM
allows the parameters D0knsy to vary by season, for simplicity, we set the long-term
demand constant throughout the year, e.g. the long-term demand for the industrial
sector at node cn1 was 700 MMcf/d for all the three seasons.
Table 5.3: Long-term Demand for Industrial and Electric Power Sectors (MMcf/d)
Industrial Demand Electric Power Demand
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Node cn1 700 700 700 420 420 420
Node cn2 650 650 650 400 400 400
5.1.3 Stochastic Parameters
The end-user spot market demand was the only random element in the case study.
At a consumption node, for each season, there were two possible random outcomes in
the demand level, high or low. Therefore, eight scenarios occurred after three seasons
in each node as shown below in Table 5.4, which resulted in 64 scenarios for the
time horizon in the market of two consumption nodes assuming the random demand
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fluctuations at the two nodes were independent. Table 5.4 shows alternatives to
the scenario tree presented in Figure 4.1. For simplicity, we also assumed that
the four demand sectors at the same consumption node were in the same state of
demand, either high demand or low demand, at the same time. For instance, if one
consumption node has a high level of demand, all demand sectors at this location
would have a high demand.
Table 5.4: Random Outcomes for Demand Levels
(a) Node cn1
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
High
(b) Node cn2
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
High
The demand functions for the residential and commercial sectors were of the
form A− By where y was the price in question and A, −B were the intercept and
the slope values, respectively. The uncertainty in the demand allow for the fact that
both A and B could be random. However, in all the cases studied, we assumed that
the intercept A was a random variable while the slope −B was deterministic. In
other words, the demand functions of the same sector at the same node and same
season were parallel to each other in different scenarios. The values of A are shown
in later sections of the case study; the values of B are shown in Table 5.5.
With the sample network and the scenario trees defined in Table 5.4, a linear
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Table 5.5: Slopes of Linear Demand Functions
Residential Demand Commercial Demand
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Node cn1 -35 -60 -90 -38 -65 -85
Node cn2 -31 -57 -85 -35 -60 -82
complementarity problem (LCP) with 6,186 variables resulted, 142 of which were
first stage variables and the remaining 6,044 recourse variables. Note that using
the same network, model D-NGEM would only result in an LCP of 184 variables.
Clearly, the number of the variables in the problem would increase exponentially
when we consider a more complicated example thus giving rise to a great deal of
computational difficulties. The problem was solved using GAMS/PATH software
(www.gams.com, [28]) on a PC computer with a 2.26 GHz IntelrPentiumr4 Pro-
cessor and 1.0GB of memory. The typical CPU time used by GAMS/PATH software
ranged from 5 seconds to 20 seconds. About two minutes were needed to read input
from an EXCEL file and write the output to another EXCEL file.
5.2 Numerical Results
5.2.1 Base Case
In all cases studied in this chapter, nodes cn1 and cn2 were identical in terms of
the probabilities associated with the corresponding random events. Therefore, we
used Table 5.6 to assign probabilities to the random demand levels for the base case
regardless of which node was under consideration. There were two random events,
high demand and low demand for each season. As a result, eight scenarios were
present for the time horizon. Table 5.6 is another expression of the scenario tree
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introduced in Section 4.2. The first columns for each season list all the possible
random realizations indexed by is,y in terms of demand levels. The last columns for
each season show the values for η(is,y), the probability of the occurrence of event
is,y. The second columns for seasons 2 and 3 show the conditional probability of the
occurrence of event is,y. For example, the high demand level in season 2 would occur
after the high demand of season 1 with a probability of 0.48 while the chance that
this event would occur given a high demand in season 1 was 0.8. Note that among
the two outcomes in each season, the high demand outcomes were more likely than
low demand outcomes in terms of associated probabilities.
Table 5.6: Base Case — Random Outcomes and Associated Probabilities for Nodes cn1
and cn2
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event η(i1,1) Event η(i2,1|i1,1) η(i2,1) Event η(i3,1|i2,1) η(i3,1) Scenarios
Low 0.3 0.024 Scenario 1
Low 0.2 0.08
High 0.7 0.056 Scenario 2
Low 0.4
Low 0.3 0.096 Scenario 3
High 0.8 0.32
High 0.7 0.224 Scenario 4
Low 0.3 0.036 Scenario 5
Low 0.2 0.12
High 0.7 0.084 Scenario 6
High 0.6
Low 0.3 0.144 Scenario 7
High 0.8 0.48
High 0.7 0.336 Scenario 8
When jointly considering nodes cn1 and cn2 as a whole, the elements of random
outcomes Is,y and the values of η(is,y) changed. Each random event belonging to I
now corresponds to the demand level of consumption nodes cn1 and cn2 occurring
at the same time. As a result, we see 82 = 64 scenarios on the new scenario tree
as shown in Table 5.7. This tree described all random events for three seasons used
for the base case. Because of the assumption of independence between the random
demand between the two consumption nodes, the product of the probabilities of the
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demand level for each node could be used. For example, the chance that node cn1
had a high demand and node cn2 had a low demand in season 1 was 0.24, which
was the product of probabilities of one event that node cn1 had high demand (0.4)
and the other event that node cn2 had low demand (0.6).
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Table 5.7: Scenario Description for Base Case
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
cn1 cn2 η(i1,1) cn1 cn2 η(i2,1) cn1 cn2 η(i3,1)
Scenarios
Low Low 0.000576 Scenario 1
Low High 0.001344 Scenario 2
Low Low 0.0064
High Low 0.001344 Scenario 3
High High 0.003136 Scenario 4
Low Low 0.002304 Scenario 5
Low High 0.005376 Scenario 6
Low High 0.0256
High Low 0.005376 Scenario 7
High High 0.012544 Scenario 8
Low Low 0.16
Low Low 0.002304 Scenario 9
Low High 0.005376 Scenario 10
High Low 0.0256
High Low 0.005376 Scenario 11
High High 0.012544 Scenario 12
Low Low 0.009216 Scenario 13
Low High 0.021504 Scenario 14
High High 0.1024
High Low 0.021504 Scenario 15
High High 0.050176 Scenario 16
Low Low 0.000864 Scenario 17
Low High 0.002016 Scenario 18
Low Low 0.0096
High Low 0.002016 Scenario 19
High High 0.004704 Scenario 20
Low Low 0.003456 Scenario 21
Low High 0.008064 Scenario 22
Low High 0.0384
High Low 0.008064 Scenario 23
High High 0.018816 Scenario 24
Low High 0.24
Low Low 0.003456 Scenario 25
Low High 0.008064 Scenario 26
High Low 0.0384
High Low 0.018816 Scenario 27
High High 0.018816 Scenario 28
Low Low 0.013824 Scenario 29
Low High 0.032256 Scenario 30
High High 0.1536
High Low 0.032256 Scenario 31
High High 0.075264 Scenario 32
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Table 5.7: (Continued)
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
cn1 cn2 η(i1,1) cn1 cn2 η(i2,1) cn1 cn2 η(i3,1)
Scenarios
Low Low 0.000864 Scenario 33
Low High 0.002016 Scenario 34
Low Low 0.0096
High Low 0.002016 Scenario 35
High High 0.004704 Scenario 36
Low Low 0.003456 Scenario 37
Low High 0.008064 Scenario 38
Low High 0.0384
High Low 0.008064 Scenario 39
High High 0.018816 Scenario 40
High Low 0.24
Low Low 0.003456 Scenario 41
Low High 0.008064 Scenario 42
High Low 0.0384
High Low 0.008064 Scenario 43
High High 0.018816 Scenario 44
Low Low 0.013824 Scenario 45
Low High 0.032256 Scenario 46
High High 0.1536
High Low 0.032256 Scenario 47
High High 0.075264 Scenario 48
Low Low 0.001296 Scenario 49
Low High 0.003024 Scenario 50
Low Low 0.0144
High Low 0.003024 Scenario 51
High High 0.007056 Scenario 52
Low Low 0.005184 Scenario 53
Low High 0.012096 Scenario 54
Low High 0.0576
High Low 0.012096 Scenario 55
High High 0.028224 Scenario 56
High High 0.36
Low Low 0.005184 Scenario 57
Low High 0.012096 Scenario 58
High Low 0.0576
High Low 0.012096 Scenario 59
High High 0.028224 Scenario 60
Low Low 0.020736 Scenario 61
Low High 0.048384 Scenario 62
High High 0.2304
High Low 0.048384 Scenario 63
High High 0.112896 Scenario 64
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Next, we discuss how the values of A, the intercepts of the demand functions,
vary randomly. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the values of A under different random
events for the residential and commercial sectors, respectively. More precisely, the
“low” or “high” demand in the residential and commercial sectors referred to the
relative levels of the values of A in the demand functions rather than the actual
consumption obtained by running the model. The values of A for the “high” demand
levels were universally higher than those in the corresponding “low” demand levels
as shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. As we can see from results shown in Section 5.2.3,
a higher value of A in the demand function did not necessarily lead to a higher
consumption at equilibrium point.
Table 5.8: Base Case — Intercepts of Residential Demand Functions
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 1380 1343.2
Low 912 960
High 1650 1679
Low 349.6 355.2
Low 1500 1460
High 1064 1100
High 1725 1606
Low 1350 1314
Low 893 940
High 1695 1635.2
High 410.4 384.8
Low 1425 1387
High 1092.5 1170
High 1875 1722.8
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Table 5.9: Base Case — Intercepts of Commercial Demand Functions
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 1104 1012
Low 720 768
High 1380 1210
Low 329 329
Low 1200 1100
High 825 880
High 1344 1265
Low 1080 990
Low 697.5 744
High 1308 1309
High 371 367.5
Low 1140 1045
High 862.5 920
High 1440 1342
As modeled, the spot market consumption for the industrial and electric power
sectors are predetermined stochastic elements subject to certain probability distri-
butions. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the the values of D1knsy,is,y ,∀k = 3, 4, the spot
market demand for the industrial and electric power sectors. When the outcomes
were called “high” in these two tables, the associated D1knsy,is,y had a greater values
than those associated with random outcomes of low demand.
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Table 5.10: Base Case — Industrial Demand in Spot Market (MMCf/d)
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 56 58.5
Low 35 39
High 105 97.5
Low 14 19.5
Low 56 58.5
High 63 65
High 91 117
Low 56 58.5
Low 35 39
High 77 97.5
High 28 32.5
Low 56 58.5
High 63 65
High 126 130
Table 5.11: Base Case — Electric Power Demand in Spot Market (MMCf/d)
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 8.4 16
Low 63 60
High 21 32
Low 105 100
Low 8.4 16
High 126 140
High 25.2 40
Low 8.4 16
Low 58.8 80
High 33.6 60
High 189 140
Low 8.4 16
High 142.8 120
High 42 80
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The numerical results for the base case are presented in Tables B.1 to B.20 in
Appendix B. Table B.1 shows the seasonal flow rates of pipeline arcs in the long-
term and spot markets. For example, in the long-term market, the gas flow rates
carried by arc a1 were 1,131.1 MMcf/d, 1,131.31 MMcf/d and 1,017.92 MMcf/d for
seasons 1,2 and 3, respectively. Note that there was no flow along arcs a2 and a3
in the long-term market. The spot market had 64 possible scenarios as established
in Table 5.7. For instance, in scenario 1, the flow rates along arc a1 was 592.06
MMcf/d, 686.46 MMcf/d and 809.33 MMcf/d for seasons 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Table B.2 shows the seasonal congestion fees for each pipeline arc in the long-term
and spot markets. Note that the congestion fees for arc a3 for season 1 in the long-
term market were negative, -0.02$/Mcf; meanwhile, the corresponding pipeline flow
rates were zero. This fact was consistent with Theorem 4.3.2, which stated that
when the congestion fee τ 0asy,is,y is less than zero, then the pipeline flow is f
1
asy,is,y
zero. Thus negative fees are unimportant. In the table, some congestion charges
were shown as $(0.00), which were actually the results of rounding off negative values
very close to zeros. For example, the congestion fee charged for arc a1 in season
1 of scenario 1, shown as $(0.00) in Table B.2, was accurately -2.7E-13, which can
be considered as zero instead of a negative number taking into account the solver
tolerance.
Tables B.3 and B.4 present the seasonal production rates and prices for pro-
ducers in both long-term and spot markets. Producers had positive production
rates over the time horizon for both markets. Also, it can be verified from Table
B.8 that the long-term production prices were equal to the expected spot market
prices, which was in accordance with Theorem 4.3.3.
Table B.5 shows the storage injection and extraction rates. The injection rates
are shown in the columns under label “Season 1”, followed by columns for extraction
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rates in Seasons 2 and 3. In this case, storage operators did not have long-term
activities. The storage operators served the spot market for all random outcomes.
Table B.6 shows the storage gas prices faced by marketers. The storage gas prices
were always higher than production prices because of the pipeline transportation
charges and the positive marginal cost functions MCST
S ,1
rsy,is,y .
Tables B.7 and B.8 show the production activities and the market prices for
the peak gas operators, respectively. Peak gas operators p1 and p2 contracted to
supply the markets with gas at 112.26 MMcf/d and 112.03 MMcf/d, respectively.
In only three scenarios 32, 48 and 64, the peak gas operators supplied gas for the
spot market. As an example of Theorem 4.3.9, we note that the expected price for
peak gas in the spot market at node cn1 was $4.33/Mcf, which was less than the
corresponding long-term market price $4.46/Mcf when the long-term supply of peak
gas was positive, i.e., 112.26 MMcf/d as shown in Table B.7.
Given a random event, if both the storage and peak gas served the market,
the prices for these two types of gas must be the same, e.g., prices for storage gas
and peak gas were both $4.45/Mcf for node cn2 in scenario 32 or $4.46/Mcf for
node cn1 in scenario 60. This fact follows from the KKT conditions (4.3.138) and
(4.3.139) and implies that storage gas and peak gas were substitutions goods for the
marketers.
Tables B.9 and B.10 summarize the consumption rates and end-user wholesale
prices for the residential sector, respectively. Tables B.11 and B.12 are the equivalent
tables for the commercial sectors. These two sectors were under the market power
of marketers and were not modeled with contracted long-term demand as opposed
to the industrial and electric power sectors.
Tables B.13 and B.14 show the consumption rates and end-user wholesale
prices for the industrial sector, respectively. Whereas tables B.15 and B.16 are
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for the electric power sector. The long-term consumption for these two sectors
was determined by the input of the data presented in Table 5.3. The spot market
consumption was based on data in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. Note that the industrial
and electric power sectors at the same locations had identical end-user prices. This
can be explained by the KKT conditions (4.3.131) and (4.3.132). Taking the long-
term market as an example, from (4.3.131), we see that for some marketer m, when
l0kmsy > 0, it must follow that Θ
0
knm(m)sy = φ
0
msy, where φ
0
msy is independent of the
index k. Thus, Θ03nm(m)sy = Θ
0
4nm(m)sy as long as l
0
3msy > 0 and l
0
4msy > 0, which
was universally true for all four marketers as shown in Tables B.17 - B.20. Similar
reasoning can be used to explain the identical spot market prices of industrial and
electric power sectors at the same location.
Also, we see that the end-user wholesale prices for residential and commer-
cial sectors were higher than those for industrial and commercial sectors. These
differences were caused by the market power that marketers had in the residential
and commercial sectors. In fact, in case 3 when the market power was lifted, the
differences between these sectoral prices disappeared further validating this line of
reasoning.
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5.2.2 Case 1
In this case, the probabilities for high demand were exchanged with those for low
demand so that the low demand outcomes were more favorable. As shown in Table
5.12, for example, the high demand in season 2 had a chance of 0.2, instead of 0.8
in the base case. All other data remained the same as in the base case. Generally
speaking, for both the input or output, case 1 represented a lower demand market
with less consumption and lower market prices.
Table 5.12: Case 1 — Random Outcomes and Probabilities for Nodes cn1 and cn2
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event η(i1,1) Event η(i2,1|i1,1) η(i2,1) Event η(i3,1|i2,1) η(i3,1)
Low 0.7 0.336
Low 0.8 0.48
High 0.3 0.144
Low 0.6
Low 0.7 0.084
High 0.2 0.12
High 0.3 0.036
Low 0.7 0.224
Low 0.8 0.32
High 0.3 0.096
High 0.4
Low 0.7 0.056
High 0.2 0.08
High 0.3 0.024
Table 5.22 examines the expected profits (i.e., the optimal values of the objec-
tive functions) for each player in the different cases and the respective percentage
differences as opposed to the base case. We see that all players in case 1 were
worse off in terms of expected profits, especially the storage operators whose profits
dropped off by more than 40%. Additionally, the last row of the table shows the
expected producer surplus, which is the sum of the expected profits of all players.
The producer surplus reduced by -13.14% compared with the base case. Also, Table
5.23 compares the expected consumer surplus in terms of the residential and com-
mercial demand sectors. The consumer surplus for the industrial and electric power
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sectors are not shown in this table since we do not have explicit demand functions
for these two demand sectors in the model. Because this case represented a low
consumption scenario, it is reasonable to observe decreases in the consumer surplus
for the residential and commercial sectors.
Next, Table 5.13 compares the results of case 1 with those of the base case in
the aspects of equilibrium quantities and market prices faced by market suppliers
(i.e., producers, storage operators and peak gas operators) and consumers (i.e., four
demand sectors) in both the long-term and spot markets. Activities (the rates of
gas bought and sold) directly related to marketers, who are the middlemen between
suppliers and consumers, can be inferred from what was shown for the suppliers and
consumers and thus were not compared in the table. The “rates” in the table, on
the supply side, are production rates (q0csy, q
1
csy,is,y) for producers C1, C2; injection
rates (g0ary, g
1
ary,i1,y) in season 1 and extraction rates (x
0
rsy, x
1
rsy,is,y) in seasons 2 and
3 for storage operators R1 and R2; peak gas production rates (w0py, w
1
py,i3,y) for peak
gas operators P1 and P2. For the end-user side, “rates” refer to consumption rates.
Also, on the supply side, the “prices” refer to production prices (pi0nsy, pi
1
nsy,is,y) in the
row for producers, storage gas prices (γ0nsy, γ
1
nsy,is,y) for storage operators and peak
gas prices (β0ny, β
1
ny,i3,y) for peak gas operators. For the four consumption sectors,
“prices” are end-user prices.
The top part of Table 5.13 compares the long-term rates and prices of case 1
with the base case. We use “same”, “up” or “down” to explain whether the results in
case 1 were the same as, greater than or less than their counterparts in the base case.
The second part of the table summarizes the differences in the spot market for all
outcomes between these two cases. For brevity, the word same/up/down used in this
part means, respectively, same/greater/less for all random outcomes. For instance,
a “down” means that the value from case 1 was less than the base case for all
random outcomes. For mixed results, we would specify which case dominates. The
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Table 5.13: Case 1 v.s. Base Case — Overview
Long-Term Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Same Same Up Down Down Down
R1, R2 Same Same Same - Down Down
P1, P2 - - Down - - Down
RD1, RD2 - - - - - -
CD1, CD2 - - - - - -
ID1, ID2 Same Same Same Down Down Down
ED1, ED2 Same Same Same Down Down Down
Spot Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Down Up Up Down Up Up
R1, R2 Down Down Down - Up Up
P1, P2 - - Up - - Up
RD1, RD2 Up Down Down Down Up Up
CD1, CD2 Up Down Down Down Up Up
ID1, ID2 Same Same Same Down Up Up
ED1, ED2 Same Same Same Down Up Up
Total end-user consumption: Down
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total consumption shown in the last row of the table was the aggregate consumption
volume of the four sectors over the three seasons. Similar tables were also used in
Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 to compare cases 2 and 3 with the base case.
The activities of players in the long-term market did not change much. The
aggregate gas produced in each season for the long-term market was the same be-
cause the long-term demand D0kmsy as shown in Table 5.3 was unchanged. However,
producers produced more while peak gas operators produced less in season 3 al-
though the total was the same. Storage operators remained nonactive. Meanwhile,
seasonal long-term market prices were lower both on the supply and demand sides.
For all scenarios in the spot market, producers produced less in season 1 while
more in seasons 2 and 3. Storage operators injected less gas in season 1 and thus
less gas was extracted in seasons 2 and 3. Peak gas operators had more peak gas
supply in season 3. The residential and commercial sectors had higher consumption
rates in season 1 but lower in seasons 2 and 3. However, the total consumption
volume over seasons decreased for both sectors. The consumption for the industrial
and electric power sectors was the same as in the base case.
In terms of the prices in the spot market, wellhead prices were lower in season
1 but higher in seasons 2 and 3; storage gas prices were higher for both seasons 2
and 3; peak gas prices were higher; thus it was reasonable to see that four demand
sectors had lower prices in season 1 and higher prices in seasons 2 and 3.
Furthermore, Table 5.14 shows the percentage differences of the expected rates
and prices in the spot market between case 1 and the base case. It is generally true
that expected rates and prices decreased from the base case. The rates for peak gas
were the exception showing 6.62% and 34.45% increases for peak gas operators p1
and p2, respectively. However,the absolute differences the two numbers representing
were only 0.05 MMcf/d and 0.21MMcf/d, respectively.
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Table 5.14: Case 1 v.s. Base Case — Expected Rates and Prices in Spot market
Expected Rates Expected Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1 -9.90% -14.08% -12.11% -3.61% -6.78% -6.15%
C2 -9.00% -12.50% -12.11% -3.61% -6.41% -6.53%
R1 -23.92% -26.98% -18.97% - -6.96% -6.31%
R2 -22.41% -24.45% -19.51% - -6.79% -4.48%
P1 - - 6.62% - - -8.11%
P2 - - 34.45% - - -7.96%
RD1 -3.02% -12.26% -13.72% -3.26% -9.82% -10.27%
RD2 -0.86% -12.62% -9.94% -2.25% -10.12% -8.31%
CD1 -1.76% -12.74% -11.41% -2.83% -9.44% -8.72%
CD2 -1.49% -12.53% -13.06% -2.71% -9.54% -9.49%
ID1 -12.50% -30.04% -25.97% -3.45% -6.96% -6.31%
ID2 -9.52% -26.88% -29.09% -3.44% -6.79% -6.34%
ED1 -10.81% -38.14% -46.55% -3.45% -6.96% -6.31%
ED2 -6.45% -31.53% -47.49% -3.44% -6.79% -6.43%
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5.2.3 Case 2
In this case, we increased the demand for all high demand outcomes from the base
case. In particular, the demand intercept values of A of the residential and com-
mercial demand functions were increased by a certain amount for the high demand
outcomes. Also, the spot market demand D1knsy,is,y for the industrial and electric
power sectors was doubled all high demand outcomes. The other data remained
unchanged from the base case.
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 present the values of A used for the residential and
commercial sectors in this case. Those underlined values in the tables increased
by approximately 5% to 20% of their counterparts in the base case. Tables 5.17
and 5.18 show the spot market demand values of D1knsy,is,y used for industrial and
electric power sectors in this case. Those underlined in the tables were double of
their counterpart in the base case. Generally speaking, this case represents a higher
demand scenario as opposed to the base case.
Table 5.15: Case 2 — Intercepts of Residential Demand Functions
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 1380 1343.2
Low 912 960
High 1800 1898
Low 349.6 355.2
Low 1500 1460
High 1178 1200
High 1950 1752
Low 1350 1314
Low 893 940
High 1890 1810.4
High 440.8 399.6
Low 1425 1387
High 1235 1340
High 2250 1985.6
In terms of the expected profits, it is reasonable to see from Table 5.22 that
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Table 5.16: Case 2 — Intercepts of Commercial Demand Functions
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 1104 1012
Low 720 768
High 1560 1320
Low 329 329
Low 1200 1100
High 900 960
High 1488 1430
Low 1080 990
Low 697.5 744
High 1416 1518
High 392 385
Low 1140 1045
High 975 1040
High 1680 1584
Table 5.17: Case 2 — Industrial Demand in Spot Market(MMcf/d)
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 56 58.5
Low 35 39
High 210 195
Low 14 19.5
Low 56 58.5
High 126 130
High 182 234
Low 56 58.5
Low 35 39
High 154 195
High 56 65
Low 56 58.5
High 126 130
High 252 260
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Table 5.18: Case 2 — Electric Power Demand in Spot Market(MMCf/d)
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2 Event Node cn1 Node cn2
Low 8.4 16
Low 63 60
High 42 64
Low 105 100
Low 8.4 16
High 252 280
High 50.4 80
Low 8.4 16
Low 58.8 80
High 67.2 120
High 378 280
Low 8.4 16
High 285.6 240
High 84 160
all players in case 2 were doing better in their expected profits. In particular, both
storage operators had their profits doubled. The fact of increased profits for players
can be explained as a result of the high demand market with higher consumption
and prices. Also, as shown in Table 5.23, the consumer surplus in all the residential
and commercial sectors increased leading to a total increase by 17.32% as opposed
to the base case.
Similar to what was done done for case 1, Table 5.19 compares case 2 with the
base case in terms of equilibrium rates and market prices for both the supply and
demand sides of the market. For the most part, case 2 represented a high demand
market where the consumption rates and prices were all higher.
The long-term consumption rates remained the same since no data in Table
5.3 were varied. The long-term demand was supplied by producers and peak gas op-
erators. There were no storage activities in the long-term market. We also observed
that all the long-term prices went up, which is the opposite of case 1.
The changes in the spot market were more complicated than case 1. With
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increased intercepts of the demand functions, we see significant increases in the
end-user consumption rates for the residential and commercial sectors in most cases,
accordingly accompanied by increased market prices. However, in some cases, the
rates reduced and so did the corresponding prices while in others, reduced rates
came with increased prices. On the other hand, the increases in the industrial and
electric demand were determined by the parameter changes shown in Tables 5.17
and 5.18; the corresponding prices for the four sectors were up for most random
outcomes. It was generally true that for each random outcome, the changes of
prices were determined by the upstream prices. For example, if the wellhead price
increased, then so did the downstream, including storage gas, peak gas and end-
user prices. Lastly, we noticed that the aggregate end-user consumption of the four
sectors across seasons was higher than the base case except scenario 1 where the
demand levels were low for three seasons in both nodes.
Further, in order to have more insight, we compared the expected spot market
rates and prices of case 2 with the base case as shown in Table 5.20. For suppli-
ers, both the rates and market prices increased significantly. Note that although
expected production rates of peak gas increased by over 2000%, the absolute val-
ues increased by only 15 MMcf/d or so. Except the commercial sectors, CD1 and
CD2 experienced consumption decreases by insignificant percentages, -0.16% and
-0.29%, respectively in season 1, we see significant increases in the expected end-user
consumption rates. Also, the expected end-user prices exhibited universal increases.
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Table 5.19: Case 2 v.s. Base Case — Overview
Long-Term Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Same Same Down Up Up Up
R1, R2 Same Same Same - Up Up
P1, P2 - - Up - - Up
RD1, RD2 - - - - - -
CD1, CD2 - - - - - -
ID1, ID2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
ED1, ED2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
Spot Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Up Mostly Up Mostly Up Up Mostly Up Mostly Up
R1, R2 Up Up Up - Mostly Up Mostly Up
P1, P2 - - Up - - Up
RD1, RD2 Mostly Up Mostly Up Mostly Up Up Mostly Up Mostly Up
CD1, CD2 Mostly Up Mostly Up Mostly Up Up Mostly Up Mostly Up
ID1, ID2 By Table 5.17 Up Mostly Up Mostly Up
ED1, ED2 By Table 5.18 Up Mostly Up Mostly Up
Total end-user consumption: Up except Scenario 1
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Table 5.20: Case 2 v.s. Base Case — Expected Rates and Prices in Spot market
Expected Rates Expected Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1 23.19% 24.30% 10.22% 8.45% 10.74% 17.28%
C2 23.26% 22.30% 9.19% 9.32% 10.75% 17.33%
R1 20.45% 17.53% 26.90% - 10.56% 18.20%
R2 19.30% 16.86% 25.00% - 10.66% 16.57%
P1 - - 2019.87% - - 17.13%
P2 - - 2472.47% - - 15.55%
RD1 2.86% 9.90% 10.15% 6.32% 10.20% 13.90%
RD2 -0.16% 10.26% 7.17% 4.73% 10.43% 11.60%
CD1 0.49% 9.06% 5.39% 5.81% 9.91% 12.15%
CD2 -0.29% 9.16% 9.56% 5.44% 9.94% 13.41%
ID1 75.00% 87.94% 81.71% 8.91% 10.56% 18.20%
ID2 71.43% 87.10% 82.64% 8.90% 10.66% 16.71%
ED1 72.97% 90.10% 90.41% 8.91% 10.56% 18.20%
ED2 67.74% 87.80% 89.89% 8.90% 10.66% 16.71%
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5.2.4 Case 3
This case studied a perfectly competitive market where all players were price-takers
including marketers, based on data of the base case.
In terms of expected profits, all players but the marketers were better off,
especially the storage operators whose profits increased by 370.84% and 342.10%,
respectively. Without market power, the marketers had zero profits. The drop
in the marketers’ profits shifted to other players’ profits and the consumer surplus.
Also, we observed dramatic increases in the consumer surplus for the residential and
commercial demand sectors. These increases included the deadweight loss recovered
by lifting imperfect competition from the market.
Table 5.21 presents the differences between case 3 and the base case. Similar
to what was observed for cases 1 and case 2, the rates in the long-term market were
relatively stable while the corresponding prices either on the supply side or demand
side rose. In the spot market, the supply rates all increased with increased supply
prices since the setup of cost functions, i.e., positive marginal costs, implied that the
more produced, the more expensive the product. The consumption rates increased
for the residential and commercial sectors, where marketers could not exert their
market power any more. As a result, the corresponding end-user prices dropped for
the two sectors. However, the industrial and electric power sectors suffered price
increases because of the increase of the upstream prices. Note that after lifting
the market power on the residential and commercial sectors, price discrimination
disappeared and thus the four sectors faced common end-user prices.
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Table 5.21: Case 3 v.s. Base Case — Overview
Long-Term Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Same Same Down Up Up Up
R1, R2 Same Same Same N/A Up Up
P1, P2 - - Up - - Up
RD1, RD2 - - - - - -
CD1, CD2 - - - - - -
ID1, ID2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
ED1, ED2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
Spot Market
Rates Prices
Participants
Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 1 Season 2 Season 3
C1, C2 Up Up Up Up Up Up
R1, R2 Up Up Up - Up Up
P1, P2 - - Up - - Up
RD1, RD2 Up Up Up Down Down Down
CD1, CD2 Up Up Up Down Down Down
ID1, ID2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
ED1, ED2 Same Same Same Up Up Up
Total end-user consumption: Up
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Table 5.22: Expected Profits for Players (Million Dollars)
Participants Base Case Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
C1 1,191.8 1,081.8/-9.23% 1,456.4/22.20% 1,619.3/35.87%
C2 1,185.3 1,077.3/-9.11% 1,459.9/23.16% 1,617.9/36.49%
R1 8.0 4.6/-43.22% 17.5/117.18% 38.0/371.84%
R2 8.6 5.0/-41.67% 17.4/101.88% 38.0/342.10%
P1 6.9 6.0/-12.93% 10.2/46.48% 14.8/114.10%
P2 6.9 6.0/-13.17% 9.8/42.93% 14.3/107.82%
M1 399.4 324.0/-18.88% 469.7/17.60% 0/-100%
M2 399.4 324.0/-18.88% 469.7/17.60% 0/-100%
M3 458.1 376.0/-17.91% 536.3/17.07% 0/-100%
M4 458.1 376.0/-17.91% 536.3/17.07% 0/-100%
Producer Surplusa 4,122.5 3.580.8/-13.14% 4,983.1/20.87% 3,342.4/-18.92%
aThe pipeline operators’ profits are not included since their costs are not modeled in (PL).
Table 5.23: Expected Consumer Surplus (Million Dollars)
Participants Base Case Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
RD1 525.9 423.1/-19.55% 628.4/19.48% 1,031.7/96.16%
RD2 602.5 496.6/-17.57% 706.6/17.29% 1,204.3/99.89%
CD1 272.8 224.9/-17.57% 311.0/13.99% 504.5/84.92%
CD2 313.7 255.4/-18.56% 365.9/16.67% 596.4/90.14%
Consumer Surplusa 1,714.9 1,400.0/-18.36% 2,011.9/17.32% 3,336.8/94.58%
aThe surplus of the industrial and electric power sectors are not included.
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5.3 V SS and EV PI
Several concepts related to the performance of stochastic programming were pre-
sented in Section 4.1.3. Here, we use these concepts in the context of a stochastic
equilibrium model to quantitatively evaluate the advantage of using a stochastic
solution, from both the market and the individual players’ perspectives, as opposed
to a deterministic one. In particular, we explore the WS, RP and EEV for the
four cases presented above. In fact, these four cases themselves indeed are examples
of the here-and-now solution concept. Thus, the values of the RP for the players’
profit and consumer surplus, can be found in Tables 5.22 and 5.23, respectively. In
what follows, the calculations for WS and EEV are presented.
First, we define zi(x, ξ) the profit/consumer surplus for player/demand sector
i choosing the decision x under scenario ξ. The choice of x is obtained by solving
an overall stochastic equilibrium problem for various players, which is formulated
as an MiCP as shown in Theorem 4.3.14. This differs from what was discussed in
Section 4.1.3 for the stochastic programming, where the x is the result of solving an
optimization problem.
In the wait-and-see case, it is assumed that all players have same access to
the information about the future. As a result, we solve an overall MiCP for each
scenario ξ, i.e., S-NGEM-MiCP(GS, HS, ξ) (see Theorem 4.3.14 for the definition),
where ξ is treated as a parameter. The solution for each of these MiCP is denoted
x(ξ), which implies that the WS for player i is
WSi ≡ Eξ
[
zi(x(ξ), ξ)
]
(5.3.1)
Also, we can use the expected value ξ of the random variable random ξ to solve
an alternative problem. Thus, the resulting MiCP is S-NGEM-MiCP(GS, HS, ξ),
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whose solution is x(ξ). Thus the EEV for player i is
EEV i ≡ Eξ
[
zi(x(ξ), ξ)
]
(5.3.2)
Based on the preceding descriptions for the WS, RP and EEV , Tables 5.24 -
5.27 show these three values for the four cases as well as EV PI and V SS by market
agent. From these tables, we observe that the EV PI and V SS have negative values
for some agents in various cases. In general, this means that the relationship shown
in (4.1.12) (i.e., EEV ≤ RP ≤ WS) does not hold in equilibrium problems. How-
ever, these negative values are very small as compared with EEV , RP orWS. Some
of them might be numerical errors caused by the solver’s tolerance. Concentrating
on the value for the stochastic solution, V SS, we further observe that
• Marketers and the producer surplus have positive V SS in the four cases. These
values for V SS are relatively significant as compared with the V SS for the
other players. Thus, the stochastic solutions are favorable for marketers and
the entire market. Note that the marketers are the only players in the market
who explicitly face the random demand in their objective functions and thus
this corresponds best to the case of “regular stochastic programming” with
just one optimization problem.
• In general, the consumer surplus for the residential and commercial sectors
have positive V SS in the four cases, except for the commercial demand sec-
tor CD1 in case 3, which has very small negative V SS of $-0.048 million as
opposed to a here-and-now solution of $504.5 million. Thus, the stochastic so-
lution is generally advantageous to the residential and commercial consumers.
• Producer C2, storage operator R1 and peak gas operator P2 have all positive
V SS for the four cases. While producer C1, storage operator R2 and peak gas
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operator P1 have mixed values for the V SS. Therefore, a stochastic solution
is not necessary a better choice for these players, who see the random demand
implicitly via the market-clearing conditions and do not have as much control
over it as for example, the marketers.
We learn from these values of the V CC that a stochastic solution for an equi-
librium model generally improves the profits of the players as well as the consumer
surplus. However, the observation of the negative V SS cannot be explained accu-
rately without further investigation.
In terms of the EV PI, it seems that the perfect information does not bring
significant returns to the players in that the values of EV PI are generally insignifi-
cant as opposed to the values of RP orWS and some players (e.g., producers C1 and
C2) even suffered losses as a result of the perfect information. Since this dissertation
is concerned with the stochastic solution rather than the perfect information, we do
not elaborate on the details regarding the EV PI for the various agents. Further
research on these phenomena is certainly desired.
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Table 5.24: Base Case — EEV , RP , WS (Million Dollars)
Participants EEV RP WS EV PI V SS
C1 1,192.1 1,191.8 1,190.8 -1.0 -0.3
C2 1,180.5 1,185.3 1,184.8 -0.5 4.8
R1 8.0 8.0 8.4 0.4 0.0
R2 9.0 8.6 9.0 0.4 -0.4
P1 7.0 6.9 6.9 0.0 -0.056
P2 6.8 6.9 6.9 0.0 0.1
M1 395.0 399.4 399.5 0.1 4.4
M2 395.0 399.4 399.5 0.1 4.4
M3 454.5 458.1 458.2 0.1 3.6
M4 454.5 458.1 458.2 0.1 3.6
Producer Surplus 4,102.4 4,122.5 4,122.2 -0.3 20.10
RD1 520.2 525.9 526.1 0.2 5.7
RD2 598.2 602.5 602.6 0.1 4.3
CD1 269.9 272.8 273.0 0.2 2.9
CD2 310.9 313.7 313.8 0.1 2.8
Consumer Surplus 1,699.2 1,714.9 1,715.5 0.6 15.7
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Table 5.25: Case 1 — EEV , RP , WS (Million Dollars)
Participants EEV RP WS EV PI V SS
C1 1,082.3 1,081.8 1,081.4 -0.4 -0.5
C2 1,074.1 1,077.3 1,076.8 -0.5 3.2
R1 4.3 4.6 4.7 0.1 0.3
R2 5.0 5.0 5.1 0.1 0.0
P1 6.1 6.0 6.0 0.0 -0.05
P2 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.0
M1 320.5 324.0 324.2 0.2 3.5
M2 320.5 324.0 324.2 0.2 3.5
M3 373.4 376.0 376.3 0.3 2.6
M4 373.4 376.0 376.3 0.3 2.6
Producer Surplus 3,565.6 3,580.7 3,581.0 0.3 15.5
RD1 418.6 423.1 423.4 0.3 4.5
RD2 493.3 496.6 497.0 0.4 3.3
CD1 222.4 224.9 225.1 0.2 2.5
CD2 253.4 255.4 255.7 0.3 2.0
Consumer Surplus 1,387.7 1,400.0 1,401.2 1.2 12.3
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Table 5.26: Case 2 — EEV , RP , WS (Million Dollars)
Participants EEV RP WS EV PI V SS
C1 1,428.8 1,456.4 1,454.4 -2.0 27.6
C2 1,414.2 1,459.9 1,455.6 -4.3 45.7
R1 11.6 17.5 21.6 4.1 5.9
R2 13.0 17.4 21.8 4.4 4.4
P1 8.4 10.1 10.6 0.5 1.7
P2 8.3 9.8 10.3 0.5 1.5
M1 467.0 469.7 469.4 -0.3 2.7
M2 467.0 469.7 469.4 -0.3 2.7
M3 533.0 536.3 535.6 -0.7 3.3
M4 533.0 536.3 535.6 -0.7 3.3
Producer Surplus 4,884.3 4,983.1 4,984.3 1.2 98.8
RD1 623.7 628.4 628.0 -0.4 4.7
RD2 701.9 706.6 705.8 -0.8 4.7
CD1 310.3 311.0 310.8 -0.2 0.7
CD2 364.1 365.9 365.4 -0.5 1.8
Consumer Surplus 2,000.0 2,011.9 2,010.0 -1.9 11.9
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Table 5.27: Case 3 — EEV , RP , WS (Million Dollars)
Participants EEV RP WS EV PI V SS
C1 1,625.0 1,619.3 1,620.2 0.9 -5.7
C2 1,600.9 1,617.9 1,617.5 -0.4 17.0
R1 35.8 38.0 39.2 1.2 2.2
R2 38.3 38.0 39.4 1.4 -0.3
P1 14.0 14.8 15.1 0.3 0.8
P2 13.7 14.3 14.6 0.3 0.6
M1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Producer Surplus 3,327.7 3,342.4 3,346.0 3.7 14.6
RD1 1,028.8 1,031.7 1,031.1 -0.6 2.9
RD2 1,198.7 1,204.3 1,203.4 -0.9 5.6
CD1 504.6 504.5 504.2 -0.3 -0.05
CD2 593.2 596.4 595.9 -0.5 3.2
Consumer Surplus 3,325.3 3,336.9 3,334.6 -2.3 11.6
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5.4 Conclusions
A sample complementarity problem of 6,186 variables as well as three variations was
used to validate the model S-NGEM and related theorems established in Chapter 4.
From the base case, case 1 and case 2, we learned that the greater the consump-
tion is, the greater the expected profits for suppliers and the higher the expected
end-user prices for four demand sectors. Also, case 3 showed the influence of market
power of imperfect competing marketers on the market. We also observed some
results concerning the properties of the V SS and EV PI established for “regular”
stochastic programming with one optimization problem.
Among market players, storage operators’ profits changed most dramatically.
The levels of storage gas varied greatly with these cases so as to lighten the con-
gestion in pipelines in wintertime and buffer the impact of demand changes on the
market. In addition, recalling that in Section 4.3.3 for storage operators in model
S-NGEM, the mass balance constraints (4.3.53) and (4.3.54) are relaxed as inequal-
ities for modeling purposes, we note that the two constraints held as equalities for
the four cases presented.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Future Work
One of the main thrusts of this dissertation is an endeavor in the field of energy
modeling for the North American natural gas market using an NCP/VI formula-
tion combined with the stochastic programming. To our knowledge, a model with
as much detail as the model S-NGEM using the NCP/VI format and stochastic
programming for modeling equilibrium activities has not appeared before. We an-
ticipate that such a model will be of use to both public and private sector concerns.
As part of the process of building a stochastic model, we first described a deter-
ministic model D-NGEM, which is an enhancement of the equilibrium model initially
developed in [35] in that free market prices (i.e., pinsy, γnsy and βny) are equivalently
replaced by nonnegative prices under minor assumptions. The improvement on the
existence and uniqueness results was also presented. However, since it does not
take into account the uncertain aspects inherent in the industry, model D-NGEM
would not provide a satisfactory solution to an uncertainty environment. To this
end, a new model S-NGEM emphasizing the decision making under uncertainty is
developed using stochastic programming techniques. In general, model S-NGEM is
a stochastic extension of model D-NGEM and model D-NGEM can be considered
as a special case of model S-NGEM.
Model S-NGEM is composed of separate optimization problems that maxi-
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mize the expected profits for pipeline operators, producers, storage operators, peak
gas operators and Nash-Cournot marketers as well as market-clearing conditions.
Besides the long-term decisions incorporated by model D-NGEM, model S-NGEM
also considers decisions regarding how to react to the uncertainty. In particular,
after they have observed the realizations of the randomness, players make recourse
decisions in the spot market to compensate for any adverse effects that might have
been experienced as a result of the long-term decisions. This model generates a set
of strategies or policies in response to difference scenarios resulting from the uncer-
tainty. The model was shown to be a instance of an MiCP under minor assumptions.
These assumptions require that the cost functions are convex and continuously dif-
ferentiable and that the marginal cost functions are positive in the positive orthant.
We illustrate the model S-NGEM on a sample network of two production
and consumption nodes, respectively and four connecting pipeline arcs. The end-
user demand for the four demand sectors is taken as random subject to a discrete
probability distribution. A base case was calibrated using the right magnitude for
this small network based on the data on consumption, wellhead prices and end-
user prices publicized on the EIA website. Varying the distribution of the end-user
demand resulted in two comparison cases, one representing a relatively high demand
scenario, the other for a low demand scenario as opposed to the base case. A third
case of perfectly competing marketers was also presented to show the influence of
market power in the equilibrium prices and quantities. We compared the changes in
the network activities, the expected profits for all agents, the prices and consumption
for the four demand sectors, and the overall producer and consumer surplus. EVPI
and VSS were also presented.
Recall that in Chapter 5, model S-NGEM resulted in over 6,000 variables with
only a four-node sample network, a simple two-realization seasonal demand and a
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time horizon of three seasons. This is far too simple to be a real application. The
increase in the time horizon or the number of scenarios associated with uncertain
seasonal demand will certainly cause great computational difficulties given the larger
number of variables if treated as is. Therefore, an important future direction of the
current work is to develop efficient algorithms for this stochastic equilibrium model
formulated as an MiCP. Algorithms for a stochastic NCP/VI are still in infant stage.
The existing studies include [40] that used a sample-path method, a simulation-
based scheme to solve stochastic variational inequalities and [3] that analyzed the
stochastic NCP/VI using a quasi-Monte-Carlo simulation technique and relied on
the gradient information at sample solution points.
In the numerical results, the concept of the VSS is presented, showing that a
stochastic solution (RP) was better than a solution obtained using the expectation of
the uncertainty (EEV) in terms of the total producer surplus and consumer surplus.
However, this quantity failed to measure the advantage of a stochastic solution in
terms of the individual players. Theoretically, we need to establish a mechanism
similar to what has been done for stochastic programming showing the value of the
stochastic solution in a market equilibrium model.
As opposed to the recourse method, another method in stochastic program-
ming is the chance-constraint method, which, however, was not adopted in this
dissertation. Some results using the chance-constraint method based on the model
D-NGEM have been obtained and presented at the INFORMS annual meeting in
Denver in 2004. Due to time limitations, this part of work was not included here.
Further exploration of the corresponding application of this method for the equilib-
rium model in the future is desired. Last but not least, establishing the existence
and uniqueness results for the model S-NGEM is another future research item.
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Appendix A
Notation
Acronyms
D-NGEM Deterministic natural gas equilibrium model presented in Chapter
3
D-NGEM-MiCP MiCP formulation for model D-NGEM
D-NGEM-VI VI formulation for model D-NGEM
LCP Linear complementarity problems
LNG Liquified natural gas
MiCP Mixed complementarity problems
MCC Market clearing conditions
MK Marketer(s)
NCP Nonlinear complementarity problems
PG Peak gas operator(s)
PL Pipeline operator(s)
PR Producer(s)
S-NGEM Stochastic natural gas equilibrium model presented in Chapter 4
S-NGEM-MiCP MiCP formulation for model S-NGEM
ST Storage operator(s)
VI Variational inequalities problems
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Problem Classes
D-NGEM The deterministic natural gas equilibrium model presented in
Chapter 3
D-NGEM-MiCP The MiCP formulation for model D-NGEM
D-NGEM-VI The VI formulation for model D-NGEM
(MK) The collection of optimization problems (M˜K) for all m ∈ M in
model D-NGEM
(M˜K) Optimization problems of the individual marketers in model D-
NGEM
(MKS) The collection of optimization problems (M˜K
S
) for all m ∈M in
model S-NGEM
(M˜K
S
) Optimization problems of the individual marketers in model S-
NGEM
(PG) The optimization problem for all peak gas operators in model D-
NGEM
(P˜G) Optimization problems for the individual peak gas operators in
model D-NGEM
(PGS) The optimization problem for all peak gas operators in model S-
NGEM
(P˜G
S
) Optimization problems for the individual peak gas operators in
model S-NGEM
PG-MCC The system of the problem (PG), market-clearing conditions for
peak gas market and the corresponding nonnegative prices βny in
model D-NGEM
PG-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for system PG-MCC in model D-NGEM
(PL) The optimization problem for all pipeline operators in model D-
NGEM
(P˜L) Optimization problems for the individual pipeline operators in
model D-NGEM
(PLS) The optimization problem for all pipeline operators in model S-
NGEM
(P˜L
S
) Optimization problems for the individual pipeline operators in
model S-NGEM
(PR) The optimization problem for all producers in model D-NGEM
(To be continued)
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Problem Classes (Cont’d)
(P˜R) Optimization problems for the individual producers in model D-
NGEM
(PRS) The optimization problem for all producers in model S-NGEM
(P˜R
S
) Optimization problems for the individual producers in model S-
NGEM
PR-MCC The system of the problem (PR), market-clearing conditions for
the production market and the corresponding nonnegative prices
pinsy in model D-NGEM
PR-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for system PR-MCC in model D-NGEM
S-CM-MCC The system of the the problem (M˜K
S
) for all m ∈ M , market-
clearing conditions for the industrial and electric power sectors
and the corresponding nonnegative prices Θ0knsy and Θ
1
knsy,is,y in
model S-NGEM
S-CM-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for system S-CM-MCC in model S-NGEM
S-NGEM The stochastic natural gas equilibrium model presented in Chapter
4
S-NGEM-MiCP The MiCP formulation for model S-NGEM
S-PG-MCC The system of the problem (PGS) , market-clearing conditions
for peak gas market and the corresponding nonnegative prices β0ny
and β1ny,i3,y in model S-NGEM
S-PG-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for S-PG-MCC in model S-NGEM
S-PR-MCC The system of the problem (PRS), market-clearing conditions for
the production market and the corresponding nonnegative prices
pi0nsy and pi
1
nsy,is,y in model S-NGEM
S-PR-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for S-PR-MCC in model S-NGEM
S-ST-MCC The system of the problem (STS), market-clearing conditions for
the storage gas market and the corresponding nonnegative prices
γ0nsy and γ
1
nsy,is,y in model S-NGEM
S-ST-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for system S-ST-MCC in model S-NGEM
(ST ) The optimization problem for all storage operators in model D-
NGEM
(S˜T ) Optimization problems for the individual storage operators in
model D-NGEM
(STS) The optimization problem for all storage operators in model S-
NGEM
(To be continued)
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Problem Classes (Cont’d)
(S˜T
S
) Optimization problems for the individual storage operators in
model S-NGEM
ST-MCC The system of the problem ST-NCP, market-clearing conditions
for the storage gas market and the corresponding nonnegative
prices γnsy in model D-NGEM
ST-MCC-NCP The NCP formulation for system ST-MCC in model D-NGEM
ST-NCP The NCP formulation for problem (ST ) in model D-NGEM
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Data in Models D-NGEM and S-NGEM
dayss The number of days in season s
D0knsy The long-term consumption rates of industrial and electric power sectors
located at node n in season s of year y, (MMcf/day)
D1knsy,is,y The spot market consumption rates of industrial and electric power sec-
tors located at node n in season s of year y under random event is,y,
(MMcf/day)
fa Positive pipeline capacity value of arc a ∈ A, (MMcf/day)
gr Positive upper bound on injection rate for storage operator r,
(MMcf/day)
kr Positive upper bound on capacity of working gas storage volume for
storage operator r, (MMcf)
lossa Loss along arc a ∈ A, lossa ∈ [0, 1)
lossr Storage operator r loss factor, lossr ∈ [0, 1)
qc Positive upper bound on production rate for producer c, (MMcf/day)
prodc positive production forecast for producer c for the time horizon, (MMcf)
wp Positive upper bound on peak gas rate for peak gas operator p,
(MMcf/day)
xr Positive upper bound on extraction rate for storage operator r,
(MMcf/day)
RC0asy Reservation charge rates for the firm service with pipeline company,
($/Mcf)
η(is,y) The probability node is,y on the event tree
τ regasy Positive regulated transportation rate (e.g., FERC rate) for season s and
year y, ($/Mcf)
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Functions and Operations in Models D-NGEM
and S-NGEM
cPL(·) The nonnegative, continuously differentiable, pipeline operations cost
function
cPRc (·) The nonnegative, continuously differentiable cost function for producer
c
cPGp (·) The nonnegative, continuously differentiable cost function for peak gas
operator p
cSTr (·) The nonnegative, continuously differentiable cost function for storage
operator r
n1(a) Consumption node at the end of arc a
n2(a) Production node at the end of arc a
nc(c) The node where producer c is located
nm(m) The node where marketer m is located
nr(r) The node where storage operator r is located
np(p) The node where peak gas operator p is located
s(i) The season associated with random event i
y(i) The year associated with random event i
θknsy(·) The nonnegative, nonincreasing, continuously differentiable, inverse end-
use demand function for consumption node n for season s and year y in
model D-NGEM
θ1knsy,is,y(·) the nonnegative, nonincreasing, continuously differentiable, inverse end-
use demand function for residential and commercial sectors for consump-
tion node n for season s and year y under random event is,y in model
S-NGEM
ψ(i) The immediate predecessor set of random event i on the scenario tree
Ψ(i) The immediate predecessor set the immediate predecessors of random
event i on the scenario tree
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Variables in Model D-NGEM
fasy Flow along arc a ∈ A for season s and year y, (MMcf/day)
gary Flow rate of gas for storage operators r from producer in season 1 along
arc a ∈ A(nr(r)), (MMcf/day)
hamsy Flow rate of gas shipped to marketer m from producers along arc a ∈
Am(m) in season s and year y, (MMcf/day)
lkmsy Rate of gas to demand sector k from marketer m in season s and year
y, (MMcf/day)
qcsy Production rate for producer c for season s and year y, (MMcf/day)
umsy Rate of storage gas shipped to marketer m for s = 2, 3 and year y,
(MMcf/day)
vmy Rate of peak gas shipped to marketer m for s = 3 and year y,
(MMcf/day)
wpy Rate of peak gas produced by peak gas operator p in year y, (MMcf/day)
xrsy Extraction rate by storage operator r for seasons s = 2, 3, and year y,
(MMcf/day)
βpy Peak gas price for node n ∈ CN , in year y, ($/Mcf)
γnsy Storage market gas price for n ∈ CN , seasons s = 2, 3 and year y,
($/Mcf)
δry Multiplier for material balance constraint for storage operator r in year
y, ($/Mcf)
ζry Multiplier for storage volume capacity constraint for storage operator r
and year y, ($/Mcf)
λcsy Multiplier for production capacity constraint of producer c for season s
and year y, ($/Mcf)
µc Multiplier for production forecast constraint, ($/Mcf)
ξrsy Multiplier for injection capacity constraint for storage operator r for
s = 2, 3, and year y, ($1000/MMcf/day)
ωry Multiplier for extraction capacity constraint for storage operator r for
s = 2, 3, and year y, ($1000/MMcf/day)
pinsy Production price for node n ∈ PN in season s and year y, ($/Mcf)
ρasy Multiplier for pipeline capacity constraint for season s and year y,
($1000/MMcf/day)
(To be continued)
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Variables in Model D-NGEM (Cont’d)
σpy Multiplier for capacity constraint for peak gas operator p in year y
($1000/MMcf/day)
τasy Transportation rates for arc a season s and year y, exogenous for
pipeline, marketers and storage operators, but a variable in the over-
all equilibrium problem, ($/Mcf)
φmsy Multiplier for gas balance constraint between four sectors for marketer
m in season s and year y, ($/Mcf)
Variables in Model S-NGEM
f0asy Flow along arc a ∈ A for season s and year y in the long-term market,
(MMcf/day)
f1asy,is,y Flow along arc a ∈ A for season s and year y in the spot market under
random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
g0ary Flow rate of gas to storage operators r from producer in season 1 along
arc a ∈ A(nr(r)), (MMcf/day)
g1ary,i1,y Flow rate of gas to storage operators r from producer in season 1
along arc a ∈ A(nr(r)) in the spot market under random event is,y,
(MMcf/day)
h0amsy Flow rate of gas shipped to marketer m from producers along arc a ∈
Am(m) in season s and year y in the long-term market, (MMcf/day)
h1amsy,is,y Flow rate of gas shipped to marketer m from producers along arc a ∈
Am(m) in season s and year y in the spot market under random event
is,y, (MMcf/day)
l0kmsy Rate of gas to demand sector k from marketer m in season s and year y
in the long-term market, (MMcf/day)
l1kmsy,is,y Rate of gas to demand sector k from marketer m in season s and year y
in the spot market under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
q0csy Production rate for producer c for season s and year y in the long-term
market, (MMcf/day)
q1csy,is,y Production rate for producer c for season s and year y in the spot market
under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
(To be continued)
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Variables in Model S-NGEM (Cont’d)
u0msy Rate of storage gas shipped to marketer m for s = 2, 3 and year y in the
long-term market, (MMcf/day)
u1msy,is,y Rate of storage gas shipped to marketer m for s = 2, 3 and year y in the
spot market under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
v0my Rate of peak gas shipped to marketer m for s = 3 and year y in the
long-term market, (MMcf/day)
v1my,is,y Rate of peak gas shipped to marketer m for s = 3 and year y in the spot
market under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
w0py Rate of peak gas produced by peak gas operator p in year y in the
long-term market, (MMcf/day)
w1py,i3,y Rate of peak gas produced by peak gas operator p in year y in the spot
market under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
x0rsy Extraction rate by storage operator r for seasons s = 2, 3, and year y in
the long-term market, (MMcf/day)
x1rsy,is,y Extraction rate by storage operator r for seasons s = 2, 3, and year y in
the spot market under random event is,y, (MMcf/day)
β0py Peak gas price for node n ∈ CN , in year y in the long-term market,
($/Mcf)
β1py,i3,y Peak gas price for node n ∈ CN , in year y in the spot market under
random event is,y, ($/Mcf)
γ0nsy Storage market gas price for n ∈ CN , seasons s = 2, 3 and year y in the
long-term market, ($/Mcf)
γ1nsy,is,y Storage market gas price for n ∈ CN , seasons s = 2, 3 and year y in the
spot market under random event is,y, ($/Mcf)
δ0ry Multiplier for material balance constraint for storage operator r in year
y in the long-term market, ($/Mcf)
δ1ry,i3,y Multiplier for material balance constraint for storage operator r in year
y in the spot market under random event i3,y, ($/Mcf)
Θ0knsy End-use prices for industrial and electric power sectors for node n ∈ CN ,
season s year y in the long-term market, ($/Mcf)
Θ1knsy,is,y End-use prices for industrial and electric power sectors for node n ∈ CN ,
season s year y in the spot market under random event is,y, ($/Mcf)
ζ1ry,i3,y Multiplier for storage volume capacity constraint for storage operator r
and year y in the spot market under random event i3,y, ($/Mcf)
(To be continued)
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Variables in Model S-NGEM (Cont’d)
λ1csy,is,y Multiplier for production capacity constraint of producer c for season s
and year y in the spot market under random event is,y, ($/Mcf)
µ1
c,i3,|Y | Multiplier for production forecast constraint in the spot market under
random event i3,|Y |, ($/Mcf)
ξ1rsy,i1,y Multiplier for injection capacity constraint for storage operator r for
s = 2, 3, and year y in the spot market under random event i1,y,
($1000/MMcf/day)
ω1ry,is,y Multiplier for extraction capacity constraint for storage operator r for
s = 2, 3, and year y in the spot market under random event is,y,
($1000/MMcf/day)
pi0nsy Production price for node n ∈ PN in season s and year y in the long-
term market, ($/Mcf)
pi1nsy,is,y Production price for node n ∈ PN in season s and year y in the spot
market under random event is,y, ($/Mcf)
ρ1asy,is,y Multiplier for pipeline capacity constraint for season s and year y in the
spot market under random event is,y, ($1000/MMcf/day)
σ1py,i3,y Multiplier for capacity constraint for peak gas operator p in year y in
the spot market under random event is,y, ($1000/MMcf/day)
τ0asy Transportation rates for arc a season s and year y in the long-term
market, exogenous for pipeline, marketers and storage operators, but a
variable in the overall model S-NGEM
τ1asy,is,y Transportation rates for arc a season s and year y in the spot market
under random event is,y, exogenous for pipeline, marketers and storage
operators, but a variable in the overall equilibrium problem, ($/Mcf)
φ0msy Multiplier for gas balance constraint between four sectors for marketer
m in season s and year y in the long-term market, ($/Mcf)
φ1msy,is,y Multiplier for gas balance constraint between four sectors for marketer
m in season s and year y in the spot market under random event is,y,
($/Mcf)
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Sets
A The set of pipeline arcs, a ∈ A
A(n) The set of arcs connected to node n ∈ N
C The set of producers, c ∈ C
Cn The set of producers located at node n ∈ PN
CN The set of consumption nodes, CN ⊂ N
I The set of realizations of random perturbation
Is,y The set of realizations of random perturbation in season s of year y
ISC(i) The set of immediate successors of random outcome i in the scenario
tree
IISC(i) The set of immediate successors of immediate successors of random out-
come i in the scenario tree
M The set of marketers, m ∈M
Mn The set of marketers located at node n ∈ CN
N The set of nodes in the network, n ∈ N
P The set of peak gas operators, p ∈ P
Pn The set of peak gas operators located at node n ∈ CN
PD(i) The set consisting of all the predecessors of random outcome i in the
scenario tree, inclusive of i
PN The set of production nodes, PN ⊂ N
R The set of storage operators
Rn The set of storage operators located at node n ∈ CN
S The set of seasons under consideration, S = {1, 2, 3}, s ∈ S
SC(i) The set consisting of all the successors of random outcome i in the
scenario tree, inclusive of i
Y The set of years under consideration, y ∈ Y
ψ(i) The immediate predecessor (set) of random event i in the scenario tree
Ψ(i) The immediate predecessor (set) the immediate predecessors of random
event i in the scenario tree
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Appendix B
Numerical Results for Base Case
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Table B.1: Pipeline Flow Rates, f0asy, f
1
asy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.2: Pipeline Congestion Fees, τ0asy, τ
1
asy,is,y ($/Mcf)
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Table B.3: Production Rates, q0csy, q
1
csy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.4: Production Prices, pi0nsy, pi
1
nsy,is,y ($/Mcf)
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Table B.5: Storage Injection/Extraction Rates, g0ary, g
1
ary,i1,y , x
0
rsy, x
1
rsy,is,y(MMcf/d)
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Table B.6: Storage Gas Prices, γ0nsy, γ
1
nsy,is,y ($/Mcf)
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Table B.7: Peak Gas Production Rates, w0py, w
1
py,i3,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.8: Peak Gas Prices, β0ny, β
1
ny,i3,y ($/Mcf)
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Table B.9: Consumption Rates for Residential Sector (MMcf/d)
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Table B.10: End-User Prices for Residential Sector ($/Mcf)
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Table B.11: Consumption Rates for Commercial Sector (MMcf/d)
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Table B.12: End-User Prices for Commercial Sector ($/Mcf)
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Table B.13: Consumption Rates for Industrial Sector (MMcf/d)
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Table B.14: End-Use Prices for Industrial Sector ($/Mcf)
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Table B.15: Consumption Rates for Electric Power Sector (MMcf/d)
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Table B.16: End-User Prices for Electric Power Sector ($/Mcf)
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Table B.17: Supply by Marketer M1, l0kmsy, l
1
kmsy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.18: Supply by Marketer M2, l0kmsy, l
1
kmsy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.19: Supply by Marketer M3, l0kmsy, l
1
kmsy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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Table B.20: Supply by Marketer M4, l0kmsy, l
1
kmsy,is,y (MMcf/d)
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